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Abstract
In our highly computerized and networked society, privacy of individuals is precious
and becomes increasingly important. Problems particularly arise in the context of
authentication protocols where, as a general rule, entities actively reveal their re-
spective identities to each other. To encounter this issue, different privacy-preserving
authentication methods have been developed in the last decades. The list of these
techniques comprises, apart from identity escrow, ring authentication, hidden and
anonymous credentials, and several others, the concept of affiliation-hiding authen-
tication (AHA). Such protocols offer the appealing and seemingly contradictory
service to enable users to authenticate each other as members of a certain group
without revealing their affiliation to group outsiders.
In AHA protocols (also known as Secret Handshakes), users become group mem-
bers by registering with group authorities (GAs) and obtaining individual member-
ship credentials. Group members then use their credentials to privately authenticate
each other, optionally also establishing a secure session key. The pivotal privacy
property that contrasts AHA with classical authentication or authenticated key es-
tablishment is that parties learn each other’s affiliations to groups and compute
common session keys if and only if their groups match.
Prior work has succeeded in constructing AHA protocols that offer different degrees
of security, privacy, and efficiency. However, a set of essential problems have been
left open. These include a close study of the level of trust that intrinsically has to
be placed into participants of such systems (including into GAs), the extension of
the single-group setting with only one GA to a setting where users are affiliated to
multiple groups and, through AHA, want to discover matching ones, and certainly
the question of efficient implementability. We argue that all these topics are highly
relevant for practical deployment of privacy-preserving authentication in general,
and AHA in particular. In this thesis, the author concretizes and cryptographically
models these challenges, and offers provably secure solutions.
Furthermore, this thesis treats privacy-related challenges that are posed in the
context of network-based social interactions. Without doubt, online social networks,
that help participants to build and reflect their social relations to other participants,
have taken an essential role in people’s daily life. A key step in the constitution of
new links between participants consists of the reconciliation of shared contacts or
friends. The author develops techniques to discover common contacts in social net-
works in a privacy-aware manner, i.e., without disclosing non-matching contacts.
Besides formalizing this task and offering appropriate solutions, the thesis analyzes
an interesting connection between AHA protocols and the challenge of private dis-
covery of common contacts.
By identifying and solving a variety of relevant open problems in the context
of privacy-aware authentication, this thesis contributes to wide-scale deployment
of methods that respect and regain user privacy in p2p systems, mobile ad hoc
networks, and social networking applications.
Zusammenfassung
In unserer zunehmend computerisierten und vernetzten Gesellschaft gewinnt der
Schutz der Privatspha¨re der Menschen zunehmend an Bedeutung. In dieser Hin-
sicht ko¨nnen insbesondere Authentikationsprotokolle problematisch sein, da es ihre
Aufgabe ist, Nutzer und ihre jeweiligen Identita¨ten eindeutig zu bestimmen. Um
dieser Problematik zu begegnen, sind in den vergangenen Jahren verschiedene pri-
vatspha¨ren-schu¨tzende Authentikationsmethoden entwickelt worden, etwa identity
escrow, ring authentication, hidden und anonymous credentials. Ein weiteres in-
teressantes Konzept ist die zugeho¨rigkeit-versteckende Authentikation (affiliation-
hiding authentication, AHA). Solche Protokolle bieten Nutzern die scheinbar wi-
derspru¨chliche Mo¨glichkeit, sich gegenseitig als Mitglieder bestimmter Gruppen zu
authentisieren, ohne jedoch zugleich Außenseitern diese Zugeho¨rigkeit preiszugeben.
In AHA-Protokollen (auch bekannt als Secret Handshakes) werden Nutzer zu Mit-
gliedern von Gruppen durch Registrierung bei sog. Gruppenautorita¨ten (group aut-
horities, GAs) und erhalten dabei entsprechende Zugeho¨rigkeitsnachweise. Gruppen-
mitglieder verwenden diese Nachweise, um sich gegenseitig zu authentisieren, und
um evtl. sichere Sitzungsschlu¨ssel auszutauschen. Die entscheidende Eigenschaft, die
AHA bzgl. Privatspha¨renschutz von klassischer Authentikation unterscheidet, liegt
jedoch in der Tatsache, dass Teilnehmer nur bei U¨bereinstimmung ihrer Gruppen
die jeweiligen Gruppenzugeho¨rigkeiten erfahren (bzw. gleiche Sitzungsschlu¨ssel be-
rechnen).
Die bisherige Forschung in diesem Bereich hat verschiedene AHA-Protokolle her-
vorgebracht. Diese genu¨gen unterschiedlichen Sicherheits- und Effizienzanforderun-
gen. Einige wichtige Probleme sind jedoch weiterhin ungelo¨st. Dazu geho¨rt u.a. eine
genaue Vermessung des Vertrauens, das immanent den Mitgliedern von Gruppen und
ihren GAs entgegengebracht werden muss, sowie die Erweiterung des Ein-Gruppen-
Settings mit nur einer GA zu einem Setting, in dem es Nutzern mo¨glich ist, mehreren
Gruppen zugeho¨rig zu sein und vermo¨ge AHA u¨bereinstimmende Gruppen zu erken-
nen. Zudem stellt sich natu¨rlich die Frage nach effizienter Implementierbarkeit von
AHA-Verfahren. Die Bearbeitung dieser Themen ist Voraussetzung fu¨r den prakti-
schen Einsatz von privatspha¨ren-schu¨tzender Authentikation im Allgemeinen, und
von AHA insbesondere. In der vorliegenden Dissertation werden die genannten Fra-
gestellungen diskutiert und kryptographisch bearbeitet. In diesem Rahmen werden
zudem entsprechende AHA-Protokolle entworfen und als sicher bewiesen.
Diese Dissertation befasst sich des weiteren mit Problemen des Schutzes der
Privatspha¨re, die im Bereich Netzwerk-gestu¨tzter sozialer Interaktion entstehen.
Online-gefu¨hrte soziale Netzwerke unterstu¨tzen ihre Nutzer beim Aufbau und Ver-
walten sozialer Verbindungen und haben sicherlich eine wesentliche Rolle im ta¨glichen
Leben der Menschen eingenommen. Eine Schlu¨sselfunktion kommt beim Aufbau
neuer Verbindungen zwischen Teilnehmern dem Abgleich gemeinsamer Kontakte
oder Freundschaften mit anderen Teilnehmern zu. Die in dieser Arbeit entwickel-
ten Methoden erlauben es, in sozialen Netzwerken solche gemeinsamen Kontakte
unter Einhaltung der Privatspha¨re der Teilnehmer zu identifizieren, d.h., ohne dass
nicht-gemeinsame Kontakte preisgegeben werden. Neben der Formalisierung dieser
Aufgabe und dem Entwickeln geeigneter Lo¨sungen, analysiert die vorliegende Arbeit
einen interessanten Zusammenhang zwischen AHA-Protokollen und Protokollen zur
Entdeckung gemeinsamer Kontakte.
Durch das Identifizieren und Lo¨sen einer Reihe von relevanten offenen Problemen
im Bereich der kryptographischen Authentikation tra¨gt diese Arbeit zum breiten
praktischen Einsatz von Methoden bei, die die Privatspha¨re von Nutzern schu¨tzen
bzw. bei ihrer Wiedererlangung helfen.
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1
Introduction
Traditional protocols for authentication [73,85,143] and authenticated key exchange
(AKE) [28,70,111,112,114] reveal to observers the identities and certificates of users.
In particular, in the PKI setting, the main goal is the establishment of unforgeable
and publicly verifiable links between users’ public keys and identities. Although this
paradigm has proved to work reliably from a security point of view, it certainly raises
questions about privacy of participants; for instance, if users want to communicate
securely without leaving evidence that a conversation has ever taken place.
To cope with this issue, specialized privacy-aware authentication methods have
been developed. What at first seems counter-intuitive (since authentication tradi-
tionally goes hand-in-hand with identification) turns out to be a very reasonable
concept: Instead of authenticating users by identities, they are authenticated by
properties or attributes. For example, in order to access a company’s parking lot,
it would be sufficient to authenticate as an (anonymous) employee of the company,
instead of providing full name or worker’s id. The variety of such property-based
authentication methods that appeared in the literature is extensive (see Section 1.4
for a list). One interesting technique, affiliation-hiding authentication (AHA), where
users authenticate as members of groups, emerged in 2003 (Balfanz et al. [9]) and
received much attention [6, 47,47,95–97,99,150,155,161].
The idea behind AHA is simple: Prior to participation in the actual authentication
session users become members of groups. These are administrated by specific group
authorities (GAs) who issue individual membership credentials to registering users,
but can also revoke users. The goal of AHA is to let participants mutually authenti-
cate each other by privately comparing their respective affiliations. Authentication
is deemed successful if the affiliations of participants are equal. Moreover, one of
the posed privacy requirements is that affiliations of participants remain hidden to
group outsiders, i.e., to members of non-matching groups, independently of whether
authentication succeeds or not. Observe that this setting considerably deviates from
classical authentication where roles are clearly separated in prover and verifier: in
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AHA, equally equipped participants mutually authenticate each other.
Since the introduction of this concept by Balfanz et al., several AHA constructions
have been proposed, many of them bringing their individual tailor-made security
models with them (compare, for instance, the four models from [6,9,95,104]). How-
ever, in all cases, the essential security notions of AHA (that optionally comprises
secure key establishment) are captured by the following intuitive description:
Affiliation-hiding security
It should be infeasible for an active adversary to learn the affiliation, i.e.,
the group membership, of any user from his authentication sessions or from
knowledge of keys computed in these sessions.
Available publications model this requirement in various ways: For instance,
while in [9] the (game-based) goals of impersonator and detector resistance
have to be simultaneously fulfilled, Jarecki et al. [95] propose the more sophis-
ticated notion of affiliation-hiding that encompasses both named sub-goals
and additionally allows the adversary to schedule an unbounded number of
concurrent AHA sessions (in contrast to [9]).
Authenticated key exchange security
It should be infeasible for an active adversary to distinguish the session key
computed in a test session from a random value in the same range, with a
probability non-negligibly exceeding 1/2.
Key security in AHA is generally modeled following the general approach for
key exchange protocols (e.g., [14, 46]), including the (sub)requirement of for-
ward secrecy. The first AHA construction that formally considers key security
is [95].
We anticipate that, in Chapter 3, we will introduce a third requirement: the un-
traceability of users. However, this goal plays a role only in the special context of
untrusted group authorities.
1.1. Summary of results
The contributions of this thesis (apart from the introduction to existing concepts
and constructions of AHA in Chapter 2) can be summarized as follows:
AHA with untrusted group authorities (Chapter 3)
After observing that, in current security models for AHA, group authorities
are considered fully trustworthy, we investigate the effects that malicious/cor-
rupt GAs can have on security of protocols. Our investigations reveal that, in
most cases both, privacy of affiliations and security of established session keys,
1.1. Summary of results 3
are immediately lost after GA corruptions. To counter this problem, we pro-
pose an extended security model that factors in untrusted GAs, i.e., considers
GAs as active adversaries. Amongst others, we introduce the new security
notion of untraceability that, roughly speaking, requires that group members
are not identifiable even by their own GA. We present an RSA-based AHA
construction that is secure in this stronger model. Dealing with corrupt GAs
is especially challenging in the RSA setting, as our model principally allows
GAs to propagate malformed RSA parameters to group members. After giving
a treatment on how well-formedness of such parameters can be enforced, the
chapter concludes with a comparison of security and efficiency of our solution
and other protocols.
This chapter bases on joint research with Mark Manulis and Gene Tsudik.
Corresponding results were published in the proceedings of ACNS 2010 [124]
and PETS 2010 [125].
Strategies towards multigroup AHA (Chapter 4)
This chapter focuses on AHA in a setting with multiple GAs who manage
their groups independently of each other. In particular, users are allowed to
be member of several groups, and corresponding authentication protocols pri-
vately discover the set of all common groups. Note that this setting is a very
attractive and natural one; nevertheless, existing AHA constructions do not
consider this problem and, as we discuss, (acceptably efficient) adaptions to
this setting are not obvious. We conceptually separate the underlying problem
of group discovery from more established cryptographic tools, like private set
intersection (PSI, APSI). We describe several attempts to achieve construc-
tions of multi-affiliation AHA protocols (mAHA), and propose a new crypto-
graphic primitive — IHME — that proves itself path-breaking in the design
of a first mAHA protocol. Concerning IHME, we specify corresponding secu-
rity properties and give an information-theoretically secure construction. We
highlight that this primitive may also be of independent interest and may find
applications that are not necessarily related to preservation of users’ privacy.
This chapter bases on a joint publication with Mark Manulis and Benny Pinkas
that appeared on ACNS 2010 [121].
Multigroup AHA (Chapter 5)
Here we formally adapt the general syntax and security models of AHA schemes
to the setting with multiple group authorities (mAHA). In addition, basing
on observations and design strategies discovered in Chapter 4, we present
two independent and efficient solutions to the mAHA challenge, generically
building on the new IHME primitive and on non-interactive key distribution
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(NIKDS), respectively. We highlight that the challenge of constructing such
protocols was posed as an open problem by Jarecki, Kim, and Tsudik on
CT-RSA 2008 [95, p. 356], and has not yet been solved in a satisfactory way.
Efficiency of our protocols is impressive: it can be estimated with O(n) public-
key operations (i.e., exponentiations and pairing evaluations), where n is the
number of affiliations per user. We provide detailed security reductions for our
schemes and conclude the chapter with a comparison of all known approaches
to mAHA in terms of security and efficiency.
Our mAHA constructions were also presented on ACNS 2010 [121] and WISTP
2011 [122], and result from joint work with Benny Pinkas (in the former case)
and Mark Manulis.
Multigroup AHA in practice (Chapter 6)
This chapter evaluates whether efficiency of the mAHA constructions from
Chapter 5 is in practice sufficient for deployment of affiliation-hiding authen-
tication. In order to obtain a meaningful analysis, instead of comparing na¨ıve
implementations of the protocols, we combine a large set of known and novel
techniques and tricks to further optimize the schemes and the underlying IHME
primitive in several aspects. This leads to remarkable performance gains (in
respect to runtime and bandwidth complexity, and key sizes). By present-
ing performance measurements obtained from concrete implementations of the
protocols on different computing environments, we make evident that mAHA
is ready for practical deployment, even on devices with constraint resources.
Our contributions on practical deployability of mAHA were also presented on
ASIACCS 2011 [123], and were jointly achieved with Mark Manulis.
Applications of AHA: private contact discovery (Chapter 7)
We consider the concept of private discovery of shared social contacts in which
two participants of an online social network interact and assess their social
proximity by learning the set of contacts (friends) they have in common, with-
out disclosing non-matching ones. We discuss the approaches to this challenge
so far proposed in the literature — coming to the conclusion that none of them
provides satisfying privacy guarantees. In particular, we formalize adequate
security properties for private contact discovery and note that none of the an-
alyzed schemes is secure in respect to this model. In contrast, we propose two
solutions and prove their security in our model. Although our constructions
share design ideas with our mAHA schemes from Chapter 5, we indicate why a
generic conversion of mAHA protocols to contact-discovering schemes (CDS) is
not feasible. We conclude the chapter evaluating and comparing the efficiency
of our constructions. Note that, with private contact discovery, we identified
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a further application of our IHME primitive from Chapter 4.
Our RSA-based construction for discovery of common contacts was published
at ACNS 2011 [62] as joint work with Emiliano de Cristofaro and Mark Man-
ulis. The NIKDS-based scheme was developed by the author especially for this
thesis.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis and, within others, enumerates some open prob-
lems and ideas for future research in the context of privacy-aware authentication.
1.2. Related work
We briefly describe the publications that appeared in the area of affiliation-hiding
authentication. A more compact overview is also provided in Table 1.1. We do not
consider schemes [156], [163], and [90], as they were broken (in [95], [103], and [152],
respectively).
Early (linkable) AHA schemes [9,47] provide group members with credentials com-
posed of a pseudonym and additional secrets. Although authentication is in the
main focus of these schemes (‘secret handshakes’), both of them offer session key
establishment as an additional service, but no formal security treatment of the lat-
ter is provided. All known linkable AHA schemes provide efficient revocation using
certificate/pseudonym revocation lists. An extension to AHA that comprises (for-
ward) secure session key establishment has been formally modeled and analyzed
in [95]. The schemes by Balfanz et al. [9], Castelluccia, Jarecki, and Tsudik [47],
and Jarecki, Kim, and Tsudik [95] are defined in the pairing-based, DLP, and RSA
setting, respectively.
In unlinkable schemes, participants reuse their credentials across different AHA
invocations, while the possibility of (adversarial) correlation of multiple sessions in-
volving the same participant is precluded. In this setting, the challenging part is
revocation of protocol participants, which is completely disregarded in the schemes
by Ateniese, Kirsch, Blanton [6], Hoepman [89], Nasserian and Tsudik [131], and
its refinement by Zhou, Susilo, and Mu in [168]. The unlinkable schemes [155] by
Tsudik and Xu and [96] by Jarecki and Liu (partially) handle revocation by de-
ployment of group key management (GKM) techniques based on Wallner’s logical
key hierarchy [158, 160]. More specifically, while [155] utilizes group signatures to
achieve traceability of users, [96] adapts GKM to the key-private [10] public-key
setting in which it is able to handle desynchronized revocation epochs. Jarecki and
Liu [99] also construct a scheme that supports more efficient revocation, based on
the verifier-local mechanism introduced in [26] (observe that each revocation check
requires two pairing evaluations per revoked user). In particular, by publishing a
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user-specific revocation token, GA turns unlinkable session transcripts into trace-
able ones, i.e., into transcripts that directly reveal the respective user. We remark
that [99] builds on a ‘conditional oblivious transfer’ primitive (originally introduced
in [66,67]), and that privacy of the scheme is not regarded in a model with concur-
rent sessions. The scheme proposed by Sorniotti and Molva in [150] adds revoca-
tion to the unlinkable AHA scheme [149] by the same authors. In particular, they
claim that the ‘RevocationMatching’ (sub-)protocol they construct adds revocation
to most linkable AHA schemes. As in [99], each revocation check takes two pairing
evaluations per revoked user, assuming hardness of a tailor-made pairing-based ‘SM’
assumption. [150] also discusses why dynamic accumulators [40] are not suited for
revocation in AHA schemes: the accumulator itself would reveal the affiliation of
corresponding user.
A weaker flavor of unlinkability, k-anonymity, is explored by Xu and Yung in [161].
Intuitively, in k-anonymous schemes, participants hide behind sets of k users chosen
ad-hoc, where k is an adjustable parameter, in contrast to classical unlinkability,
where users hide behind the whole population. [161] also proposes a motivation
for why k-anonymity might suffice to protect users’ privacy in practice: in modern
western jurisdiction, 2-anonymity would impose ‘reasonable doubt’ at court, i.e., 2-
anonymous AHA transcripts do not serve as evidence for committed online crimes1.
We point out that some technical problems might arise when deploying the protocol
from [161]: not only that [161] assumes that all users are aware of all available
groups, but in order to compute the ‘optimal’ value of k, the probability p that any
given user is corrupted during its interactions, has to be known. Another critique
on k-anonymity was raised by Jarecki and Liu [96], who notice that the affiliation of
participants belongs to the intersection of the k-element sets released at each protocol
invocation, such that sessions become linkable to users with high probability after a
small number of recorded sessions. The notion of k-anonymity was originally coined
in the context of database security [153].
The notions of dynamic and fuzzy matching were introduced to the AHA con-
text by Ateniese, Kirsch, and Blanton in [6]. In the dynamic matching scenario,
participants specify attributes that the protocol peer is expected to occupy (corre-
sponding certificates are issued by the GA). In fuzzy matching, authentication is
deemed successful if more than d of participants’ attributes match, where d is a
session-dependent threshold. However, the matching algorithm proposed in [6] de-
ploys standard techniques for private-set intersection [78,107], whose security is only
proven in the semi-honest adversary model2. As all participants possess the same
1We argue, however, that the primary aim of deployment of privacy-preserving authentication
should not lie in frustrating legal prosecution, but in hiding communication patters of partici-
pants in general.
2Explicitly, the authors “assume that it is in the best interest of the players to authenticate
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(possibly rerandomized) credential, [6] cannot offer revocation of users. Note that
Ateniese et al. claim that their schemes supports multiple groups per user. How-
ever, close inspection of the specification reveals that the corresponding GAs need to
share a single secret key, i.e., the different groups are not independent of each other.
The notion of dynamic matching is strengthened to dynamic controlled matching by
Sorniotti and Molva [149–151], where participants need specific certificates not only
for the attributes they have, but also for the attributes they expect the peer to have.
Some schemes [93, 94, 155, 162] extend AHA’s execution model from two-party to
multi-party authentication and key establishment. An approach by Jarecki, Kim,
and Tsudik [93] uses credentials similar to those in (DLP-based) [47]. The same
authors also lift the RSA-based scheme from [95] to the multi-party setting [94]. Both
approaches achieve session group key establishment according to accepted security
models [30] through a variant of the well-known Burmester-Desmedt technique [33].
Further on, Xu and Yung convert their k-anonymous AHA protocol from [161] to the
multi-party setting in [162]. The only known unlinkable multi-party AHA scheme
was given by Tsudik and Xu in [155], and is discussed above.
First results on privacy protection against misbehaving GAs are due to Kawai,
Yoneyama, and Ohta [104] and Sorniotti and Molva [151]. They deviate from the
traditional setting by splitting GA into a set of mutually distrusting authorities.
However, as we will study in detail in Chapter 3, the setting with a single authority
suffices to protect users’ privacy from corrupt GAs. Our line of work is hence more
consistent with earlier AHA-related results.
Exclusively the protocol by Jarecki and Liu [97] offers support for multiple creden-
tials per user, i.e., solves the problem of efficient group discovery. Yet, their scheme
has the questionable property that, during the registration process, users have to
surrender their secret keys to the GAs. We will identify concrete weaknesses of this
approach in Sections 5.1 and 7.2.
1.3. Classification of AHA
We complete the presentation of related work from Section 1.2 and Table 1.1 by
giving a classification of the notions of AHA that appeared in the literature so far.
Plain authentication vs. authenticated key agreement
While initially proposed AHA schemes [6, 9, 47, 155, 161] focused exclusively
on privacy-aware authentication of participants (and were hence termed se-
cret handshakes [9]), more recent constructions [94–97] also encompass secure
(and deviating from the prescribed behavior might prevent this), and the players follow the
set intersection protocol correctly”. This argumentation, however, precludes adversaries from
actively taking part in AHA sessions. This is certainly an unacceptable assumption in practice.
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Publication Conference Linkability1 Revocation2 AKE3 Setting4 Remark
Balfanz et al. [9] S&P 03 L 3 7 BM
Xu, Yung [161] CCS 04 k 3 7 generic
Castelluccia et al. [47] Asiacrypt 04 L 3 7 DL
Nasserian, Tsudik [131] FC 06 L 3 7 DL
Zhou et al. [168] ISPEC 06 L 3 7 DL
Tsudik, Xu [155] PET 06 U 3 7 generic multi-party AHA
Jarecki et al. [93] ACNS 06 L 3 7 DL multi-party AHA
Xu, Yung [162] FC 07 k 3 7 generic multi-party AHA
Hoepman [89] ESAS 07 U 7 7 DL
Ateniese et al. [6] NDSS 07 U 7 7 BM fuzzy matching, semi-honest
Jarecki, Liu [96] ACNS 07 U 3 3 generic delayed revocation5
Jarecki et al. [94] CT-RSA 07 L 3 3 RSA multi-party AHA
Jarecki et al. [95] CT-RSA 08 L 3 3 RSA
Jarecki, Liu [97] ICALP 08 L 3 3 DL multiple groups/credentials
Jarecki, Liu [99] CRYPTO 09 U 3 7 DL verifier-local revocation
Sorniotti, Molva [149] SEC 09 U 7 7 BM controlled matching
Sorniotti, Molva [150] ICISC 09 U 3 7 BM controlled matching
Kawai et al. [104] ISPEC 09 U 7 7 BM untrusted GAs
Sorniotti, Molva [151] ICICS 10 U 3 7 BM untr. GAs, cntr. matching
Section 3.2 ACNS 10 L 3 3 RSA single untrusted GA
Section 5.4 ACNS 10 L 3 3 RSA multiple groups/credentials
Section 5.5 WISTP 11 L 3 3 BM multiple groups/credentials
Section 6.3 ASIACCS 11 L 3 3 RSA multiple groups/credentials
1{L,U, k} = {linkable, unlinkable, k-anonymous}; 2support for revocation: all linkable schemes are marked as revo-
cable, although this property is not always explicitly considered in the corresponding publication; 3protocol offers
secure key establishment (with forward secrecy); 4{BM,RSA,DL} = {bilinear map, RSA, discrete logarithm} based
setting; 5scheme tolerates delayed update of revocation lists by the users
Table 1.1.: Comparison of published AHA schemes and those from Chapters 3–6
establishment of session keys [14,46]. As a design principle of such affiliation-
hiding key agreement [95] protocols, we note that affiliations are guaranteed to
remain hidden even if established session keys are leaked to adversaries.
Linkable vs. unlinkable schemes
In linkable AHA protocols [9,47,94,95,97], sessions of the same participant can
easily be linked together. Such protocols are useful if participants wish to be
recognized across different sessions, and usually employ re-usable pseudonyms
that members obtain during the registration process to the group. Hiding of
affiliations is considered valuable nonetheless, and remains an explicit security
goal of those protocols. Linkable schemes are typically deployed in settings
where users are identified by pseudonyms anyway (e.g., in instant messaging
or in online social networks).
In contrast, unlinkable AHA protocols [6, 96, 99, 150] prevent any correlation
among sessions of the same participant. This property is explicitly covered by
the corresponding security models. Unlinkable schemes are typically deployed
when linkability is considered a privacy threat (see discussions in the context
of identity escrow [106], electronic cash [52], and anonymous credentials [38]).
Clearly, the property of unlinkability contradicts revocation handling via re-
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vocation lists. This makes unlinkable schemes often more difficult to design
and implement, in comparison to linkable schemes.
An intermediate form of linkability is given by the notion of k-anonymity [161,
162], for an adjustable parameter k ∈ N. Intuitively, a scheme is k-anonymous
if an adversary can infer from a session transcript only that the monitored
protocol participant is one out of k certain users.
Linkable schemes can trivially be turned into unlinkable ones (as proposed
by [9,93]), by letting users obtain a set of different credentials upon registration
to the group, and letting them use each credential for exactly one session.
However, such one-time credentials seem to be unsuitable in practice, as honest
users’ credentials can easily be easily depleted by adversaries.
Two-party vs. multi-party authentication
The concept of protocols involving two users that mutually authenticate each
other finds a natural extension in the multi-party setting, i.e., in group secret
handshakes [93, 94, 155, 162]. Here, a set of multiple users engages in a joint
protocol session, and the authentication is deemed successful if all participants
provide valid credentials for the same group. While this goal is achieved in
the linkable setting [93,94] by combining 2-party AHA protocols with standard
multi-party key agreement techniques [33], the challenging task in the unlink-
able case is that participants have to ensure that all their peers are distinct.
However, [155,162] succeed in finding solutions to this problem.
Role-based AHA
In most linkable AHA schemes, sessions can be linked through participants’
pseudonyms that are exchanged in clear at every protocol invocation. In this
setting, roles are supplements to participants’ pseudonyms and express the
social function that participants are expected to play (e.g., teacher, doctor,
policeman). Early linkable and unlinkable AHA schemes support roles (cf. [6,9]
and [47, Appendix A.1]). However, this concept turned out to be rather trivial,
as there is no logical distinction between pseudonyms and roles (neither in the
protocol specifications, nor in the security models). More recent schemes [94,
95,97,99,150] do not consider roles any more.
1.4. Related concepts
We give an overview about different established cryptographic schemes and con-
structions that are related to privacy-aware authentication. Observe that none of
them comes close to the service that affiliation-hiding authentication offers: Even in
those schemes (e.g., anonymous credentials, identity escrow) where users hide behind
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groups that are managed by designated authorities, the presented schemes’ focus lies
on hiding the identities of authenticating users, while the identities of the managing
authorities do not remain hidden. In contrast, in AHA schemes, keeping GA’s (but
not necessarily user’s) identity hidden is the main goal. Moreover, AHA offers joint
and mutual authentication: users learn about the validity of peer’s credentials only
if they provide valid credentials themselves.
1.4.1. Ring signatures
Ring signatures, introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [140], allow a member
of an ad-hoc group of users to sign a given message on behalf of that group, without
revealing its own identity (i.e., public key). The only information that verifiers learn
about the signer is that it is part of the group. The signatures are unforgeable,
meaning that generation of signatures without knowledge of at least one secret key
corresponding to a public key in the group must be infeasible. Observe that ring
signatures offer privacy to the signer since the latter remains anonymous (in the
group). Moreover, most schemes are also unlinkable, i.e., verifiers are not able to
determine whether two signatures were produced by the same signer. Ring signatures
can be used, for instance, to leak insider information to the press in a manner that
authenticates the source as a knowledgeable insider, yet protecting its identity.
1.4.2. Ring authentication, private authentication
Naor’s deniable ring authentication [130] bases on the concept of ring signatures and
focuses on interactive authentication of messages by a member of an ad-hoc group,
such that corresponding transcripts are additionally deniable (i.e., computable by
an appropriate simulator without knowledge of secret keys).
Similarly, Abadi [1] explores private authentication: here, apart from hiding them-
selves behind ad-hoc groups of users, provers can also limit the set of verifiers that
are able to check the validity of created signatures.
1.4.3. Group signatures
In group signatures [12, 53], introduced by Chaum and van Heyst, users register
with group authorities (GAs) to obtain individual signing keys. Using these keys,
they can sign arbitrary messages on behalf of the group. Resulting signatures can
be verified in respect to group’s (constant-size) public key, independently of the
specific signer. Two security properties besides unforgeability are important in the
context of group signatures: the property of unlinkability demands that adversaries,
given a signature on a message, cannot identify the specific signer that produced the
signature. In contrast, traceability formalizes the requirement that GAs have the
ability to open signatures to recover signer’s identity.
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1.4.4. Traceable signatures
Traceable signatures, introduced by Kiayias, Tsiounis, and Yung [105] (see also
[16, 55, 80]) are a special type of group signatures with a slightly modified trace-
ability concept: for each member Ui of the group, GA is in possession of a special
tracing trapdoor. By revealing this trapdoor, all signatures issued by Ui can be
identified/linked independently by other parties, called tracing agents. However,
tracing agents do not learn the actual identity of Ui. Traceable signatures hence of-
fer anonymity (through the group-based authentication approach) and unlinkability
of signatures, while the latter can be revoked through publication of the appropriate
trapdoor. The group manager is the only authority that can identify the actual
signer Ui through the corresponding opening procedure, as in group signatures.
1.4.5. Identity escrow
Also closely related to group signatures is identity escrow [39, 106]. In this setting,
users (interactively) authenticate to verifiers as members of groups administered by
specific authorities. These authorities are able to admit and revoke memberships,
and to reveal identities of users from recorded session transcripts. Identity escrow
schemes are mostly build from group signature schemes [39, 106], and the main
security properties, unlinkability and traceability, are similarly defined.
1.4.6. Anonymous signatures
Yang et al. [164] introduced anonymous signatures that aim at achieving anonymity
in the traditional setting of digital signatures, where signer’s private key is used to
generate signatures that are verifiable using the corresponding public key. At first
sight, achieving anonymity in this setting seems contradictory, as signatures can
readily be linked to signers using the verification routine. The crucial observation
in [164] is that a signature scheme’s verification procedure requires three inputs:
verification key, candidate signature, and the message. The hope is to keep the
signer anonymous as long as the message is not disclosed to the adversary. This
intuition was formalized in [75, 164], under the assumption that signed messages
have sufficiently high entropy.
Interestingly, techniques underlying anonymous signature schemes for high-entropy
messages have recently [17] been used in the construction of group signatures, to
achieve an efficiency improvement over many earlier schemes.
1.4.7. Anonymous credentials
Anonymous credential systems (ACS, proposed by Chaum [50]) provide strong au-
thentication of users to verifiers, while protecting privacy of the former. ACS users
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receive, as their specific secrets, credentials from organizations. These credentials
are typically provided through certificates that are issued on unique identifiers of
the users, e.g., on the identities under which the users are known to the particular
organizations.
The core functionality of ACS is to allow users to prove possession of valid cre-
dentials without revealing their (certified) identities. Early ACS [50, 60, 119] were
not efficient or required additional (trusted) parties to assist the execution of ACS
sessions [51]. Modern ACS, designed with both security and efficiency in mind, were
proposed only in the last decade [38,40], and improved and extended in [35–37,41].
Some ACS [36, 37] offer efficient support for revocation of issued credentials. The
challenge in this case is to allow revocation without compromising revoked users’
privacy.
ACS have several important security properties: within others, credentials should
be unforgeable to prevent (colluding) users from claiming possession of credentials
that were never issued; ACS should be unlinkable to guarantee user’s privacy against
third-party verifiers and colluding organizations. These requirements are satisfied
by all modern ACS. Collusion-resistance is especially important for ACS that addi-
tionally support certification of attributes [35]. Attributes, such as age or address
information, may allow for a finer form of access control. In contrast to group signa-
tures, ACS lack the ability of organizations to identify/trace users based on recorded
ACS executions.
Key agreement where authentication is based on anonymous credentials is ex-
plored in credential-authenticated key exchange [34].
1.4.8. Predicate-based signatures and key agreement
In attribute-based signatures (Li et al. [116]), users obtain certificates for (sets of)
attributes from a designated attribute-certification authority. Generated signatures
are verifiable in respect to policies consisting of expected attribute sets, indepen-
dently of signer’s identity. Predicate-based signatures (Maji et al. [120]) generalize
this concept towards complex predicates on attributes, and allow for modeling more
fine-grained access control. As an application of both attribute- and predicate-based
signatures, predicate-based key agreement (Birkett and Stebila [19]) uses these meth-
ods to authenticate users for key agreement. Besides the classical goal of session
key security, predicate-based key agreement offers credential privacy. This security
property demands that nobody is able to distinguish between two users whose cre-
dentials satisfy the same predicate, even if they have different credentials. Observe
that this notion covers both anonymity and unlinkability of users.
2
Prerequisites and building blocks
We briefly recall some well-known facts about standard cryptographic primitives and
useful structures in number theory and algebra. In addition, we formalize hardness
assumptions and instantiate building blocks on which we base our protocol designs in
later chapters. We also give an exposition of important design ideas that drive some
affiliation-hiding authentication (AHA) schemes that were reported in the literature
so far. These will also serve as a foundation of our constructions in Chapters 3–7.
2.1. Mathematical background
2.1.1. Number theory
Although we assume that the reader is generally familiar with the concepts of basic
number theory, we recall some important results needed in this thesis. We refer
to [127] for a more detailed exposition.
A safe prime p is a prime number such that p = 2p′+ 1, where p′ is prime as well.
For a safe prime p, the multiplicative group Z×p of the finite field Zp ∼= GF (p) has
order p− 1 = 2p′, and each of its subgroups has order 1, 2, p′ or 2p′ (by Lagrange’s
theorem). The subgroup of order p′ consists exactly of all squares in Z×p , it is hence
called the subgroup of quadratic residues mod p, QR(p) for short. Note that QR(p)
is generated by each square in Z×p , except by 1, and that 2|QR(p)| = |Z×p |. Note
also that about every second element g in Z×p is primitive, i.e., 〈g〉p = Z×p .
For any prime p, the Legendre symbol
( ·
p
)
: Z×p → {−1, 1} is defined by
(
a
p
)
=
1 :⇔ a ∈ QR(p). By considering {−1, 1} = Z×3 , this mapping becomes a group
homomorphism. Observe ker
( ·
p
)
= QR(p). It is known that
(−1
p
)
= −1 for all
p = 3 (mod 4), that
(
2
p
)
= −1 for all p = 3 (mod 8), and that (2p) = 1 for all
p = 7 (mod 8).
Euler’s totient function ϕ : N→ N; m 7→ ϕ(m) indicates the number of invertible
elements in Zm, i.e., ϕ(m) = |Z×m|. The related Carmichael function λ : N →
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N; m 7→ λ(m) indicates the order of the largest cyclic subgroup in Z×m. Both
functions can easily be computed if the factorization of its argument is known. In
particular, if n = pq is an RSA modulus, i.e., p, q are prime numbers, then ϕ(n) =
(p − 1)(q − 1) and λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). If n is moreover a safe RSA modulus,
i.e., p = 2p′+1 and q = 2q′+1 are safe primes, then we have λ(n) = 2p′q′ = ϕ(n)/2.
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) states that rings Zpq and Zp × Zq are
isomorphic, for all primes p, q. We denote this by Zpq ∼= Zp × Zq. The correspond-
ing (ring) isomorphism is given by an 7→ (an mod p, an mod q), and its inverse by
(ap, aq) 7→ ap + ph for h = (aq − ap)/p (mod q). Note that is follows that groups Z×pq
and Z×p × Z×q are isomorphic as well, i.e., Z×pq ∼= Z×p × Z×q .
Let n = pq be a safe RSA modulus. In particular, n is a Blum integer, i.e.,
p = q = 3 (mod 4), and it follows that −1 6∈ QR(p) and −1 6∈ QR(q). Consider
an element g ∈ Z×n that is primitive in QR(p) but is not primitive in QR(q) (or
vice versa). Then ordn(g) = 2p
′q′ = λ(n) and −1 6∈ 〈g〉n hold. In this case, we
have Z×n ∼= 〈−1〉n×〈g〉n. A simple combinatorial argument shows that this property
holds for about a half of the elements in Z×n .
2.1.2. Cryptography in cyclic groups
By (G, g, q) we denote the setting where G = 〈g〉 is a cyclic group of prime order q.
We further denote algorithms that, on input security parameter 1κ, generate (spec-
ifications of) such groups by GGen(1κ). It is easy to see that hardness of any of the
problems given below implies that q = q(κ) grows super-polynomially in κ.
Some well-known hardness assumptions defined in the cyclic group setting base
on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), and the Computational and Decisional
Diffie-Hellman problems (CDH and DDH, respectively). We briefly describe the
adversary’s task:
DLP: given g, gx for x ∈ Zq, compute x
CDH: given g, gx, gy for x, y ∈ Zq, compute gxy
DDH: given g, gx, gy, gz for x, y, z ∈ Zq, decide whether z = xy (mod q)
The less known GapDH assumption states that the CDH problem stays hard even
when the adversary is equipped with a DDH oracle. As the DLP and DDH problems
are only marginally referred to in this thesis, we restrict ourselves to define just the
CDH problem in full detail:
Definition 1 (CDH assumption) Let GGen denote a (possibly deterministic) al-
gorithm that outputs descriptions (G, g, q) of cyclic groups. For an adversary A,
consider the experiment from Figure 2.1. Define A’s success probability as
SucccdhGGen,A(κ) = Pr
[
ExptcdhGGen,A(κ) = 1
]
.
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The CDH assumption states that there exists an algorithm GGen such that SucccdhGGen,A
is negligible for all efficient adversaries A.
ExptcdhGGen,A(κ):
(a) (G, g, q)← GGen(1κ)
(b) x, y ←R Zq
(c) h← A(G, g, q, gx, gy)
(d) Return 1 iff h = gxy.
Figure 2.1.: cdh experiment
For each of the named problems (DLP, CDH, DDH), there exist candidate groups
(G, g, q) in which the corresponding assumptions are conjectured to hold. Classical
examples [21, 86, 127] are given by prime order subgroups of Z×p , for primes p, and
by subgroups of the set of rational points on elliptic curves, defined over finite fields.
In particular, the group QR(p) of quadratic residues modulo a safe prime p is a
group in which all three problems are assumed to be hard to solve [24]. Indeed, in
Definition 2, we capture the assumption that CDH is difficult in all such groups,
provided that safe prime p has a certain minimal length.
Definition 2 (SCDH assumption) For an adversary A = (A1,A2), consider the
experiment from Figure 2.2. Define A’s success probability as
SuccscdhA (κ) = Pr
[
ExptscdhA (κ) = 1
]
.
The SCDH assumption states that SuccscdhA is negligible for all efficient adversaries A.
ExptscdhA (κ):
(a) (p, g, state)← A1(1κ)
(b) If p is not a safe prime of length κ: return 0.
(c) If 〈g〉p 6= QR(p): return 0.
(d) x, y ←R Z(p−1)/2
(e) h← A2(state, gx mod p, gy mod p)
(f) Return 1 iff h = gxy mod p.
Figure 2.2.: scdh experiment
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2.1.3. Cryptography in composite order groups
Composite order groups are of the form Z×n , where modulus n is not prime. The
intrinsic property of these groups is that their order is generally difficult to deter-
mine, unless some trapdoor information is known (namely, the factorization of n).
The most prominent example is given by Z×n , for RSA moduli n = pq.
In this thesis, however, we will exclusively deploy safe RSA moduli, i.e., we assume
that both factors of n are safe primes. As noted already in Section 2.1.1, the order
of Z×n is then given by ϕ(n) = 2λ(n) = 4p′q′. Observe that, for any given element
m ∈ Zn \Z×n , a non-trivial factor of n is given by gcd(m,n). Hence, picking elements
at random from Zn will yield non-invertible elements only with negligible probability,
assuming hardness of the factorization problem.
We formalize the RSA assumption in the setting of safe RSA moduli. Note that
condition (d) on SRSA-GEN algorithm is generally rarely needed, but required when
dealing with RSA moduli that are provided by malicious users (cf. Chapter 3).
Definition 3 (RSA assumption on safe moduli) Let SRSA-GEN be an efficient
algorithm that, on input security parameter 1κ, outputs tuples (n, e, d) such that
(a) n = pq for primes p and q, (b) p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 for primes p′ and
q′, (c) e, d ∈ Z×ϕ(n) with ed = 1 modϕ(n), and (d) dne2 = κ and dpe2 ≈ κ/2 ≈ dqe2.
The success probability of an adversary A with respect to SRSA-GEN is defined as
SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN,A(κ) = Pr
[
ExptsrsaSRSA-GEN,A(κ) = 1
]
,
where ExptsrsaSRSA-GEN,A is defined in Figure 2.3. The RSA assumption on safe moduli
states that there exists an algorithm SRSA-GEN such that SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN,A is negligible
for all efficient adversaries A.
ExptsrsaSRSA-GEN,A(κ):
(a) (n, e, d)←R SRSA-GEN(1κ)
(b) z ←R Z×n
(c) m← A(n, e, z)
(d) Return 1 iff me = z.
Figure 2.3.: srsa experiment
2.1.4. Cryptography in the pairing-based setting
Let G = 〈g〉 and GT = 〈gT 〉 be cyclic groups of prime order q. A pairing is an
efficient bilinear map eˆ : G × G → GT such that eˆ(ga, gb) = gT ab for all a, b ∈ Zq
(see also [22, Chapter X]). This setting is usually called a Type I setting [79], for
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which efficient constructions are known [145, 146]. The (computational) Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption [25] states that there exist bilinear groups such that the
BDH problem is hard:
BDH: given g, gx, gy, gz for x, y, z ∈ Zq, compute gT xyz.
Note that pairings eˆ : G × G → GT are always symmetric, i.e., eˆ(h1, h2) = eˆ(h2, h1)
for all h1, h2 ∈ G, as the simple observation eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab = eˆ(gb, ga) shows.
2.2. Digital signature schemes
Digital signatures belong to the most fundamental primitives in public key cryptog-
raphy. They will play explicit and implicit roles in the protocols we design in later
sections. Here, we define syntax and security properties, and recall two important
instantiations.
Definition 4 (Digital signature scheme) A digital signature scheme Σ is a set
Σ = {KGen,Sign,Verify} of three efficient algorithms:
KGen(1κ)
On input of security parameter 1κ, this algorithm outputs a secret signing
key sk and a verification key pk.
Sign(sk,m)
On input signer’s secret key sk and message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, this algorithm outputs
a signature σ.
Verify(pk,m, σ)
On input verification key pk, message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and candidate signature σ,
this algorithm either accepts or rejects, i.e., outputs either true or false.
Definition 5 (Correctness of signature schemes) A digital signature scheme Σ
is correct if for all κ ∈ N, all (sk, pk) ← KGen(1κ), all messages m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
all signatures σ ← Sign(sk,m), we have Verify(pk,m, σ) = true.
The principal security property of signature schemes is unforgeability. This notion
is formalized as follows:
Definition 6 (Existential unforgeability, EUF-CMA) A digital signature scheme
Σ is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA) if
for all efficient adversaries A the success probability
Succeuf-cmaΣ,A (κ) = Pr
[
Expteuf-cmaΣ,A (κ) = 1
]
is negligible, where Expteuf-cmaΣ,A is the experiment specified in Figure 2.4.
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Expteuf-cmaΣ,A (κ):
(a) (sk, pk)←R KGen(1κ)
(b) (m,σ)← AOS (pk)
– If A queries OS(m):
(a) σ ← Sign(sk,m)
(b) Append m to SList.
(c) Answer A with σ.
(c) Return 0 if m ∈ SList.
(d) Return 1 iff Verify(pk,m, σ) = true.
Figure 2.4.: euf-cma experiment
2.2.1. Schnorr’s signature scheme
We sketch the signature scheme by Schnorr [143,144]. Its EUF-CMA security can be
proven in the random oracle model, if the scheme is instantiated over a group where
DLP is hard [137].
KGen(1κ)
Run (G, g, q) ← GGen(1κ) (cf. Section 2.1.2) and specify a hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → Zq. We assume that these parameters are implicitly known to the
signer and all verifiers. Pick a random element x ←R Zq \ {0}, and output
signing key sk = x and verification key pk = gx.
Sign(sk,m)
To sign message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, pick r ←R Zq and compute ω ← gr and t ←
r + xH(ω‖m). Output signature σ = (ω, t).
Verify(pk,m, σ)
Candidate signature σ = (ω, t) on message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is accepted under
verification key pk = gx iff gt = ωpkH(ω‖m).
2.2.2. Full-domain hash RSA signature scheme
The FDH-RSA signature scheme is provably EUF-CMA-secure, in the random oracle
model, provided that the RSA assumption holds [15].
KGen(1κ)
Run SRSA-GEN(1κ) to obtain a tuple (n, e, d) of RSA parameters (cf. Defi-
nition 3). Specify a hash function Hn : {0, 1}∗ → Zn. Output signing key
sk = (n, d,Hn) and verification key pk = (n, e,Hn).
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Sign(sk,m)
To sign messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute and output signature σ ← Hn(m)d modn.
Verify(pk,m, σ)
Candidate signature σ on message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is accepted under verification
key pk = (n, e,Hn) iff σ
e modn = Hn(m).
A blind version of this signature scheme was introduced by Chaum [49] (see also
the specification of AddUser protocol in Section 3.2.1), but its security reduction
requires a non-standard interactive ‘one-more’ assumption [13].
2.3. Non-interactive key distribution
In a multi-user setting, the purpose of a non-interactive key distribution scheme
(NIKDS) [22, 71, 135, 141] is the assignment of a (fixed) symmetric key to each pair
of users. The intrinsic property and advantage of NIKDS over (authenticated) key
establishment protocols is that NIKDS are non-interactive, i.e., users can compute
the particular keys shared with other users without any (prior) communication with
them.
Typically, NIKDS are identity-based schemes where the identities may be arbitrary
strings. In NIKDS, users first register their particular identity id ∈ {0, 1}∗ with an
authority called key generation center (KGC) to obtain their specific credential sk[id].
Using this credential, they can compute a secure key shared between id and id′,
for any other identity id′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and without any further communication. We
formalize this in Definition 7.
Definition 7 (NIKDS) A non-interactive key distribution scheme is a set NIKDS =
{NSetup,NRegister,NGetKey} of three efficient algorithms:
NSetup(1κ)
This algorithm is used to initialize a KGC. On input of security parameter 1κ,
it outputs a master secret key msk.
NRegister(msk, id)
On input KGC’s master secret key msk and identity id ∈ {0, 1}∗, this algorithm
outputs credential sk[id].
NGetKey(sk[id], id′)
On input credential sk[id] and identity id′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, this algorithm outputs a
key K ∈ {0, 1}κ.
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We expect from a NIKDS that, if two users with identities id and id′ compute
NGetKey(sk[id], id′) and NGetKey(sk[id′], id), respectively, then the resulting keys al-
ways match. We consider this key as a shared key between parties id and id′, and, for
convenience, denote it by NSharedKey(msk; id, id′). Observe that (registered) users
with identities id, id′ do not need KGC’s key msk to compute NSharedKey(msk; id, id′).
Definition 8 (Correctness of NIKDS) A NIKDS is correct if for all κ ∈ N, all
msk ← NSetup(1κ), all identities id1, id2 ∈ {0, 1}∗, all sk[id1] ← NRegister(msk, id1)
and sk[id2] ← NRegister(msk, id2), and all K1 ← NGetKey(sk[id1], id2) and K2 ←
NGetKey(sk[id2], id1), we have K1 = K2.
The security notions we present next adopt the classical one-wayness and key
indistinguishability requirements of interactive key agreement [14,23,28] to the (de-
terministic) non-interactive setting.
Definition 9 (OW-CIA security of NIKDS) A NIKDS is one-way secure under adap-
tive chosen-identity attacks (OW-CIA) if for all efficient adversaries A the success
probability
Succow-ciaNIKDS,A(κ) = Pr
[
Exptow-ciaNIKDS,A(κ) = 1
]
is negligible, where Exptow-ciaNIKDS,A is the experiment specified in Figure 2.5.
Definition 10 (IND-CIA security of NIKDS) A NIKDS is indistinguishable under
adaptive chosen-identity attacks (IND-CIA) if for all efficient adversaries A = (A1,A2)
the advantage
Advind-ciaNIKDS,A(κ) =
∣∣∣Pr [Exptind-cia,0NIKDS,A(κ) = 1]− Pr [Exptind-cia,1NIKDS,A(κ) = 1]∣∣∣
is negligible, where Exptind-cia,bNIKDS,A is the experiment specified in Figure 2.5.
2.3.1. Construction of NIKDS based on bilinear maps
The first efficient NIKDS was constructed by Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara in [141]
(although the notion of NIKDS was introduced to cryptography about 20 years ear-
lier, in [147]). We sketch their scheme:
NSetup(1κ)
Specify cyclic groups G = 〈g〉 and GT of prime order q, for which an efficient
bilinear pairing eˆ : G × G → GT is known (see Section 2.1.4). In addition,
specify hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G and H1 : GT → {0, 1}`, for fixed ` ∈ N.
Randomly pick s←R Zq \ {0} and return master secret key msk = s.
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Exptow-ciaNIKDS,A(κ):
(a) msk← NSetup(1κ)
(b) (K, id1, id2)← AOR(1κ)
– If A queries OR(id):
(a) sk[id]← NRegister(msk, id)
(b) Append id to RList.
(c) Answer A with sk[id].
(c) Return 0 if id1 ∈ RList or id2 ∈ RList.
(d) Return 1 iff K = NSharedKey(msk; id1, id2).
Exptind-cia,bNIKDS,A(κ):
(a) msk← NSetup(1κ)
(b) (id1, id2, state)← AOR1 (1κ)
– If A queries OR(id):
(a) sk[id]← NRegister(msk, id)
(b) Append id to RList.
(c) Answer A with sk[id].
(c) K0 ←R {0, 1}κ
(d) K1 ← NSharedKey(msk; id1, id2)
(e) b′ ← AOR2 (state,Kb)
– Answer OR queries as above.
(f) Return 0 if id1 ∈ RList or id2 ∈ RList.
(g) Return b′.
Figure 2.5.: OW-CIA and IND-CIA experiments for NIKDS
NRegister(msk, id)
On input master secret key msk = s and identity id ∈ {0, 1}∗, credential sk[id]
is computed as sk[id]← H(id)s.
NGetKey(sk[id], id′)
This algorithm outputs key K = H1
(
eˆ(sk[id], H(id′))
)
.
Proof of correctness. For arbitrary id1, id2 ∈ {0, 1}∗, let h1 ← H(id1) and h2 ←
H(id2). We then have sk[id1] = h1
s and sk[id2] = h2
s, and correctness is implied by
eˆ(h1
s, h2) = eˆ(h1, h2)
s = eˆ(h2, h1)
s = eˆ(h2
s, h1). 
Security of this NIKDS construction was determined in [71,135] as follows:
Theorem 1 (Security of pairing-based NIKDS) The NIKDS proposed above is
OW-CIA-secure and IND-CIA-secure under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption
(cf. Section 2.1.4), in the random oracle model.
Observe that, in the NGetKey algorithm, user’s first input element to the pair-
ing operation is a fixed long-term parameter, namely credential sk[id]. This can be
exploited to obtain efficient implementations: see [57,145] for considerable optimiza-
tions on fixed-argument pairing evaluations.
2.4. Syntax and Correctness of AHA
Many different definitions of AHA (also known under the names of secret handshakes
or affiliation-hiding key exchange) have been proposed in the literature [6,9,47,95–
97, 99, 150, 161]. This variety is a natural consequence of the fact that particular
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schemes have specific properties, e.g., some are pure authentication protocols, while
others also establish and output shared keys.
The following syntactical definition reflects the basic principles of (linkable) AHA
and is general enough to cover most settings found in the literature. However, as the
scenarios considered in subsequent Chapters 3 and 5 deviate considerably from this
classical setting, we will have to slightly adapt the syntax to fit the new requirements.
We defer this step to the particular sections.
Definition 11 (Affiliation-hiding authentication) An affiliation-hiding authen-
tication scheme is a set AHA = {CreateGroup,AddUser,Handshake,Revoke} of four
efficient algorithms and protocols:
CreateGroup(1κ)
This algorithm is executed by a GA to set up a new group G. On input of
security parameter 1κ, it generates a private key G.sk and initializes the group’s
pseudonym revocation list G.prl to ∅. The algorithm outputs revocation list
G.prl along with private key G.sk.
AddUser(G, id)
This algorithm is executed by GA of group G to admit a new user U to the
group. On input secret key G.sk and user’s pseudonym id, a membership cre-
dential skG[id] is computed and given to the user, enabling the latter to au-
thenticate with pseudonym id in group G in future Handshake sessions. The
communication channel between U and GA is assumed to be authentic.
Observe that our definition allows users to have several pseudonyms registered
in the same group, and to have the same pseudonym registered in different
groups. In case this is considered undesirable, GAs should be equipped with
suitable admission policies.
Handshake(U1 ↔ U2)
This protocol is executed between two users, U1 and U2. User Ui, i ∈ {1, 2},
provides as input parameters paramsi = (idi, skGi [idi], Gi.prl, ri) and executes
its individual part Handshake′(paramsi). It is expected that (idi, skGi [idi]) is a
valid pseudonym/credential pair for group Gi, obtained via AddUser algorithm.
By Gi.prl we denote the pseudonym revocation list of respective group Gi. Fi-
nally, we require ri ∈ {init, resp}.
The protocol shall detect whether both users provide credentials for the same
group (i.e., whether G1 = G2). If this is the case, the protocol shall accept
with an established shared session key. Otherwise, it shall reject.
Users keep track of the state of created Handshake protocol sessions pi through
session variables that are initialized as follows: pi.state ← running, pi.id ←
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id (where id is taken from paramsi), pi.key ← ⊥, and pi.partner ← ⊥. At
some point, the protocol completes and pi.state is updated to either rejected
or accepted. In the latter case, pi.key is set to the established session key
(of length κ) and the pseudonym of the Handshake partner is assigned to
pi.partner. State accepted cannot be reached if the protocol partner is revoked
(i.e., pi.partner ∈ G.prl).
Revoke(G, id)
This is the revocation algorithm executed by GA of group G. It outputs the
updated pseudonym revocation list G.prl← G.prl ∪ {id}.
Note that CreateGroup algorithm does not output a public key for created group G.
The intuition behind this is that all parameters otherwise comprehended as ‘public
keys’ play a role only for group insiders, i.e., for admitted users that have received
their individual credential material. In the above definition, we may hence assume
that all these ‘public’ parameters are embedded in users’ credentials.
We require from a useful AHA scheme that if two registered users run a Handshake
honestly and without any interference by others, then the corresponding sessions
accept and output the same session key. This idea is captured more precisely in
Definition 12.
Definition 12 (Correctness of AHA) Suppose that two users, U1 and U2, reg-
ister as members of groups G1 and G2, respectively, and obtain their credentials
(id1, skG1 [id1]) and (id2, skG2 [id2]) via corresponding AddUser executions. Further
suppose that U1 and U2 use these credentials to engage in a Handshake protocol. Let
pi1 and pi2 denote the corresponding sessions. The AHA scheme is correct if (a) pi1
and pi2 complete in the same state which is accepted iff G1 = G2 and id1 6∈ G2.prl
and id2 6∈ G1.prl and r1 6= r2, and (b) if both sessions accept, then (pi1.key, pi1.partner,
pi1.id) = (pi2.key, pi2.id, pi2.partner).
2.5. Basic AHA constructions
In the following sections, we expose in greater detail some pioneering AHA con-
structions found in the literature [9, 47, 95]. The presented schemes cover the most
common cryptographic settings (cf. Sections 2.1.2–2.1.4): [95] is based on the RSA
cryptosystem, [47] is defined in a cyclic group of prime order, while [9] requires
availability of an efficient bilinear map.
2.5.1. AHA based on RSA
The scheme proposed in [95] by Jarecki, Kim, and Tsudik is RSA-based and builds
on Okamoto’s identity-based key establishment protocol [81, 132, 133]. The idea to
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turn Okamoto’s protocol into an AHA scheme came initially from Vergnaud [156].
However, his scheme turned out to be flawed [95]. We describe a simplified version
of [95]:
CreateGroup
To set up a group G, corresponding GA generates fresh parameters (n, g, e),
where n is a safe RSA modulus of length κ (where κ is the security parameter),
e ∈ Z×ϕ(n) is an RSA exponent, and g ∈ Z×n is an element satisfying Z×n =
〈−1〉n×〈g〉n (i.e., ordn(g) ≈ n/2). See Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 for more details
about this setting. GA also specifies hash functions Hn : {0, 1}∗ → Z×n and
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`, for some fixed ` = `(κ). Moreover, let T = T (κ)  n
be independent of n, e.g., T = 2κ+`.
AddUser
The credential skG[id] = (n, g, e, σid) corresponding to pseudonym id ∈ {0, 1}∗
in group G consists of parameters (n, g, e) and the RSA signature σid =
Hn(id)
d modn on the full-domain hash of id (where d = e−1 modϕ(n), cf.
Section 2.2.2).
Handshake
The protocol is sketched in Figure 2.6. By pad we denote a probabilistic
algorithm that maps its first argument θ′ to an element θ within interval
[0, T − 1] such that θ = θ′ (modn). For concreteness, let pad map θ′ to
θ = θ′ + kn, where k ←R [0, bT/nc − 1]. Protocol’s correctness follows from
rA = g
2exAxB = rB, which holds if both participants deploy valid credentials
and consistent group parameters (n, g, e):
rA =
(
(θ′B)
2eAHnA(idB)
−2)xA = ((gB)2eAxB (σidB )2eAHnA(idB)−2)xA (2.1)
=
(
(gB)
2eAxBHnB (idB)
2eAdAHnA(idB)
−2
)xA
= (gB)
2eAxAxB (modnA)
Note that, in this computation, we assume that Hn(id) is invertible (modn)
for all used pseudonyms id. However, the case that Hn(id) hits an element
from Zn \ Z×n , in which the protocol would fail, occurs only with negligible
probability, as we argue in Section 2.1.3.
Observe that hash function H1 is used for both key derivation and key confir-
mation.
A comparison of this protocol with the original scheme by Okamoto [132,133] reveals
that Jarecki et al. consider trusted authorities from [132] as GAs in [95]. However,
in order to achieve the property of affiliation-hiding, the authors introduce two es-
sential modifications: First, RSA modulus n and generator g are now chosen such
that Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n. Under this premise, we observe that the multiplicative
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User A
Input: idA, nA, gA, eA, σidA
(bA, xA)←R Z2 × ZnA/2
θ′A ← (−1)bA(gA)xAσidA modnA
θA ← pad(θ′A, nA, T )
User B
Input: idB, nB, gB, eB, σidB
(bB, xB)←R Z2 × ZnB/2
θ′B ← (−1)bB (gB)xBσidB modnB
θB ← pad(θ′B, nB, T )
−
m1 = (idA, θA)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
←−
m2 = (idB, θB)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
sidA ← m1 ‖m2
rA ←
(
(θB)
eAHnA(idB)
−1)2xA modnA
vA ← H1(rA ‖sidA ‖ init)
sidB ← m1 ‖m2
rB ←
(
(θA)
eBHnB (idA)
−1)2xB modnB
vB ← H1(rB ‖sidB ‖ resp)
− vA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
←− vB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
accept with K = H1(rA ‖sidA) if
vB = H1(rA ‖sidA ‖ resp); else reject.
accept with K = H1(rB ‖sidB) if
vA = H1(rB ‖sidB ‖ init); else reject.
Figure 2.6.: RSA-based Handshake protocol from [95] (simplified)
blinding of intermediate element gx ∈ 〈g〉n with a factor in {−1, 1} = 〈−1〉n makes
resulting value θ′ (almost) uniformly distributed in Zn. Second, padding function
pad is designed such that it sends a uniformly distributed element in Zn = [0, n− 1]
to an element (almost) uniformly distributed in [0, T − 1], where T  n is indepen-
dent of n and hence independent of specific group G. This technique, that dates
back to Desmedt [65], makes the distribution of transmitted messages θ (almost)
independent of deployed group G. Jarecki et al. prove [95] that this blinding suffices
to achieve an affiliation-hiding protocol.
In respect to key establishment, Jarecki et al. claim that their protocol offers
key indistinguishability with forward secrecy. However, the corresponding proof is
flawed1. Independently of Jarecki et al., Gennaro, Krawczyk, and Rabin [81, 82]
analyze Okamoto’s protocol in a slightly different setting: in their variant, group
parameter g is chosen to be a generator of QR(n). Under this condition, however,
Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n does not hold (recall that this property was essential to achieve
affiliation-hiding security). In this thesis, we abstain from giving an adaption of the
proof found in [81,82] to the setting where g is chosen according to our requirements.
Nevertheless, we have verified that the proof is convertible to the AHA setting in a
sound way and enumerate all necessary modifications in Appendix A.
To prove forward secrecy of their two-pass scheme (that does not provide ex-
plicit key confirmation), Gennaro et al. require a strong non-standard interactive
extractability assumption [82]. A weaker notion of key security, where the peer of
the Test session under some circumstances may not be corrupted, is proven under
SRSA assumption (cf. Definition 3), in the random oracle model.
1Precisely, in [95], the proposed reduction fails to provide means to simulate the actions of user Uj
in the analysis of ‘Type III adversaries’. In other words: the proof assumes (in contrast to the
model) that impersonated users stay completely oﬄine.
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However, the key confirmation step in Figure 2.6 has a healing consequence on
key secrecy: Recall that, in strong models for key security that also regard forward
secrecy [45], Corrupt queries on Test session’s peer may only be asked after session
termination. In the AHA protocol, the latter requires reception of correct confirma-
tion tag v, i.e., adversary has to pose a H1(r‖ . . .) query before the session actually
terminates. This implies that the solution to embedded SRSA challenge can be ex-
tracted before adversary gets permission to corrupt the peer. In other words: the
case in which [82] cannot answer Corrupt queries is irrelevant in the three-pass pro-
tocol from Figure 2.6. In particular, the protocol is forward secure. We summarize
this discussion as follows:
Theorem 2 The protocol specified in Figure 2.6 is a secure authenticated key estab-
lishment protocol with (strong) forward secrecy in the sense of [45], under the RSA
assumption on safe moduli, in the random oracle model.
2.5.2. AHA based on DLP
Another approach towards AHA was pioneered by Castelluccia, Jarecki, and Tsudik
in [47], basing on a new cryptographic building block: In a PKI setting with mul-
tiple certification authorities (CA), a PKI-enabled encryption scheme allows users
to encrypt messages to other users with respect to a specific CA. Recipients, before
being able to decrypt any ciphertext, have to obtain from the particular CA an indi-
vidual (but ciphertext-independent) certificate that is bound to their identity. The
scheme is CA-oblivious if ciphertexts do not leak information about the ‘addressed’
CA. Given such an encryption scheme, an AHA protocol can be constructed by iden-
tifying CAs with GAs, and by admitting users to groups by issuing corresponding
certificates. Castelluccia et al. [47] give a construction of CA-oblivious encryption,
based on Schnorr signatures (cf. Section 2.2.1) and ElGamal encryption [72]. We
briefly describe their AHA scheme:
Let (G, g, q) denote a cyclic group of prime order q (cf. Section 2.1.2). Let H :
{0, 1}∗ → Zq and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` denote hash functions, for some fixed
` = `(κ).
CreateGroup
To initialize a group G, GA picks as private key a random element x ←R
Zq \ {0}.
AddUser
A credential for pseudonym id ∈ {0, 1}∗ is issued by GA by computing a
Schnorr signature (ω, t) on id, i.e., (ω, t) ← (gr, r + xH(ω ‖ id)) for random
r ←R Zq, and handing out skG[id] = (ω, t, y) to the user, where y = gx.
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Observe that, in the context of Schnorr’s signature scheme, signed message
is id, while y serves as verification key.
Element ω ∈ G is considered a (public) value associated with pseudonym id
from which gt can be computed via gt = ωyH(ω‖id), while t acts as a trapdoor
for this value and is known only to the ‘owner’ of skG[id]. We remark that
the CA-oblivious encryption scheme proposed in [47] is standard ElGamal
encryption to public key gt, where t is the decryption key.
Handshake
We reproduce a simplified version of the protocol from [47] in Figure 2.7,
expanding it from a four-move to a six-move protocol for the sake of better
readability. Observe that key K and confirmation messages vA, vB are derived
from random nonces rA, rB ∈ G. These nonces are transmitted from one party
to the other via CA-oblivious encryption, in (ElGamal) ciphertexts (CA,1, CA,2)
and (CB,1, CB,2), respectively.
We remark that Castelluccia et al. do not analyze key security of their AHA scheme.
Observe that key establishment protocols, like the one from Figure 2.7, that authen-
ticate participants by challenging their decryption capabilities, generally cannot be
proven secure in a model that considers active adversaries, without explicitly as-
suming CCA security of the underlying encryption scheme (as decryption is needed
in the simulation). As ElGamal encryption is not CCA-secure, it is unclear how
Castelluccia’s scheme could be proven secure in a strong model. However, the ap-
proach to construct AHA schemes from Schnorr signatures remains interesting and
will serve as a basis for our constructions in later sections.
User A
Input: idA, ωA, tA, yA
nA ←R {0, 1}`
User B
Input: idB, ωB, tB, yB
nB ←R {0, 1}`
−
idA, ωA, nA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
←−
idB, ωB, nB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
zB ← ωB (yA)H(ωB‖idB)
(rA, xA)←R G × Zq
(CA,1, CA,2)← (gxA , rA zBxA)
zA ← ωA (yB)H(ωA‖idA)
(rB, xB)←R G × Zq
(CB,1, CB,2)← (gxB , rB zAxB )
−
(CA,1, CA,2)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
←−
(CB,1, CB,2)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
rB ← CB,2/(CB,1)tA
vA = H1(rA ‖rB ‖nA ‖nB)
rA ← CA,2/(CA,1)tB
vB = H1(rA ‖rB ‖nB ‖nA)
− vA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
←− vB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
accept with K = H1(rA ‖rB) if
vB = H1(rA ‖rB ‖nB ‖nA); else reject.
accept with K = H1(rA ‖rB) if
vA = H1(rA ‖rB ‖nA ‖nB); else reject.
Figure 2.7.: DLP-based Handshake protocol from [47] (simplified)
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2.5.3. AHA based on bilinear maps
The AHA scheme proposed by Balfanz et al. in [9] is defined in the pairing-based
setting. More precisely, its central building block is the non-interactive key distribu-
tion scheme (NIKDS) by Sakai et al. [141] (cf. Section 2.3.1). The idea is to identify
KGCs with GAs, i.e., the user with pseudonym id receives NIKDS’s sk[id] as creden-
tial. Implicitly, this establishes a fixed symmetric (per-group) key between each two
users. The actual Handshake is a simple protocol that verifies whether both parties
have knowledge of the same key. Note that it is the absence of network traffic in
NIKDS that yields the affiliation-hiding privacy. The scheme from [9] is specified as
follows:
CreateGroup
To initialize a group G, GA runs msk ← NSetup(1κ) and outputs secret key
G.sk = msk.
AddUser
Admission of a user with pseudonym id ∈ {0, 1}∗ is done by computing id’s
credential as skG[id]← NRegister(msk, id).
Handshake
A simplified version of the protocol is given in Figure 2.8. Basically, it consists
of the computation of the shared NIKDS key and a standard nonce-based
equality check. The latter makes use of hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`,
for some fixed ` = `(κ).
Observe that the protocol outputs K = NSharedKey(G.sk; idA, idB) as session
key, which is independent of the actual Handshake session. Clearly, protocols
that output fixed keys cannot offer key security in respect to a strong model [14,
45].
User A
Input: idA, sk[idA]
nA ←R {0, 1}`
User B
Input: idB, sk[idB]
nB ←R {0, 1}`
−
idA, nA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
←−
idB, nB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
KA ← NGetKey(sk[idA], idB)
vA ← H1(KA ‖nA ‖nB)
KB ← NGetKey(sk[idB], idA)
vB ← H1(KB ‖nB ‖nA)
− vA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
←− vB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
accept with K = KA if
vB = H1(KA ‖nB ‖nA); else reject.
accept with K = KB if
vA = H1(KA ‖nA ‖nB); else reject.
Figure 2.8.: NIKDS-based Handshake protocol from [9] (simplified)
3
AHA with untrusted group authorities
Authentication protocols that follow the classical AHA concept defend group mem-
bers’ privacy against group outsiders (i.e., non-members). This is clearly reflected
in the accepted security models [9,47,95,121]. Yet, the possibility of insider attacks
has not been considered in the literature so far. This is mainly due to the fact
that early constructions [9,47] were pure authentication protocols, i.e., there was no
point in defending from insiders as it was intended that these learned all relevant
information anyway. However, observing the rise of AHA protocols that also encom-
pass key establishment [94, 95, 121], we argue that there is the strong necessity to
also formally treat security regarding attacks from the inside, most importantly to
preclude attacks against key secrecy.
We even go a step further and ask for reasonable security notions that consider
not only other members as potentially malicious, but also group authorities. For
instance, if two honest members execute a Handshake in the presence of a malicious
GA that mounts, say, a man-in-the-middle attack, then one should still require that
both, the affiliations of participants and the computed session key, remain hidden
from GA. In this section, we study and mitigate the consequences of potential GA
misbehavior in AHA protocols. Within others, we show that unconditional trust of
group members in their particular GAs is problematic in most schemes proposed in
the literature so far. We also design a new scheme that tolerates malicious GAs,
raising users’ privacy to a new level.
Consider a social network that is operated in an oppressive regime as an example
where trustworthiness of GAs cannot be guaranteed and, moreover, maliciousness
even has to be assumed. Although AHA could be of great importance for members
of an anti-government group to recognize each other and to hold discrete meetings
and conversations, an AHA scheme with the classical security properties would not
be safe to use: If the government raids the social network and confiscates the GA,
then all parameters and records become exposed and the government can thereafter
identify all members and unveil all (past) communication.
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Considering possible insider attacks, we anticipate a malicious GA to attempt any
of the following: generate group parameters in a rogue way, create phantom group
members, misbehave during the registration process of honest members, and mount
active attacks on sessions involving honest members. In the following paragraphs,
we discuss these attacks in more detail. We also discuss the resulting challenge:
Which security requirements for AHA protocols can be preserved in a meaningful
way, even when dealing with corrupt GAs?
Security of registration/revocation
Among GA’s duties is the registration and revocation of group members. Clearly,
if GA misbehaves and introduces phantom members, then security of session keys
computed by honest participants in sessions with phantom members can no longer
represent a meaningful requirement. However, we argue that ‘good’ security models
for AHA should at least leave GAs incapable of generating credentials for freely
chosen pseudonyms, as this would keep GAs from impersonating admitted users by
recomputing their credentials.
We believe that possible GA misbehavior during the registration procedure of
new (honest) members must also be taken into account. Note that the registration
process is the only step where GA interacts directly with users and that information
obtained or issued by GA during registration may be later misused to the detriment
of members’ privacy.
Security of session keys
An AHA instance between two honest members should result in a secret session
key. Often it is desirable that this key is secure even against a curious GA. More
precisely, we might require that established keys offer forward secrecy with respect
to any future corruption of GAs and regular users. Although this issue has not
been formally addressed so far, it seems that some recent results [94,95,121] satisfy
this extended form of forward secrecy. However, in many other constructions [9,47],
GA’s private keys can be used to immediately recover session keys.
Privacy of group members
The central privacy property offered by AHA protocols is that group memberships
of participants remain hidden from outsiders. However, it is also meaningful to
extend this requirement towards the GA: As long as GA is trusted with the security
of the registration, it makes sense to demand that transcripts of sessions among
honest members do not reveal affiliations to GA. This requirement is of particular
importance for linkable schemes where participants communicate via pseudonyms
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and exchange these in the clear when executing Handshake sessions. Current linkable
AHA schemes [9,47,94,95,121] do not provide this stronger privacy notion, since GA
learns (or even picks) the pseudonyms of its members during the registration process
and will recognize these when monitoring network traffic.
We argue, however, that there is an even more significant threat to privacy of group
members. It stems from the fact that, during the registration process of users, GA
learns users’ real identities (in addition to users’ pseudonyms). In particular, we
believe that Handshake sessions involving honest members should not reveal to GA
any information about participants’ real identities (even though GA knows the real
identities of all group members). In other words, users should remain untraceable
throughout their communication sessions.
Untraceability is a new privacy requirement that does not appear in current AHA
security models; in fact, none of the current linkable protocols we are aware of
provides it. In linkable AHA protocols, hiding real identities of participants from GA
appears to be especially challenging due to the use of pseudonyms created during the
registration phase. Informally, we define the security goal of untraceability as follows
(cf. Chapter 1). Note that untraceability is a property individual to a member, while
affiliation-hiding is shared by all members of the same group.
Untraceability of members
It is infeasible for an (adversarial) GA to learn the real identity U of an honest
group member from AddUser and Handshake sessions involving that member.
Intuitively, untraceability is related to GA’s ability to obtain information during
the registration phase of an honest member that allows it to later link back AHA
sessions of that member to the registration process and, thus, to the real identity.
A possible way to achieve untraceability is to prevent GA from learning pseudo-
nyms of group members upon their registration. This can be achieved by blinding
the registration process. For instance, in the case of AHA protocols sketched in
Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, where users’ credentials are signatures on their respective
pseudonyms, the AddUser algorithm could be replaced by a (multipass) protocol for
blinded signature generation.
However, care has to be taken to prevent the adversary from registering pseudo-
nyms of its choice with any given group. In particular, assuming a fully blinded
registration process, the adversary would readily be able to obtain membership cre-
dentials for pseudonyms id that are already in use by honest group members, with-
out explicitly corrupting any of them. This, in turn, would allow the adversary to
mount impersonation attacks against key secrecy. We stress that this problem does
not arise solely because of blind registration, but also due to specific constructions
of pseudonyms. In fact, in Section 3.2, we will identify requirements on pseudonym
registration that are sufficient to protect against this type of attack.
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The concepts of untraceability and blind registration raise some concerns about
membership revocation. Note that, in linkable AHA protocols, revocation can be
understood in two ways: The first approach is revocation of users, where GA may
want to revoke some particular user U . The second approach is revocation of pseu-
donyms, where GA may want to revoke some pseudonym id. In traceable protocols,
i.e., in protocols that do not offer untraceability, there is usually no difference be-
tween these two approaches, since GA knows the mapping between U and id, and
adds id in both cases to revocation list G.prl. However, in untraceable AHA, it is
ensured that GA does not learn any pseudonym id, i.e., revocation of users is no
longer possible. This is the price we have to pay for untraceability. However, users
participate in group applications via pseudonyms. Therefore, if some misbehavior
is noticed, the responsible pseudonym can be identified and revoked. This type of
revocation is still meaningful, since, if GA revokes some pseudonym id that is owned
by some user U , then U cannot communicate in that group anymore. Hence, revoca-
tion of pseudonyms can still be sufficient to prevent misbehaving users from further
participation in groups.
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3.1.1. Adapted syntax for AHA
In the general definition of AHA that we gave in Section 11, the AddUser proce-
dure was considered to be an algorithm executed by GA. However, as discussed
in the preceding paragraphs, the new security property of ‘untraceability’ can only
be achieved by permitting a blinded registration, i.e., a registration via an interac-
tive protocol. Hence, before proposing our security model for AHA schemes in the
presence of corrupt authorities, we have to slightly adjust the syntax of AHA, by
replacing the AddUser algorithm from Definition 11 by the following protocol:
AddUser(U ↔ G)
This protocol is executed between the prospective group member U and the
GA of group G. The algorithm on U ’s side is denoted AddUserU(U,G), the
algorithm on GA’s side by AddUserG(G,U). Let pi be a session of either
AddUserU or AddUserG. The state of pi is defined through the session vari-
able pi.state and can take running, accepted, or rejected values. For both algo-
rithms we initially assume pi.state = running. Once AddUserU session pi reaches
pi.state = accepted, its variable pi.result holds a pair (id, skG[id]), where id is
a pseudonym and skG[id] is a membership credential that enables user U to
authenticate with pseudonym id in group G in future Handshake sessions.
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3.1.2. Adversarial queries
In the security experiments defined below, adversary A is modeled as a probabilistic
algorithm that runs in polynomial time and interacts with the experiment via the
following set of queries. Unless explicitly noted, we assume that, at any time, A has
access to exhaustive (system-wide) lists GLi and IDLi of available groups and regis-
tered pseudonyms, respectively. Note that these lists do not disclose the mapping
between pseudonyms and groups.
CreateGroup
This query sets up a new group G and publishes its (empty) revocation list
G.prl. The group is added to GLi.
AddUserU(U,G)
This query models the actions of user U initiating the AddUser protocol with
target group G. A new protocol session pi is started. Optionally, a first mes-
sage M is output. Group G is added to GLi if it is a new group.
Note that we do not require G ∈ GLi to hold before this query is asked.
Basically, this allows the adversary to introduce its own groups with arbitrary
(potentially maliciously chosen) parameters, and to populate these groups with
honest members.
AddUserG(G,U)
This query differs from AddUserU in that it models GA’s actions on the AddUser
protocol. We require that G has been established through CreateGroup before
this query is posed.
Handshake(id, G, r)
This query lets pseudonym id ∈ IDLi start a new session pi of the Handshake
protocol. It receives as input the group G wherein the Handshake shall take
place (given that id has credentials for that group) and a role identifier r ∈
{init, resp} that determines whether the session shall act as protocol initiator
or responder. Session variable pi.revealed is initialized to false. Optionally, this
query returns a first protocol message M .
Send(pi,M)
Message M is delivered to session pi. After processing M , the eventual output
is given to A. This query is ignored if pi is not waiting for input. Note that pi
is either an AddUserU, an AddUserG, or a Handshake protocol session. If pi is
an AddUserU session and is in state accepted after processing M , then id from
pi.result is added to IDLi.
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Reveal(pi)
This query is defined only for Handshake sessions. If pi.state ∈ {accepted,
rejected} it returns (pi.state, pi.key) and sets pi.revealed ← true; otherwise, if
pi.state = running, the query is ignored.
Corrupt(∗)
The input is either a pseudonym id or a group G:
Corrupt(id)
If id ∈ IDLi, credential skG[id] is given to A, for any group G in which
pseudonym id is registered.
Corrupt(G)
If G ∈ GLi is a group created by a CreateGroup query, then G’s long term
secret G.sk and control over G’s revocation list G.prl is handed over to A.
Revoke(G, id)
This query lets GA of G include pseudonym id in its revocation list G.prl.
Remark 1 In addition to factoring in potentially malicious GAs, our security model
differs from that of, e.g., [95] in the way that user corruptions are handled. Indeed,
unlike in [95], we do not require that Corrupt(id) queries automatically trigger the
inclusion of pseudonym id in corresponding G.prl, i.e., we allow the adversary to
actually use credentials obtained through corruptions. We argue that our model more
comprehensively reflects some realistic attack scenarios, when compared to [95].
Within others, our security model regards groups and pseudonyms that are intro-
duced by the adversary. It is hence meaningful to distinguish between honest and
potentially dishonest users and GAs:
Definition 13 (Honest generation of pseudonyms and groups) A pseudo-
nym id is honestly generated if it has been established through an AddUserU query,
i.e., if id ∈ IDLi. It is honest if thereafter no Corrupt(id) query has been asked.
Similarly, a group G is honestly generated if it has been established through a
CreateGroup query. It is honest if thereafter no Corrupt(G) query has been asked.
It is also convenient to introduce a notion for groups in which the adversary can
obtain a valid membership credential in a trivial way:
Definition 14 (Intruded groups, intact groups) A group G is intruded if at
least one of the following holds:
• G was not created via a CreateGroup query;
• G was created via a CreateGroup query, but later Corrupt(G) was asked;
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• G was infiltrated via an AddUserG(G, ·) query;
• G was infiltrated via a Corrupt(id) query, for some pseudonym id ∈ IDLi.
If a group G is not intruded, then it is intact.
As they prove useful also in the context of AHA protocols, we borrow some con-
cepts from security models for key establishment [14,45,113]:
Definition 15 (Session id, partnered session, matching session) The session
id pi.sid of a Handshake session pi with pi.state = accepted is a value that uniquely
identifies pi in the set of all protocol instances run by pi.id. Two Handshake sessions
pi, pi′ are partnered if pi.state = pi′.state = accepted and (pi.sid, pi.id, pi.partner) =
(pi′.sid, pi′.partner, pi′.id). Sessions pi, pi′ are matching if the groups G and G′ as-
sociated with pi and pi′, respectively, are identical, and if the concatenation of the
messages received by pi is a prefix of the concatenation of messages sent by pi′, and
vice versa (i.e., pi and pi′ have consistent transcripts).
3.1.3. Affiliation-hiding security in the presence of corrupt GAs
In this section, we define the notion of (linkable) affiliation-hiding security (AH).
Our model adapts the simulation-based approach from [95] to a setting that regards
potentially malicious GAs. The idea is to require that the real protocol execu-
tion remains indistinguishable from an idealized one performed by a simulator SIM
that simulates Handshake executions without knowing participants’ affiliations. This
intuition is formalized through two experiments, Exptah,0 and Exptah,1, which adver-
sary A has to distinguish. More precisely, in security experiment Exptah,bAHA,A,SIM,
b ∈ {0, 1}, the adversary is run on input security parameter 1κ and is provided
access to a set of queries similar to those from Section 3.1.2. Eventually, the adver-
sary stops and outputs a bit b′, which is the output of the experiment. While in
Exptah,1 all queries posed by A are answered (almost) as described in Section 3.1.2,
in Exptah,0 some queries are answered by help of SIM, as shown below. Clearly,
deployment of SIM can readily be detected by A for intruded groups, simply by
executing the Handshake protocol on behalf of an (impersonated) group member.
Hence, the model lets SIM simulate only those sessions that are run on behalf of
honest pseudonyms in groups that are intact.
We specify in detail how adversary’s queries are processed in experiment
Exptah,bAHA,A,SIM, b ∈ {0, 1}:
CreateGroup,AddUserU(U,G),Revoke(G, id)
These queries are answered as described in Section 3.1.2.
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AddUserG(G,U)
This query is answered as described in Section 3.1.2, unless there exists a
running Handshake session pi invoked for a group G which is intact. In this
case, AddUserG queries are ignored if their input is such that, after processing
these queries, group G would become intruded.
Note that the named restriction preserves integrity of groups: It ensures that
Handshake sessions that are started in intact groups continue running in intact
groups until their termination.
Handshake(id, G, r)
We distinguish between two (complemental) cases:
• If G is intruded or b = 1, then the query is answered as described in
Section 3.1.2 (i.e., without involving SIM). We call the invoked session
a honest session.
• If G is intact and b = 0, then (st,M) ← SIM.Handshake(1κ, id, r) is
invoked. While answer M is given to the adversary, simulator’s state is
stored in a session variable: pi.sim ← st. Note that SIM does not learn
group G that was provided to the Handshake query1. We call the invoked
session a simulated session.
As mentioned above, in intruded groups, adversary A could detect deployment
of SIM by trivial means. Hence, we let SIM engage only in intact groups,
and only in Exptah,0.
Send(pi,M) for AddUserU and AddUserG sessions
These queries are answered as described in Section 3.1.2.
Send(pi,M) for Handshake sessions
Again, we distinguish between two cases:
• If pi is an honest session, then the query is answered as described in
Section 3.1.2 (i.e., without involving SIM).
• If pi is a simulated session, then algorithm SIM.Send(pi.sim,M) is invoked
and its answer is replied.
1Here, for simplicity, we make the assumption that pseudonyms of users do not
leak information about their groups, meaning that the statistical difference be-
tween the distributions Di = {id | id was established by AddUser(Gi, U)} and Dj =
{id | id was established by AddUser(Gj , U)} is bounded by a negligible function, for any two
groups Gi, Gj . This is the case for most practical AHA protocols, including [9, 47, 94, 95], and
also for our protocols presented in later sections. The assumption can be omitted by further
refining the model such that SIM.Handshake( ) does not receive id, but instead some identifier
F (id, G) for a suitable function F that hides both the pseudonym and its affiliation from SIM.
This approach is discussed in detail in [95].
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Observe that, in our definition, simulator SIM is stateful. In particular,
different invocations of SIM.Handshake and SIM.Send can be processed
by the simulator in dependence of each other. Although it deviates from
the requirements proposed in [95], we stress that this restriction still
defines a meaningful setting.
Reveal(pi)
Again, we distinguish between two cases:
• If pi is an honest session, then the query is processed as described in
Section 3.1.2.
• If pi is a simulated session: The query is ignored if pi did not receive
enough messages to complete the protocol. Otherwise, if no session pi′
exists which is matching pi, then (rejected,⊥) is returned. In all other
cases the experiment returns (accepted, pi.key), where pi.key is assigned
according to the following rules:
– If pi.key is not set but pi′.key is, then pi.key← pi′.key;
– If both pi.key and pi′.key are not set, then pi.key←R {0, 1}κ.
Observe that if sessions pi and pi′ are matching then all requirements are
satisfied for acceptance in the Handshake protocol. In this case, clearly,
by revealing state and keys established in pi and pi′, A will learn that id
and id′ belong to the same group. As noticed in [95], this is unavoidable
and, even in this case, A is not supposed to learn the affiliation of these
members.
Observe that we do not allow the adversary to corrupt users or groups, i.e., to pose
Corrupt(∗) queries. We are now ready to define affiliation-hiding security:
Definition 16 (Affiliation-hiding security) Let AHA = {CreateGroup,AddUser,
Handshake,Revoke} and let Exptah,0 and Exptah,1 be the experiments described above.
The advantage of adversary A in respect to simulator SIM is defined as
AdvahAHA,A,SIM(κ) =
∣∣∣Pr [Exptah,0AHA,A,SIM(κ) = 1]− Pr [Exptah,1AHA,A,SIM(κ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
We say that AHA is affiliation-hiding if there exists an efficient simulator SIM such
that AdvahAHA,A is negligible for all efficient adversaries A.
3.1.4. Key security in the presence of corrupt GAs
Security of session keys established in AHA protocols is defined analogously to that
in classical key agreement schemes [14, 45]. The adversary’s task is to distinguish a
key established in a protocol execution from a randomly generated value of the same
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length. To formalize this intuition, we introduce a new session flag, pi.tested, that is
set to false upon session initialization, and slightly adapt the Reveal query. We then
define security experiments Exptake,b, b ∈ {0, 1}, that make use of an auxiliary Test
query (that is dependent on bit b).
We start by describing the new queries:
Reveal(pi)
This query is answered as specified in Section 3.1.2 (in particular, it sets
pi.revealed← true), unless pi.tested = true or pi′.tested = true, for any session pi′
that is partnered with pi. In the latter case, the query is ignored.
Test(pi)
This query is ignored if pi is not fresh (cf. Definition 17). Otherwise, pi.tested
is set to true and a key is returned, according to the following rule: If b = 1,
pi.key is returned. If b = 0, a random element drawn uniformly from {0, 1}κ is
returned. The Test query may be invoked at most once.
The notion of session freshness is useful to exclude trivial attacks and simplifies the
definition of key security:
Definition 17 (Session freshness) A session pi that is invoked in response to a
Handshake(id, G, r) query is fresh if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) pi.state = accepted and pi.revealed = false and pi′.revealed = false for all ses-
sions pi′ that are partnered with pi;
(b) in the moment that pi.state ← accepted was assigned, all of the following did
hold:
(1) if pi.partner is honestly generated: no Corrupt(pi.partner) has been asked;
(2) if pi.partner is not honestly generated: G is honest and no AddUserG(G, ·)
query has been asked;
(3) no Corrupt(pi.id) query has been asked.
We provide rationale for these constraints: Condition (a) prevents the trivial attack
where adversary A ‘computes’ the session key established by pi or any partnered
session pi′ by simply Revealing it. Conditions (1)–(3) model forward secrecy by
allowing A to corrupt participants after the computation of pi’s session key took
place. Note that the specific conditions prevent impersonation attacks (of honest
users, and of members of ‘honest groups’, respectively), and are identical to those
in Definition 14. Observe that condition (3) permits the consideration of protocols
that are not resilient to key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks [23,113]. Also
note that the freshness conditions consider valid the attack where a malicious GA
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sets up ‘odd’ group parameters and tries to break security of session keys established
between honest members of that group.
Given the set of queries specified above and in Section 3.1.2, security experiments
Exptake,b(κ), b ∈ {0, 1}, are defined as follows: adversary A is run on security pa-
rameter 1κ, and access to all queries is provided (where only Test query is dependent
on bit b). Eventually, the adversary stops and outputs a bit b′, which is taken as
output of the experiment. The definition of key security for AHA schemes is now
straight forward:
Definition 18 (Key security with forward secrecy) Let AHA = {CreateGroup,
AddUser,Handshake,Revoke} and let Exptake,0 and Exptake,1 denote the experiments
described above. The advantage of adversary A is defined as
AdvakeAHA,A(κ) =
∣∣∣Pr [Exptake,0AHA,A(κ) = 1]− Pr [Exptake,1AHA,A(κ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
We say that AHA offers key security with forward secrecy if AdvakeAHA,A is negligible
for all efficient adversaries A.
3.1.5. Untraceability
The idea behind untraceability is that (even malicious) GAs should not be able to
trace back users’ pseudonyms to the identities of their owners. As discussed in the
introduction to this section, untraceability is a new (individual) privacy requirement,
orthogonal to key security and affiliation-hiding. We formalize it using the indistin-
guishability approach: In the corresponding security experiment, we let adversary A
first specify parameters for a group G. Two users, U0 and U1, are enrolled into G,
whereby their respective pseudonyms id0 and id1 (and corresponding credentials) are
obtained. Untraceability reflects the inability of A to trace these pseudonyms back
to the two users.
Definition 19 (Untraceability) Let AHA = {CreateGroup,AddUser,Handshake,
Revoke} and let Expttrace,0 and Expttrace,1 be the experiments specified in Figure 3.1,
where, for obvious reasons, we do not allow adversary A to access the list of pseu-
donyms IDLi. The advantage of A is defined as
AdvtraceAHA,A(κ) =
∣∣∣Pr [Expttrace,0AHA,A(κ) = 1]− Pr [Expttrace,1AHA,A(κ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
We say that AHA is untraceable if AdvtraceAHA,A is negligible for all efficient adver-
saries A.
Note that, in experiments Expttrace,b, b ∈ {0, 1}, corruption of id0 and id1 is
not forbidden. Therefore, untraceable AHA schemes hide the real identity of group
members even if their membership credentials are leaked.
40 3. AHA with untrusted group authorities
Expttrace,bAHA,A(κ):
(a) adversary A(1κ), having access to the queries from Section 3.1.2,
specifies parameters for a group G
(b) let U0 and U1 be two users. The experiment executes the ad-
mission protocol AddUserU(U0, G), followed by AddUserU(U1, G),
where all protocol steps on behalf of G are executed by A. The
experiment does not proceed until the corresponding protocol
sessions executed on behalf of U0 and U1 accept and output pseu-
donyms id0 and id1, respectively.
(c) adversary A continues its execution on input idb (still having
access to the queries from Section 3.1.2) and outputs bit b′
(d) the output of the experiment is b′
Figure 3.1.: trace experiment
3.2. A construction based on RSA
The design of the protocol presented in this section is based on schemes by Vergnaud
[156] and Jarecki, Kim, and Tsudik [95], whose ideas were sketched in Section 2.5.1.
It turns out that an adaption of [95, 156] towards a scheme that is secure in the
presence of corrupted GAs is rather challenging. This is due to the fact that the
scheme is RSA-based, i.e., security heavily depends on the well-formedness of the
RSA parameters (n, e). For instance, the security argument for the classical pro-
tocol for blind generation of RSA signatures (cf. Section 2.2.2) through blinding
to-be-signed message m with a blinding factor re (for random r ∈ Z×n ) assumes
that operation r 7→ re modn is bijective (which is the case iff gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1).
Moreover, even if RSA parameters have been properly generated, GA’s knowledge
of the modulus’ factorization can burden users’ security. For example, solving the
CDH problem in group Z×n appears to be much easier if the factorization of n is
known, as the Chinese Remainder Theorem readily decomposes Z×n into Z×p × Z×q ,
i.e., CDH modn can be computed by solving CDH mod p and mod q separately,
and then combining the results. All in all, we see that special care has to be taken
with RSA-related operations if the generation of parameters is not fully trusted,
and that public verifiability of correct generation of group parameters is a necessary
requirement of secure AHA protocols. In the RSA-based setting, the latter is gen-
erally achieved using (slight modifications of) the zero-knowledge proof framework
from [42], although such proofs are rather expensive to generate and to check.
A different challenge, related to the goal of untraceability, is the following: If
users’ pseudonyms are arbitrary strings (as in [95, 156] and in Section 2.5.1), and if
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their credentials are RSA signatures on these pseudonyms, then every member of a
group can trivially be impersonated by a corrupt GA: the latter would just have to
recompute the credential of targeted pseudonym. However, this would contradict
our security model from Section 3.1. In our solution, we deal with this issue by
replacing user pseudonyms by public keys of an independent signature scheme (cf.
Section 2.2). User authentication can then be performed by checking signatures on
session transcripts.
3.2.1. Protocol specification
Let H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}3` and, for any (RSA modulus) n ∈ N, Hn : {0, 1}∗ → Zn be
hash functions, where ` = `(κ) is fixed. For instance, if H : {0, 1}∗ → Z2κ+` denotes
an auxiliary hash function, then Hn can be constructed as Hn(x) := H(n‖x) modn.
Let Σ = (KGen,Sign,Verify) be an unforgeable signature scheme (cf. Definition 6),
and let T = 2κ+`.
Camenisch and Michels [42] show how to prove in zero-knowledge (ZK) the correct
generation of an RSA modulus n = pq, for safe primes p and q, including the
necessary primality tests and without revealing any further information about the
factors. We deploy an extended version of these ZK proofs: In Section 3.2.4 we
describe a technique based on [42] that constructs a ZK proof that, for given (n, g, e),
shows that (n, e) is well-formed according to Definition 3, and that Z×n = 〈−1〉n ×
〈g〉n. By Πn,g,e we denote a non-interactive version of that proof, e.g., obtained via
Fiat-Shamir transformation [74].
CreateGroup
To set up a new group, GA generates fresh RSA parameters (n, e, d) ←R
SRSA-GEN(1κ) and picks an element g ∈ Z×n such that Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n
(cf. Section 2.5.1). Let Πn,g,e be a non-interactive ZK proof that establishes
well-formedness of (n, g, e) (see Section 3.2.4 for details). The algorithm sets
G.prl← ∅ and outputs G.sk = (n, g, e, d,Πn,g,e) and G.prl.
AddUser
Member admission is implemented using a protocol between U and GA, as
specified in Figure 3.2. Communication between U and GA is assumed to
be authentic, yet it does not need to be confidential as in [95]. In a first
step, U obtains and examines the validity of group parameters (n, g, e), by
checking the NIZK proof Πn,g,e. Then, U generates a fresh signature key
pair (pk, sk) of signature scheme Σ. The verification key, pk, is thereafter
used by U as its pseudonym id in group G, i.e., we set2 id ← pk. Using
2In practice, one would typically set id ← F (pk), for a collision-resistant hash function F . Here,
for simplicity, we assume that id = pk.
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standard blind RSA signature scheme (cf. Section 2.2.2), U obtains an RSA
signature σid = Hn(pk)
d on Hn(pk). Note that the blinding factor r
e effectively
hides id = pk and Hn(pk) from GA. The output of U is (id, skG[id]), where
skG[id] contains signing key sk, the RSA parameters, and the signature on pk.
User U Group authority (GA)
←−
n, g, e,Πn,g,e−−−−−−−−−−−−−
validate Πn,g,e
(pk, sk)← Σ.KGen(1κ)
r ←R Z×n
m1 ← Hn(pk)re modn
− m1−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m2 ← m1d modn[
= Hn(pk)
dr
]
←− m2−−−−−−−−−−−−−
σid ← m2/rmodn
(id, skG[id])← (pk, (sk, n, g, e, σid))
Figure 3.2.: RSA-based AddUser protocol
Handshake
The protocol is executed between two users, A and B, holding pseudonyms
idA = pkA and idB = pkB, and credentials skGA [idA] = (skA, nA, gA, eA, σidA)
and skGB [idB] = (skB, nB, gB, eB, σidB ), respectively. The protocol is specified
in Figure 3.3. Padding function pad is specified in Section 2.5.1 and effectively
hides moduli nA and nB from observers.
Correctness of the protocol follows by inspection. Observe that intermediate
values rA and rB match in case (nA, gA, eA) = (nB, gB, eB) (cf. equation (2.1)
in Section 2.5.1), i.e., if users A and B are members of the same group.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
User A
Input: idA, skA, nA, gA, eA, σidA , GA.prl
(bA, xA)←R Z2 × ZnA/2
θ′A ← (−1)bA(gA)xAσidA modnA
θA ← pad(θ′A, nA, T )
sidA ← m1 ‖m2
rA ←
(
(θB)
eAHnA(idB)
−1)2xA modnA
(KA, vA, v
′
A)← H1(rA ‖sidA)
σA ← Σ.Sign(skA, sidA)
cA ← (Σ.Verify(idB , sidA, σB) ∧ v′A = v′B)
accept with key KA if cA = true
and idB 6∈ GA.prl; else reject.
m1 = (idA, θA)−−−−−−−−−−−→
m2 = (idB , θB)←−−−−−−−−−−−−
v′B , σB←−−−−−−
vA, σA−−−−−−→
User B
Input: idB, skB, nB, gB, eB, σidB , GB.prl
(bB , xB)←R Z2 × ZnB/2
θ′B ← (−1)bB (gB)xBσidB modnB
θB ← pad(θ′B , nB , T )
sidB ← m1 ‖m2
rB ←
(
(θA)
eBHnB (idA)
−1)2xB modnB
(KB , vB , v
′
B)← H1(rB ‖sidB)
σB ← Σ.Sign(skB , sidB)
cB ← (Σ.Verify(idA, sidB , σA) ∧ vA = vB)
accept with key KB if cB = true
and idA 6∈ GB .prl; else reject.
Figure 3.3.: RSA-based Handshake protocol
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Revoke
The pseudonym id to be revoked is added to G.prl. It is assumed that this list
is distributed authentically to all group members.
Remark 2 Observe the important difference between our Handshake protocol and
that from [95] (cf. Section 2.5.1): In addition to key confirmation messages v, v′,
signatures σA, σB are sent in the second round of our protocol; their validity confirms
not only the equality of computed session keys, but also serves as a proof of ownership
of ids claimed by the respective participants (through knowledge of the corresponding
secret keys). This thwarts active impersonation attacks where the adversary exploits
the blinding property of the AddUser protocol to obtain credentials for pseudonyms of
honest users. Note that the possibility of such pseudonym impersonation by insiders
(group members) would violate key security as defined in Section 3.1.4.
3.2.2. Efficiency and optimizations
The cost of our Handshake protocol is dominated by the computations of θ′A/B, rA/B,
generation of σA/B, and verification of σA/B. The first two involve exponentiations,
while the cost of the latter depends on the balance between Σ.Sign and Σ.Verify.
Many current signature schemes involve either low verification and high generation
costs (e.g., RSA), or vice versa (e.g., DSA). In any case, suffice it to say that,
for each participant, the overall computation cost amounts to approximately 3–4
exponentiations. Considering the high degree of security offered by our scheme, this
overhead is very low. Observe that the Handshake protocol can trivially be turned
into a three-pass protocol, by sending messages m2 and v
′
B, σB jointly.
Verification of NIZK proof Πn,g,e in the AddUser protocol is a considerably more
expensive operation. Indeed, the verifier would have to compute about 24κt log n
(multi-)exponentiations, where 2−t is the error-probability for the primality tests
(see [42], Sections 4.3 and 5.1). Note that [42] suggests two optimizations of the
protocol: the first one [42, Section 5.2] effectively removes factor t from the above
equation; the second one [42, Section 2.2] is applicable only to interactive ZK proofs
and eliminates factor κ. Nevertheless, the complexity of verifying well-formedness of
group parameters remains relatively high. In practice, however, it is conceivable to
completely omit the verification of Πn,g,e, since the set of (public) RSA parameters
of a group is fixed. Therefore, its verification by a single trusted auditing authority
would suffice. An appropriate (weaker) security model is easily derived from that
given in Section 3.1 by modifying the AddUserU query such that only group param-
eters are accepted that were previously established by a CreateGroup query. Note
that, in this relaxed model, untraceability of our AHA scheme becomes unconditional
(since there is no need to assume soundness of Πn,g,e in Theorem 5).
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3.2.3. Security analysis
Our RSA-based AHA construction satisfies the security goals defined in Section 3.1.
The proofs to corresponding Theorems 3–5 are given on pages 44, 48, and 49, re-
spectively.
Theorem 3 In the random oracle model, our RSA-based AHA scheme offers key
security (with forward secrecy) under the RSA assumption on safe moduli, the SCDH
assumption, given that Σ is EUF-CMA-secure, and given that Πn,g,e is sound and
zero-knowledge.
Theorem 4 In the random oracle model, our RSA-based AHA scheme is affiliation-
hiding under the RSA assumption on safe moduli, the SCDH assumption, given that
Σ is EUF-CMA-secure, and given that Πn,g,e is sound and zero-knowledge.
Theorem 5 Our RSA-based AHA scheme is untraceable, given that Πn,g,e is sound.
Remark 3 It might seem that, due to the deployment of blind signatures in the
AddUser protocol, key security of our AHA protocol cannot be shown without relying
on the hardness of the ‘one-more RSA inversion’ problem [13]. However, careful
examination of the constraints in our security model in Section 3.1 reveals that the
AddUserG query (i.e., adversary’s access to the blind signature oracle) is available
only in cases where the corresponding GA may be corrupted anyway. Hence, standard
RSA assumption suffices to prove protocol’s security.
Proof of Theorem 3. Besides to the experiments Exptake,b from Section 3.1.4,
we will refer to a set of auxiliary games (experiments) that will help us to prove
that our AHA scheme offers key security with forward secrecy. For each of these
games G, let W = Pr[G(κ) = 1] denote the probability that G’s execution results
in the output of 1. We will parametrize these games with a bit b and denote this
with a superscript, e.g., Gb.
Fix adversary A and security parameter κ. We assume that, for any protocol
session pi, session variables pi.partner and pi.sid are set immediately after receiving
the first message in the protocol (this is possible in our scheme, as opposed to
Section 2.4 and Definition 15).
Observe that adversary cannot distinguish experiments Exptake,0 and Exptake,1
without posing exactly one Test query, on a fresh session pi∗. In particular, we can
assume that session pi∗ accepts during the simulation. We start by proving that this
implies that there is also a session pi′ partnered to pi∗:
Lemma 1 In the simulation of Exptake,bAHA,A(κ), there exists (with overwhelming prob-
ability) a session pi′ 6= pi∗ such that pi∗ and pi′ compute the same session id in line 4
of the protocol, i.e., pi∗.sid = pi′.sid.
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Proof. As session pi∗ is fresh (cf. Definition 17), queries Corrupt(pi∗.id) and
Corrupt(pi∗.partner) are not posed until pi∗ accepts. Instead of the lemma, we will
prove the stronger statement that session pi′ exists (with overwhelming probabil-
ity) already in the moment that session pi∗ accepts. In particular, observe that the
following games need not be simulated after pi∗ accepts:
Game G¯b0. This game is identical to Expt
ake,b
AHA,A(κ).
Game G¯b1. Game G¯
b
1 is like Game G¯
b
0, except that the simulation is aborted if, for
any pseudonym id ∈ IDLi and any two sessions run by id, a collision of session
ids occurs, i.e., if there exist sessions pi 6= pi′ with (pi.id, pi.sid) = (pi′.id, pi′.sid).
Observe that session ids, as assigned in line 4 of the protocol, contain value
θ that is freshly and independently picked for each session and carries about
log2 T = κ + ` bits of entropy. By the birthday paradox, the probability
of collisions of session ids to occur is bounded by q2s/T = q
2
s/2
κ+`, where
qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake queries.
Game G¯b2. Game G¯
b
2 is like Game G¯
b
1, except that the simulator makes an a priori
guess on the session that will be Test session pi∗. The experiment aborts if, in
the later simulation, this guess turns out to be incorrect.
Game G¯b3. Recall that Test session pi
∗ is run by an honest user pi∗.id ∈ IDLi.
Game G¯b3 is like Game G¯
b
2, except that the simulator makes an a priori
guess id∗ ∈ IDLi on the pseudonym that will be pi∗.id. If this guess later turns
out to be incorrect, i.e., if adversary demands Test session be run by another
pseudonym, then the experiment outputs a random bit (i.e., the simulation
aborts).
Game G¯b4. Let ID
′ denote the list that contains the pseudonyms of all honest users
plus the pseudonyms that appear ‘on the wire’ in sessions simulated for pseu-
donym id∗, i.e., that appear in received first round messages m = (id, θ). We
assume that ID′ is initialized as ID′ ← ∅, and during the simulation new en-
tries (collected from Send queries) are appended at the end, unless they are
already on the list. Clearly we have |ID′| ≤ qa + qs, where qa, qs denote the
total numbers of posed AddUserU and Handshake queries, respectively.
Game G¯b4 is like Game G¯
b
3, except that the simulator picks a random pointer
t ←R {1, . . . , |ID′|} into this list. Denote by id′ the t-th entry in ID′. Once
the partner pi∗.partner of Test session is determined, the simulation aborts if
pi∗.partner 6= id′ (or id′ is still undefined at that point).
As it is impossible to efficiently guess a priori pseudonym pi∗.partner that the
adversary will use in Test session pi∗ (the adversary may send any arbitrary
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string), in this game we instead guess its first occurrence in the simulation.
The experiment will hence ‘learn’ id′ before it is actually deployed.
Consider the case where pseudonym id′ is honestly generated and hence
Corrupt(id′) is not asked (cf. condition (1) in Definition 17). Assuming addi-
tionally that a session pi′ with pi∗.sid = pi′.sid does not exist, then signature σ
received and verified in line 8 is either invalid (and session pi∗ would not ac-
cept), or was forged by the adversary (as session ids sid do not repeat, cf.
Game G¯b1). While the first case does not occur by assumption, by embed-
ding an EUF-CMA challenge (cf. Definition 6) into pseudonym id′, we notice
that the second case occurs only with a probability bounded by (negligible)
Succeuf-cmaΣ,A′ (κ), for an adversary A′, and does not need be considered in the
following analysis. In particular, we may conclude that either pseudonym id′
is not honestly generated or that session pi′ does exist.
Game G¯b5. Game G¯
b
5 is like Game G¯
b
4, except that the simulator makes an a priori
guess on group G ∈ GLi such that session pi∗ is executed in this group. If
the guess on G later turns out to be incorrect, then the experiment outputs a
random bit (i.e., the simulation aborts).
Game G¯b6. Let r
∗ be the value r computed in Test session pi∗, in line 5. Game G¯b6 is
like Game G¯b5, except that all confirmation messages v, v
′ and keys K (line 6)
computed in session pi∗ and all sessions pi′ with pi∗.sid = pi′.sid, are consistently
replaced by random values in the respective range.
Observe that all named confirmation tags and keys are computed from r∗ by
hashing this value, using hash function H1. By the random oracle model, ad-
versary can detect the difference between Games G¯b5 and G¯
b
6 only by querying
(a string that contains) r∗ to this oracle. However, the probability of this to
happen can be bounded by SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN (cf. Definition 3), as discussed in
Section 2.5.1.
|Pr[W¯ b6 ]− Pr[W¯ b5 ]| ≤ c · SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN,A′(κ)
(for an adversary A′ and a constant c).
In particular, by embedding an SRSA challenge (n, e, z) into parameters n, g, e
of group G and into pseudonym id′, a solution to the challenge can be com-
puted from any hash query on r∗. Moreover, the actions of all (honest) users
continue to be simulatable, with the exception that pseudonym id′ cannot be
‘corrupted’. As, in our setting, group G is honest and AddUserG(G, id′) is not
posed (cf. condition (2) in Definition 17), this is unproblematic. For further
details on the reduction we refer to Section 2.5.1, Appendix A, and to the
analysis by Gennaro, Krawczyk, and Rabin [82].
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Observe that embedding an SRSA challenge into G’s parameters for which
the factorization is not known requires the simulator to forge proof Πn,g,e.
However, in the random oracle model, it is possible to simulate (i.e., forge)
non-interactive ZK proofs for arbitrary statements.
Now, in Game G¯b6, if no session pi
′ exists such that pi∗.sid = pi′.sid, then verification
tags v, v′ computed by session pi∗ in line 6 are random and completely independent
from the rest of the simulation (recall from Game G¯b1 that session ids sid do not
repeat). Hence, an upper bound for the probability that pi∗ will accept is given by
1/T = 2−(κ+`) (due to the equality check in line 8). However, this contradicts our
assumption that pi∗ accepts with probability 1. We conclude that a session pi′ with
pi∗.sid = pi′.sid exists. 
Given the result from Lemma 1, the proof for key security is straight forward.
Consider the following games:
Game Gb0. This game is identical to Expt
ake,b
AHA,A(κ).
Our goal is to show that |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function.
Game Gb1. Due to Lemma 1, there exists a session pi
′ 6= pi∗ such that pi∗.sid = pi′.sid.
Game Gb1 is like Game G
b
0, except that the simulator makes a priori guesses
on these sessions. The experiment aborts if, in the later simulation, one of the
guesses on pi∗, pi′ turns out to be incorrect.
Game Gb2. Game G
b
2 is like Game G
b
1, except that keys K in sessions pi
∗, pi′ are
assigned via K ← K ′, where K ′ ∈R {0, 1}` is a fixed but random string.
It can be generally assumed that the simulation is aware of the factorization
of all SRSA moduli n corresponding to the groups G ∈ GLi, even if some
moduli n are provided by the adversary. This follows from soundness of ZK
proof Πn,g,e and a standard rewinding argument that extracts the factors from
the proof. Let G denote the group corresponding to session pi∗ and (n, g, e)
its parameters. In addition, let n = pq be the factorization of modulus n,
where p, q are safe primes. Without loss of generality, let 〈g〉p = QR(p) and
〈g〉q = Z×q .
The modification introduced in Game Gb2 can be detected by an adversary only
by posing an H1 query on (a string that contains) Diffie-Hellman value g
2exAxB
(line 5), where gxA , gxB ∈ 〈g〉n are the values used for mounting pi∗.sid’s val-
ues θ′ (line 2, see also equation (2.1) in Section 2.5.1). Using CRT (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1.1), we embed an SCDH challenge (cf. Definition 2) in group QR(p) =
〈g〉p into gxA , gxB ∈ 〈g〉n, using, as counterparts in Z×q , values gyA , gyB ∈ 〈g〉q,
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for known yA, yB ∈ Zq−1. This technique bounds the probability of adver-
sary A asking a H1 query on g2exAxB by a negligible function:
|Pr[W b2 ]− Pr[W b1 ]| ≤ SuccscdhA′ (κ) (for an adversary A′).
Note that exponent 2e ∈ Zϕ(n) can readily be removed from g2exAxB if factor-
ization n = pq is known.
As key K of session pi∗ is randomly chosen in Game Gb2 and the adversary is not
allowed to pose Reveal queries to neither pi∗ nor pi′ (due to condition (a) in Defi-
nition 17), we have Pr[W 02 ] = Pr[W
1
2 ]. Putting everything together, we note that
AdvakeAHA,A(κ) = |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function, provided that the
required assumptions hold. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Recall that affiliation-hiding security (Definition 16) is de-
fined in respect to a simulator SIM that generates messages that are indistinguish-
able from real protocol messages. For the following proof we require SIM to act as
follows:
SIM.Handshake(1κ, id, r)
Recall that, according to the specification of AddUser protocol (cf. Figure 3.2),
pseudonym id coincides with a verification key pk of signature scheme Σ. Let sk
denote the signing key corresponding to id and observe that sk is known to the
challenger in experiment Exptah,b. We consider sk as part of id, i.e., we assume
that SIM implicitly obtains this key in its parameters (note that knowledge
of sk does not give SIM a hint about the affiliation to simulate, as this key
is generated independently of the group to which id is registered). Under this
premise, algorithm SIM.Handshake proceeds as follows: it picks a random
value θ ←R [0, T − 1], sets st ← (1κ, id, sk, r, θ) and M ← (id, θ), and outputs
(st,M).
SIM.Send(st,M)
This algorithm parses (1κ, id, sk, r, θ)← st, sets sid← (id, θ)‖M or sid←M ‖
(id, θ) (according to role r) and σ ← Σ.Sign(sk, sid), picks v ←R {0, 1}`, and
outputs (v, σ).
Given this specification of SIM, the difference between experiments Exptah,0AHA,A,SIM
and Exptah,1AHA,A,SIM from the point of view of the adversary manifests itself at at
most three points: (a) the distributions of θs in first protocol messages might differ
(observe that the remaining part of first messages, id, is perfectly simulated); (b) the
distributions of confirmation tags v in second protocol messages might differ (observe
that the remaining part of second messages, σ, is perfectly simulated); (c) established
3.2. A construction based on RSA 49
session keys pi.key might be inconsistent with real ones (cf. specification of Reveal
query in Section 3.1.3).
In respect to (a), the difference between Exptah,0 and Exptah,1 is bounded by the
(qs-fold, where qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake queries) statistical
difference between the two methods to generate θ. As discussed in Section 2.5.1
and [95], this difference is negligible.
Case (c) is just an unusual verbalization of the requirement of secure key estab-
lishment: The latter states that any adversary is unable to distinguish real session
keys from random ones, unless it actively takes part in protocol sessions as a member
of the corresponding group (what is excluded by the model, as SIM only simulates
intact groups, see Definition 14 and Section 3.1.3). Key security of our AHA protocol
is formally established in Theorem 3.
That the adversary cannot tell apart Exptah,0 and Exptah,1 from confirmation
tags v (case (b)) follows as well from key security, and from the simple observation
that keys and confirmation messages are computed using the same hash function
query (cf. line 6 in Figure 3.3). 
Proof of Theorem 5. It is well known that the RSA blind signature scheme offers
unconditional privacy [49]. In fact, the deployed blinding method, also used in the
AddUser protocol in Figure 3.2, is exactly the application of one-time pad encryption
in Z×n and hence offers perfect secrecy (note that, if n, e are RSA parameters and
r ∈R Z×n is picked uniformly at random, then also re modn is uniformly distributed
in Z×n ). It follows that GAs cannot learn any information about registering users
from AddUser protocol sessions. In particular, id and Hn(id) are kept completely
hidden from GAs.
However, this line of argumentation holds only if n, e are indeed valid RSA param-
eters. More precisely, in order to guarantee untraceability of users, we have to ensure
that (a) random elements in Zn are, with overwhelming probability, also elements
in Z×n , and (b) exponentiation by e is a bijective operation, i.e., e ∈ Z×ϕ(n). Both
these requirements are ensured to hold by the proof of well-formedness of parameters
(n, g, e), i.e., by Πn,g,e. We may conclude that
AdvtraceAHA,A(κ) ≤ SuccsndΠn,g,e,A′(κ) (for an adversary A′),
where SuccsndΠn,g,e,A′ denotes the soundness error of ZK proof Πn,g,e. 
3.2.4. Proving well-formedness of RSA parameters
Let n ∈ N and g, e ∈ [0, n− 1]. We briefly describe how to construct a (NI)ZK proof
Πn,g,e that certifies in zero-knowledge that the following three conditions on n, g, e
are satisfied:
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(a) n = pq for p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 such that p, q, p′, q′ are primes (cf.
Definition 3);
(b) e is a valid RSA exponent for n, i.e., there exists d ∈ N such that ed =
1 modϕ(n);
(c) Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n, i.e., ordn(g) = ϕ(n)/2 and −1 6∈ 〈g〉n.
We assume that the prover has access to the factorization of n (and, thus, can
compute ϕ(n) and d). In contrast, the verifier, on input n, g, e,Πn,g,e, shall not
learn any information besides this input.
A solution for condition (a) is given by Camenisch and Michels in [42] and builds
on Pedersen’s commitments [136]. We provide a high-level description of their tech-
niques and describe how they can be extended to also address conditions (b) and (c).
The basic idea in [42] is to represent natural numbers a ∈ N by corresponding
commitments C(a) = ha1h
α
2 , where h1, h2 are independent generators of a cyclic
group, and α is a random exponent. Remarkably, simple arithmetic computations
on committed values can be performed given just the commitments. In particular,
[42] describes how to do this for the operations listed below. In addition, it is
shown how correctness of these operations can be efficiently established by dedicated
ZK proofs. Note that the (perfect) hiding property of the commitment scheme
guarantees for the secrecy of all committed values.
Basic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, exponentiation)
Let C(a), C(b), C(n) be commitments on a, b, n ∈ N, respectively. Operations
ADD and MADD compute the addition and modular addition, respectively, on
these committed values, i.e., for
C(c1)← ADD(C(a), C(b)) and C(c2)← MADD(C(a), C(b), C(n))
we have c1 = a+b and c2 = a+bmodn. Operations for (modular) subtraction
(M)SUB and multiplication (M)MUL are defined analogously. By composing
several of these operations, we also achieve a protocol for modular exponenti-
ation, defined by C(c) ← MPOW(C(a), C(b), C(n)), such that C(c) is a com-
mitment on c = ab modn.
Primality tests
(Pseudo)primality of a committed number C(p) can be verified using Lehmann’s
primality test [115]. The corresponding ZK proof internally deploys multiple
MADD, MMUL, and MPOW operations and is denoted by pseudoprime(C(p)).
Given these operations (and the respective ZK proofs that certify their correct ex-
ecution), it is straight forward to construct a proof that a committed safe prime
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p = 2p′ + 1 has indeed this form. Indeed, it suffices to check the following relation:
pseudoprime(C(p)) ∧ C(p) = ADD(MUL(C(2), C(p′)), C(1)) ∧ pseudoprime(C(p′)) .
Let us denote this predicate by safeprime(C(p)). Putting everything together, the
proof that a committed number n is an SRSA modulus in the sense of condition (a)
can be mounted like this:
C(n) = MUL(C(p), C(q)) ∧ safeprime(C(p)) ∧ safeprime(C(q)) .
Condition (b) is easily handled by committing to ϕ(n) = 2p′q′ and to exponents e
and d = e−1 modϕ(n), and by opening the following commitment to the value 1:
MMUL(C(e), C(d), C(ϕ)) ≡ 1 .
In practice, however, one would presumably pick exponent e = 3. In this case,
condition (b) is always fulfilled.
Let us now address condition (c). Note that a safe RSA modulus n is in particular
a Blum integer, i.e., every quadratic residue a ∈ QR(n) ⊆ Z×n has exactly four
distinct square roots. This also holds for a = 1, and the set of elements b satisfying
b2 = 1 (modn) is given by {±1,±ω}, for some ω ∈ Z×n . Let x, y be integers satisfying
px + qy = 1, where n = pq. Note that these integers can be found using Euclid’s
algorithm. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem (cf. Section 2.1.1), it is easily seen
that ω is given by ω = ±(px − qy) modn. Now, the set of all g ∈ Z×n that satisfy
Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n is identical to the set of all g ∈ Z×n that satisfy gp
′q′ = ±ω
(recall λ(n) = ϕ(n)/2 = 2p′q′). Summing up, a ZK proof for condition (c) can be
constructed as follows:
(1) Compute x, y such that px + qy = 1. Publish commitments C(x), C(y) and
prove
ADD(MUL(C(p), C(x)),MUL(C(q), C(y))) ≡ 1 .
(2) Compute ω ← px− qymodn. Publish C(ω) and prove
C(ω) = MSUB(MUL(C(p), C(x)),MUL(C(q), C(y)), C(n)) .
(3) Compute h← gp′q′ . Publish C(h) and prove
C(h) = MPOW(C(g),MUL(C(p′), C(q′)), C(n)) .
(4) Show h = ±ω by opening one of the following commitments:
SUB(C(h), C(ω)) ≡ 0 ∨ ADD(C(h), C(ω)) ≡ 0 .
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Protocol Security & Privacy Revocation of Complexity
AKE1 FS2 AH3 UT4 Transf. bits5 # passes6 # exps7
JKT [95] hGA 3 hGA 7 users,pseudonyms 1264 3 2 long
Sect. 3.2 cGA 3 cGA 3 pseudonyms 1504 3 2 long +
3 short
1key security; 2forward secrecy; 3affiliation-hiding security; 4untraceability; 5total number of sent
bits per protocol run; 6number of message passes per protocol run; 7number of exponentiations per
protocol run (with short or long exponents)
Table 3.1.: Security and performance comparison of AHA protocols
3.3. Comparison of protocols
Table 3.1 compares security, privacy, and efficiency of our RSA-based AHA protocol
from Section 3.2 with the scheme [95] it is based on. We see that, in respect to
key security, forward secrecy (FS) is provided by both protocols, presuming hon-
est behavior of GA — denoted by hGA — for [95] (otherwise, small subgroup at-
tacks [117] would be possible, within others). In contrast, our protocol offers key
security with forward secrecy even in the presence of corrupt GAs — denoted by
cGA. As the user registration process in [95] is not blinded, the protocol cannot
provide affiliation-hiding security if GAs are corrupt (malicious GAs could record
AddUser transcripts and later recognize affiliated pseudonyms). The same holds for
untraceability of users. In our protocol, however, both properties are given even in
the presence of corrupt GAs. As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, in
untraceable schemes, revocation can only by performed based on pseudonyms.
We also compare the message and bandwidth complexity of the specific Handshake
protocols. We assume RSA moduli of length 1024 bits. Moreover, we assume that
ECDSA signatures [101] are deployed in the scheme from Section 3.2. The lengths
of pseudonyms and key confirmation messages are assumed to be 80 bits. Although
we admit that the protocol from [95] slightly outperforms our proposal, we still
conclude that our strengthened scheme is competitive with the established solution.
4
Strategies towards multigroup AHA
The affiliation-hiding property provided by AHA protocols is meaningful only if
multiple groups are present in the system. Since users might possibly belong to
several groups at the same time, the inherent problem in practice is not to decide
whether two given users are members of the same single group, but rather whether
there is a non-empty intersection between the two sets of groups to which the users
belong. Current AHA protocols [9, 47, 95, 96, 99, 161] ignore the latter problem by
design, i.e., the Handshake execution is typically performed with respect to only a
single input group per participant and session. Little attention has been paid so
far to possible solutions for the more general group discovery problem [95, p. 356].
A protocol that solves the problem of group discovery would take as input a set
of groups per participant and session, output the intersection of these sets, and, in
the case that this intersection is not empty, provide a session key to the users for
protection of their subsequent communication. One of the main challenges here is
to prevent that participants inadvertently reveal non-matching groups from their
input sets to each other or to outsiders.
A simple approach to group discovery is to execute a single-group protocol for
each possible combination of group memberships, and, whenever some session is
successful, the corresponding group is added to the intersection set. Clearly, this
solution is highly inefficient. A further challenge would be the computation of the
session key in a way that ensures that leakage of this key does not reveal any infor-
mation about groups in the intersection set. Motivated by the importance of group
discovery for the practical deployment of AHA, we highlight in this section the main
related challenges and explore various strategies to attack the group discovery prob-
lem. We will see that, in comparison to the already mentioned trivial approach,
the ad-hoc application of more sophisticated but ‘standard’ tools can result in less
secure schemes.
In order to illustrate different approaches, we briefly introduce the setting of group
discovery in AHA protocols. Consider a total of N different groups, G1, . . . , GN ,
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that are managed by distinct GAs. We assume that user U1 with pseudonym id1
is a registered member of n1 groups, i.e., U1 holds a set {skGi [id1]}i of n1 different
membership credentials. Similarly, U2 is a registered member of n2 groups holding
own set {skGj [id2]}j of n2 credentials. To simplify the exposition, let us further
assume that n1 = n2 and use the notation n = n1 = n2.
At a high level, the goal of group discovery in AHA protocols is to execute a
Handshake session between U1 and U2 such that at the end of the session (a) the users
identify the subset of groups for which both have respective membership credentials
(without disclosing information about any other credentials they possess), and (b) if
this subset of groups is non-empty, then the two users agree on a secret key. Current
AHA protocols admit exactly one input group per Handshake participant and session,
basically allowing for privacy-preserving matching of input groups Gi and Gj used
by U1 and U2, respectively. In our description, we will utilize this ability of U1
and U2 to execute such single-group AHA protocols using any of their membership
credentials.
4.1. The na¨ıve approach
For completeness, we repeat the trivial solution proposed above. The idea is that
U1 and U2 use a single-group AHA protocol for any possible combination of their
group memberships. This requires n2 different AHA sessions, what might be a too
large overhead in practice (even if sessions are carried out in parallel).
4.2. (Authorized) Private Set Intersection
We investigate whether the group discovery problem can be solved in a generic way
using private set intersection (PSI) protocols, such as [5,59,61,63,78,87,88,98,100,
107]. In the PSI setting, users have on input individual sets of elements, and the
goal of the protocol is to allow users to learn the intersection of these sets without
disclosing any information about further elements. One might attempt to design a
group discovery protocol by simply letting group credentials be random nonces from
a large domain (but identical values are assigned to all members of a group), and by
using a PSI protocol to check if given two users have matching nonces. With this
solution, however, a number of problems arise: (a) providing the same credential
to all group members precludes member revocation since users can trivially create
and admit new members to their groups by duplicating their nonces, without GA
noticing it, (b) as consequence, the proposed technique leads to an AHA protocol
which is not affiliation-hiding in the sense defined in our model in Section 5.3, and
(c) although PSI protocols with linear computational overhead are known [63, 88],
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our group discovery protocols presented in later sections can be implemented more
efficiently as they rely on simpler building blocks.
A related class of protocols [58,63], called authorized PSI (APSI), strengthens the
requirements of PSI protocols in that users’ inputs must contain authorized elements
only, i.e., elements that have been previously certified by some trusted authority.
A technique for computing the intersection of certified sets has been introduced
in [44]. One may think that authorization of elements in APSI corresponds to the
registration process of users to groups in AHA protocols. However, the APSI setting
assumes that the same authority certifies all elements in the input sets. In contrast,
the AHA setting explicitly requires existence of multiple independent GAs providing
users with membership certificates. In addition to that, problem (a) in the PSI
setting (support of revocation) also applies here.
4.3. Reducing the overhead by using hashing
A possible improvement over the na¨ıve approach from Section 4.1 in respect to
reduction of overhead involves the usage of hashing. We describe here only the basic
ideas of this solution, since our main focus is on a more efficient approach based on
a new encoding technique we introduce in Section 4.5.
In the hashing-based approach, the parties U1 and U2 use a common random hash
function h, which either is chosen in advance or is jointly defined by the two parties.
The hash function maps arbitrary values to an output in the range [1, B], B ∈ N,
namely into one of B bins. Each party then assigns its membership credential
in group Gi into bin h(i). Now, when U1 and U2 meet, they need not run the
AHA protocol between each of the
(
n
2
)
combinations of their potential input groups.
Instead, the protocol needs only be run between the groups that were mapped by
both parties to the same bin. Indeed, for every group Gi for which both U1 and U2
have membership credentials, both parties map these credentials to the same bin
h(i) and will run an AHA protocol with these credentials.
The basic idea described above succeeds in finding every match between member-
ship credentials of the two parties. However, in order to protect privacy, a protocol
which is based on this approach must hide from each party how many credentials
were mapped by the other party to each of the bins (otherwise some data is leaked;
for example, if the first bin of U1 is empty then U2 learns that U1 in not a member
of any group Gi for which h(i) = 1). Hiding the number of items in every bin can be
done (following [78]) by finding a bound M such that the following property holds
with high probability: when n items are mapped by a random hash function to B
bins, then no more than M items are mapped to any single bin. Given this bound
M , each party first maps its credentials to the B bins, and then adds to each bin
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that has less than M credentials additional “dummy” values, which are indistin-
guishable from real credentials, so that the total number of items in the bin is M .
The protocol now requires to run M2 Handshake sessions of the single-group AHA
protocol for every bin, resulting in the total of BM2 sessions. More specifically,
users operate in the following way:
(a) Users U1 and U2 agree on a random hash function h( ) that maps items to a
range of size B.
(b) User U1 maps its credentials to bins according to h( ) (if more than M items are
mapped to a bin then U1 aborts the protocol, but this event should only happen
with negligible probability). U1 adds dummy items to the bins until each bin
has exactly M items. Party U2 performs the same procedure independently
of U1.
(c) For each bin, the parties run a single-group Handshake protocol M2 times, for
each combination of the items in their respective copies of the bin.
In order to set the right parameters, we can use the following well known fact [139,
Theorem 1]:
Fact 1 If n items are mapped at random to B = n/ log n bins, then the probability
that there is a bin with more than M = O(log n) items is o(1).
Clearly, communication and computational overhead of the protocol is O(BM2).
Plugging in the parameters B = n/ log n and M = O(log n), we get a total overhead
of O(n log n), for both cases.
4.4. An attempt to further improve the overhead
The overhead of a PSI protocol based on hashing into bins was reduced in [78] by
using a better hashing method — the balanced allocation hashing, introduced by
Azar et al. in [7]. In this hashing algorithm, the function h( ) chooses two distinct
bins for each item, and the item is mapped into the bin which is less occupied at
the time of placement. Theorem 1.1 of [7] states that, if the number of bins is
B = n/ log log n, it holds with probability 1 − o(1) that the maximum number of
items in a bin is M = O(log log n). (It was also shown in [31] that the probability
of this event not happening is exponentially small.)
This result gives rise to the following protocol: User U1 maps its credentials into
bins using the balanced allocation hashing method described above, with parameters
B = n/ log logn and M = O(log log n). Following that step, each of U1’s credentials
can be in one of two bins. User U1 then pads each of its bins with dummy credentials
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so that it contains exactly M items. Party U1 then begins the protocol by sending
the first message of the AHA session for each of the BM items in its bins. User U2
answers in the following way: for each credential it has, it assumes that an AHA
session for that credential might have been started with any of the first messages
sent in each of the two bins to which the corresponding group is mapped by h( ).
User U2 then replies to each of these messages with its matching answer in the AHA
session, and user U1 completes to protocol by sending the last message (assuming
a three-pass AHA protocol, as the ones from Section 2.5). The communication and
computation overhead of the entire protocol is reduced to BM2 = O(n log log n).
However, this variant of the protocol is insecure as it might leak some private
information: At the end of the protocol, if the two parties detect a match for a
group Gi, then U2 learns to which of the two bins the credential of Gi was mapped
by U1. This reveals to U2 that the other potential bin of Gi was more occupied at the
time the mapping of item Gi into bins took place. This fact might leak information
about the other groups in which U1 is a member. We do not know how to provably
solve this issue, and we therefore refrain from using this protocol. To conclude, we
note that a similar problem arises if one attempts to use a protocol based on Cuckoo
hashing [134].
4.5. Index-hiding message encoding
A tool that will play a central role in the group discovering AHA protocols we propose
in later sections is a new primitive called index-hiding message encoding (IHME).
By the related concept of index-based message encoding we understand a technique
that encodes a set of input messages m1, . . . ,mn ∈M (whereM is a message space)
into a single data structure S. Any of these messages can individually be recovered
from S by addressing it via its index, which is arbitrarily chosen from an index
set I and specified at encoding time. If it is impossible for an adversary to reveal
information about the deployed indices by inspecting S, then the scheme is index-
hiding. These notions are now formalized, by first giving a syntactical definition of
IBME, and then a game-based definition of IHME’s index-hiding property. We will
motivate in Section 4.5.2 on how IHME can be used to construct a group discovering
AHA protocol.
Definition 20 (Index-based message encoding) An index-based message en-
coding scheme over an index space I and a message space M is a set IBME =
{iEncode, iDecode} of two efficient algorithms:
iEncode(P)
On input a set P of n index/message pairs, i.e., P = {(i1,m1), . . . , (in,mn)} ⊆
I×M, with distinct indices ij, j ∈ [1, n], this algorithm outputs an encoding S.
58 4. Strategies towards multigroup AHA
iDecode(S, i)
On input of an encoding S and an index i ∈ I, this algorithm outputs a message
m ∈M.
An IBME scheme is correct if iDecode(iEncode(P), ij) = mj for all j ∈ [1, n], for all
sets P = {(i1,m1), . . . , (in,mn)} ⊆ I ×M with distinct indices ij.
Informally, an IBME scheme is index-hiding if it hides the indices in which the
messages are encoded. That is, it ensures that an attacker, who sees an encoding
S and might even know some of the indices and corresponding messages, cannot
identify any other indices in which messages are encoded. We formalize this property
in Definition 21.
Definition 21 (Index-hiding message encoding) Let IHME = {iEncode,
iDecode} denote an IBME scheme over index space I and message space M. Let
A = (A1,A2) be an adversary that participates in the experiment of Figure 4.1. The
advantage of A is defined as
AdvihideIHME,A(κ) =
∣∣∣Pr [Exptihide,0IHME,A(κ) = 1]− Pr [Exptihide,1IHME,A(κ) = 1]∣∣∣ .
We say that IHME is index-hiding if this advantage is negligible for all efficient
adversaries A. Moreover, IHME is perfectly index-hiding if AdvihideIHME,A(κ) = 0 for
all (unbounded) adversaries A, for all κ.
Exptihide,bIHME,A(κ):
(a) (I0, I1,M, state) ← A1(1κ) such that I0, I1 ⊆ I, |I0| = |I1|, and
M ∈Mk, with I0 ∩ I1 = {i1, . . . , ik} and M = (m1, . . . ,mk), for
some ij , mj , and k. Let n = |I0| = |I1|.
(the adversary chooses two sets of n indices each, as well as, for
each index ij in the intersection of these sets, a corresponding
message mj)
(b) let Ib \ I1−b =: {ik+1, . . . , in} and mk+1, . . . ,mn ←RM
(n− k further messages are chosen uniformly at random)
(c) S ← iEncode(P) for P = {(i1,m1), . . . , (in,mn)} ⊆ I ×M
(the messages are encoded for the indices in Ib)
(d) b′ ← A2(state,S)
(e) return b′
Figure 4.1.: ihide experiment
4.5. Index-hiding message encoding 59
4.5.1. A construction of IHME
We propose an efficient and perfectly index-hiding construction of IHME which is
based on polynomial interpolation in finite fields. Let F denote an arbitrary finite
field, and let I = M = F. An index-hiding message encoding scheme IHME =
{iEncode, iDecode} with index space I and message spaceM is given by the following
algorithms:
iEncode(P)
The encoding of P = {(i1,m1), . . . , (in,mn)} ⊆ I ×M = F2 is defined as the
list S = (cn−1, . . . , c0) of coefficients of the polynomial p(x) =
∑n−1
k=0 ckx
k ∈
F[x] that interpolates all points in P, i.e., p(ij) = mj for all (ij ,mj) ∈ P.
Note that this polynomial exists uniquely (cf. Theorem 11 on page 92), i.e.,
the iEncode algorithm is deterministic.
iDecode(S, i)
On input S = (cn−1, . . . , c0) ∈ Fn and index i ∈ I, this algorithm outputs
m =
∑n−1
k=0 cki
k, i.e., evaluation p(i) of the polynomial p(x) ∈ F[x] induced by
the coefficients in S.
Observe that our IHME construction is size-preserving: The total number of field
elements needed to represent messages {m1, . . . ,mn} on the one side, and the en-
coding S of these messages on the other side, is the same. While correctness of
the construction is obvious, its index-hiding property is assured by the following
theorem.
Theorem 6 (Security of IHME construction) The proposed IHME scheme pro-
vides perfect index-hiding.
Proof. If I0 = I1 then A obviously cannot find b. Assume therefore that I0 6=
I1. Since the messages encoded for indices in Ib \ I1−b are chosen randomly, then
regardless of whether b = 0 or b = 1, the coefficients seen by A are of a polynomial
which is random subject to the constraint that for the indices in I0 ∩ I1 its values
are equal to the fixed messages provided by A. The distribution of the coefficients
seen by A is therefore independent of b, and A’s advantage in the ihide experiment
is thus 0. 
We anticipate that we give an alternative construction of IHME in Section 6.2. In
particular, we will show how to generically compose IHME schemes from other IHME
schemes. Our transformation is motivated by the efficiency gain achieved by such
a construction. Moreover, in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we present various optimizations
and performance measurements obtained by profiling concrete implementations of
our polynomial-based IHME scheme.
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4.5.2. Multigroup AHA from IHME
We briefly describe the ideas behind a solution for the group discovery problem that
combines IHME with a single-group AHA scheme. However, the full specification and
analysis of this construction is postponed to Section 5.4. Observe that the sketched
idea is generally applicable not only to linkable AHA schemes, as treated in this
thesis, but also to unlinkable ones [6, 96,99,150].
In our protocol, index set I is identified with the set of all possible groups. User U1
starts many single-group AHA sessions in parallel, namely one for each of the groups
that it is affiliated with. The vector (mj) of the first protocol messages generated
by these Handshake instances is IHME-encoded into a single structure S, using for
each message the group-specific index. Encoding S is sent to U2, who extracts
the Handshake messages for only the groups it is affiliated with. Note that, for all
matching groups Gi (i.e., groups in which both U1 and U2 are members), the first
message of all Handshake instances is correctly transferred from U1 to U2. The IHME
technique is then independently applied to all subsequently exchanged Handshake
messages.
Observe that, for the secure deployment of IHME (as per Definition 21), it is
essential that messages exchanged between users in the given single-group Handshake
are indistinguishable from random in M = F. This property is satisfied by some
protocols, in particular by the AHA protocol from Section 2.5.1. We combine IHME
and this specific AHA scheme in Section 5.4, and achieve the first construction of an
AHA protocol that offers group discovery.
4.6. Comparison of strategies
Our different strategies to achieve group discovery are compared in Table 4.1. As
our IHME scheme from Section 4.5.1 has zero message expansion, the communica-
tion complexity of the multi-group AHA construction sketched in Section 4.5.2 is
that of O(n) single-group Handshake executions. Thus, in contrast to the proposals
from Sections 4.3 and 4.4, our IHME-based construction solves the group discovery
problem with linear communication and computation complexity, not counting the
computations that IHME encoding and decoding takes. Although the overhead of
polynomial interpolation (as used in IHME encoding) is O(n2) multiplications in
field F, with regard to Table 4.1 we assume that the overhead of these operations is
negligible when compared with the overhead of, say, exponentiations needed in AHA
protocols. We highlight that our IHME-based group discovery scheme (asymptoti-
cally) outperforms all other suggested solutions.
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Technique Computations Communication Remarks
(Handshake invocations)
Na¨ıve approach O(n2) O(n2)
Hashing into bins O(n log n) O(n log n)
Balanced allocation hashing O(n log log n) O(n log log n) not privacy preserving
AHA + IHME O(n) O(n)
Table 4.1.: Solutions for group discovery with n groups per participant
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Multigroup AHA
In Chapter 4, we motivated the need for group discovery in affiliation-hiding authen-
tication protocols: In the mAHA (multi-affiliation AHA) setting, users are envisioned
to register their pseudonym to a multitude of available groups/GAs. In subsequent
Handshake sessions, they provide all their credentials simultaneously, and the proto-
col will not only establish a secure session key, but also compute the intersection of
participants’ affiliations in a secure way, i.e., users learn partner’s group member-
ships only for those groups to which they are affiliated themselves. In this section,
we formalize this approach by proposing a corresponding syntax and a security
model. Moreover, building on design strategies discussed in Chapter 4, we propose
two efficient constructions that are secure in respect to our model.
We are not the first ones to propose a solution to the problem of group discovery;
at least one other mAHA scheme supporting multiple credentials can be found in
the literature. In particular, Jarecki and Liu [97] construct an affiliation-hiding
envelope scheme (AHE) that supports multiple credentials. Additionally, they briefly
describe how to construct a mAHA protocol from this primitive. We summarize their
approach in the next section, but we anticipate that their scheme does not satisfy
our stronger security notion of affiliation-hiding, that we will define in Section 5.3.
5.1. The mAHA scheme by Jarecki and Liu
We describe the mAHA construction by Jarecki and Liu [97], starting with a sketch
of their AHE scheme. In a setting with multiple groups G = {G1, . . . , Gn} that
are managed by their particular group authorities (GA), an AHE scheme allows
a sender S to transmit an encrypted message m to a receiver R, such that R can
only decrypt the ciphertext when satisfying a ciphertext-specific authorization policy
P ⊆ G. This policy P is specified by S independently for any new encryption, and
receiver R is compliant with this policy if R is affiliated to at least one group G ∈ P,
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i.e., if R received a credential from at least one of the corresponding GAs.
Concretely, the construction proposed in [97] is as follows: In a cyclic group
setting (G, g, q) (cf. Section 2.1.2), all users create their individual public/secret key
pair as pkU = g
xU and skU = xU , for random xU ←R Zq. GAs have key pairs of
the same form, i.e., pkG = g
xG , skG = xG, for xG ←R Zq. Users U register to
groups G by sending their respective secret key skU to the respective GA, which
raises its public key pkG to the power of skU , and returns this value, rU,G = g
xUxG ,
together with ΠU,G, a NIZK proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm of this value,
i.e., ΠU,G = PoK [(α) : rU,G = g
α] in the notation by Camenisch and Stadler [43].
Note that, under the DDH assumption, the elements rU,G ∈ G reveal neither the
identity of the user nor the identity of the issuing GA.
Given this setup, messages are sent from S to R by letting receiver R provide its
(rR,G,ΠR,G) pairs for all the groups it got credentials for, and by letting sender S,
after checking validity of the ΠR,G, perform an ElGamal encryption to ‘public
keys’ rR,G (actually, [97] describes a more sophisticated way of doing this, by reusing
the ephemeral encryption exponent in order to bring down decryption complexity
from O(n2) to O(n) exponentiations, an idea pioneered in [11,29]). The envelope is
opened by receiver R by using its secret exponent xR for ElGamal decryption. Note
that the same exponent xR serves as decryption key for all affiliations of R.
In their paper, Jarecki and Liu define multiple security notions for AHE schemes.
Besides the requirement of CCA security that protects message’s secrecy under pres-
ence of a decryption oracle, privacy of sender and receiver are captured by the no-
tions of sender privacy and receiver privacy, respectively. Basically, an AHE scheme
is sender private against outsiders if a (malicious) receiver R cannot learn anything
about the policy P specified by the sender, given that R is not affiliated to any group
in P. In contrast, sender privacy against insiders encompasses the case where R is
affiliated to some groups R ( P, but all commitments of S to groups in P \R would
still remain hidden fromR. The notion of receiver privacy assures that the affiliations
of the receiver cannot be revealed by a malicious sender. The authors of [97] claim1
that their AHE scheme is sender private against outsiders under DDH and GapDH
assumption, and that it is receiver private under DDH assumption. However, they
leave open the case of sender privacy against insiders (cf. [97, Section 4.1]).
Given such an AHE scheme, Jarecki and Liu construct a simple mAHA protocol by
letting participants transmit encrypted nonces to each other using envelopes (where
policies P are set to the own affiliations), decrypt theses nonces, and derive session
keys from them. Clearly, this scheme does not offer forward secrecy of the key
(where we admit that this issue could be fixed). Worse, as we discuss in Section 5.6,
1The proofs for sender privacy against outsiders and receiver privacy do actually not appear in
the paper [97], but are announced to be published in the full version. This version, however,
does not yet seem to be available, not even on direct request to the authors.
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the constructed mAHA scheme does not seem to provide the strong property of
affiliation-hiding security that we define in the following sections. Moreover, we
stress that the mAHA scheme in [97] is only vaguely specified, and corresponding
security models and proofs are not provided at all.
5.2. Syntax of mAHA
We proceed by defining the syntax of mAHA schemes. As the general definition of
(single-group) AHA from Section 2.4 assumes that users provide exactly one creden-
tial per Handshake session, in order to also cover the multi-group setting, we have to
slightly adjust both the syntax of Handshake protocol invocation and the definition
of mAHA correctness (cf. Definitions 11 and 12).
Handshake(U1 ↔ U2)
This protocol is executed between two users, U1 and U2. User Ui, i ∈ {1, 2},
provides as input parameters paramsi = (idi,Gi, ri) and executes its individual
part Handshake′(paramsi). It is expected that idi is user Ui’s pseudonym, Gi
is a set of pairs of the form (skG[idi], G.prl) for some groups G, and ri ∈
{init, resp}. For all groups G in Gi we require that (idi, skG[idi]) is a valid
pseudonym/credential pair, obtained via AddUser algorithm (in particular, we
require that Ui has registered the same pseudonym in all groups listed in Gi).
By G.prl we denote the pseudonym revocation list of respective group G.
The protocol shall detect the set of groups G that both participants are mem-
ber of (i.e., G is listed in both G1 and G2, together with valid membership
credentials). If there is any such group, the protocol shall accept with an
established shared session key. Otherwise, it shall reject.
Users keep track of the state of created Handshake protocol sessions pi through
session variables that are initialized as follows: pi.state← running, (pi.id, pi.G)←
(id,G), (where id and G are taken from paramsi), pi.key ← ⊥, pi.partner ← ⊥,
pi.groups ← ∅. At some point, the protocol completes and pi.state is updated
to either rejected or accepted. In the latter case, pi.key is set to the estab-
lished session key (of length κ), the pseudonym of the Handshake partner is
assigned to pi.partner, and pi.groups holds a non-empty set of group identi-
fiers. State accepted cannot be reached if the protocol partner is revoked (i.e.,
pi.partner ∈ G.prl for all groups G in G).
Definition 22 (Correctness of mAHA) Suppose that two users, U1 and U2, par-
ticipate in a Handshake protocol on inputs (id1,G1, r1) and (id2,G2, r2), respectively,
and let pi1 and pi2 denote the corresponding sessions. (We assume that all credentials
in G1 and G2 have been generated by appropriate AddUser executions). By G∩ we
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denote the set of groups that appear in both G1 and G2 with the restriction that nei-
ther id1 nor id2 are contained in the respective groups’ revocation lists. The mAHA
scheme is correct if (a) pi1 and pi2 complete in the same state which is accepted
iff G∩ 6= ∅ and r1 6= r2, and (b) if both sessions accept, then (pi1.key, pi1.partner,
pi1.id) = (pi2.key, pi2.id, pi2.partner) and pi1.groups = pi2.groups = G∩.
5.3. A security model for mAHA
We present a security model for mAHA schemes that takes into account the main
challenges implied by affiliation-hiding authentication and the group discovery prob-
lem. In particular, we cover the two central security properties of mAHA: affiliation-
hiding security and key security (see also Chapter 1). Both requirements are defined
with regard to multiple input groups per participant and session. While the defini-
tion of the latter goal is similar to standard definitions of key security [14, 45, 95],
and only minor modifications are necessary to fit the mAHA setting, the definition of
affiliation-hiding security in the multi-group environment is non-standard and first
introduced here.
5.3.1. Adversarial queries
In the security experiments defined below, adversary A is modeled as a probabilistic
algorithm that runs in polynomial time and interacts with the experiments via the
following set of queries. Observe that, in contrast to Section 3.1, our mAHA model
deals only with trusted GAs, i.e., queries CreateGroup,AddUser,Corrupt(G) for group
management are not available.
Handshake(id,G, r)
This query lets pseudonym id start a new session pi of the Handshake protocol.
It receives as input a set G of groups G wherein the Handshake shall take place
and a role identifier r ∈ {init, resp} that determines whether the session will
act as protocol initiator or responder. If there is a group G listed in G for
which id does not have a credential skG[id] then this query is ignored. Session
variable pi.revealed is initialized to false. Optionally, this query returns a first
protocol message M .
Send(pi,M)
Message M is delivered to session pi. After processing M , the eventual output
is given to A. This query is ignored if pi is not waiting for input.
Reveal(pi)
If pi.state ∈ {accepted, rejected}, this query returns (pi.state, pi.key, pi.groups)
and sets pi.revealed← true; otherwise, if pi.state = running, the query is ignored.
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Corrupt(id, G)
Credential skG[id] of pseudonym id in group G is given to the adversary. Note
that this query models the possibility of selective corruptions where pseudo-
nyms id are corrupted only for specific groups.
Revoke(G, id)
This query lets GA of G include pseudonym id in its revocation list G.prl.
5.3.2. Affiliation-hiding security
We now define the notion of (linkable) affiliation-hiding security (AH). At a high
level, the objective is to protect users from disclosing non-shared affiliations to
Handshake partners. We model AH security using the indistinguishability approach:
The goal of the adversary is to decide about which of two sets of affiliations, G∗0 or
G∗1 , a specific challenge Handshake session pi∗ is running on. Let D∗ := ∆(G∗0 ,G∗1) =
(G∗0 \G∗1)∪ (G∗1 \G∗0) = (G∗0 ∪G∗1)\ (G∗0 ∩G∗1) denote the symmetric difference between
G∗0 and G∗1 . The adversary specifies G∗0 and G∗1 himself, and is allowed to invoke any
number of Handshake sessions and to ask Reveal and Corrupt queries at will, pro-
vided that the pseudonyms in the groups from D∗ = ∆(G∗0 ,G∗1) are not impersonated
(as this would lead to trivial attacks). This intuition is formalized in Definition 23
and Figure 5.1. Note that, to define AH security, we dropped the simulation based
paradigm (cf. Section 3.1.3, and also [95]) in favor of a (more comprehensible) purely
game-based approach.
Definition 23 (Affiliation-hiding security) Let mAHA = {CreateGroup,AddUser,
Handshake,Revoke} and let Exptah,0 and Exptah,1 be the experiments specified in Fig-
ure 5.1. The advantage of adversary A is defined as
AdvahmAHA,A(κ, n,m) =∣∣∣Pr [Exptah,0mAHA,A(κ, n,m) = 1]− Pr [Exptah,1mAHA,A(κ, n,m) = 1]∣∣∣ .
We say that mAHA is affiliation-hiding if AdvahmAHA,A is negligible in κ (for all n,m
polynomially dependent on κ), for all efficient adversaries A.
In experiment Exptah,b, conditions (1)–(3) exclude some trivial attacks on AH se-
curity. In particular, condition (1) thwarts the attack where A starts a
Handshake(id′,G′, r′) session pi′ with G′ ∩ D∗ 6= ∅, relays all messages between pi∗
and pi′ and finally asks Reveal(pi∗). By protocol correctness, pi∗.groups would contain
elements from D∗ and it would be trivial to correctly decide about bit b. Condi-
tion (2) handles the same attack, but from the point of view of pi′. Condition (3)
prevents A from corrupting a pseudonym in a group in D∗, to impersonate that pseu-
donym, and to decide about bit b in dependence of acceptance in a corresponding
protocol execution with pi∗.
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Exptah,bmAHA,A(κ, n,m):
(a) the experiment creates a set of users {U1, . . . , Un} and a set of
corresponding pseudonyms ID = {id1, . . . , idn}
(b) the experiment creates m groups G = {G1, . . . , Gm} and registers
user Ui with pseudonym idi in group Gj , for all (i, j) ∈ [1, n] ×
[1,m]
(c) A(1κ) interacts with all participants using the queries from Sec-
tion 5.3.1; at some point, A outputs a tuple (id∗,G∗0 ,G∗1 , r∗) where
id∗ ∈ ID, G∗0 ,G∗1 ⊆ G with |G∗0 | = |G∗1 |, and r∗ ∈ {init, resp}. Let
D∗ = ∆(G∗0 ,G∗1).
(d) the experiment invokes a Handshake(id∗,G∗b , r∗) session pi∗ (and
provides all needed credentials)
(e) A continues to interact via queries (including on session pi∗) until
it terminates and outputs bit b′
(f) the output of the experiment is b′ if all of the following hold;
otherwise the output is 0:
(1) if pi∗ accepted and there is a Handshake session pi′ with D∗ ∩
pi′.G 6= ∅ which was in state running while pi∗ was in state
running, then no Reveal(pi∗) query was asked;
(2) no Reveal(pi′) query was asked for any Handshake session pi′
with D∗ ∩ pi′.G 6= ∅ and pi′.partner = id∗ that was in state
running while pi∗ was in state running;
(3) no Corrupt(id, G) query with (id, G) ∈ ID×D∗ was asked.
Figure 5.1.: ah experiment
Remark 4 (Variant of affiliation-hiding security) Observe that, in experiment
Exptah,b, we do not pose requirements on sets G∗0 ,G∗1 , except that we demand |G∗0 | =
|G∗1 |. It is easily seen by a hybrid argument that a modified definition of affiliation-
hiding security with the additional constraint |G∗0 \ G∗1 | = 1 = |G∗1 \ G∗0 | would be
equivalent to the one from Definition 23. In this case we would always have |D∗| = 2.
5.3.3. Key security
Key security of mAHA schemes is modeled similarly to [14, 45], where the goal of
adversary A is to distinguish the session key computed for a specific challenge ses-
sion pi∗ from a random value of the same length. Adversary A is allowed to freely
invoke any number of Handshake sessions, to corrupt pseudonyms, and to reveal es-
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tablished session keys, as long as it does not obtain the session key computed by pi∗
in some trivial way. For the formal definition of key security, we slightly modify
the Reveal query from Section 5.3.1 and introduce the auxiliary Test query (that is
dependent on a bit b ∈ {0, 1}). We also introduce a new session variable, pi.tested,
which is set to false upon session creation. Here is the specification of the new
queries:
Reveal(pi)
This query is processed as specified in Section 5.3.1 (in particular, pi.revealed←
true is assigned), unless pi.tested = true or pi′.tested = true, for any session pi′
that is partnered with pi (cf. Definition 24). In the latter case, the query is
ignored.
Test(pi)
This query is ignored if pi is not fresh (cf. Definition 25). Otherwise, pi.tested
is set to true and a key is returned, according to the following rule: If b = 1,
pi.key is returned. If b = 0, a random element drawn uniformly from {0, 1}κ is
returned. The Test query may be invoked at most once.
The notions of session id, session partnering, and session freshness have proven to
be indispensable in sound definitions of security of key agreement schemes:
Definition 24 (Session id, partnered session) The session id pi.sid of a
Handshake session pi with pi.state = accepted is a value that uniquely identifies pi in
the set of all protocol instances run by pi.id. Two Handshake sessions pi, pi′ are part-
nered if pi.state = pi′.state = accepted and (pi.sid, pi.id, pi.partner) = (pi′.sid, pi′.partner,
pi′.id).
Definition 25 (Session freshness) A session pi that is invoked in response to a
Handshake(id,G, r) query is fresh if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) pi.state = accepted and pi.revealed = false and pi′.revealed = false for all ses-
sions pi′ that are partnered with pi;
(b) there exists a group G ∈ pi.groups such that, in the moment that pi.state ←
accepted was assigned, all of the following did hold:
(1) no Corrupt(pi.partner, G) query has been asked;
(2) no Corrupt(pi.id, G) query has been asked.
Conditions (a) and (b) are the usual constraints found in key secrecy models that
include forward secrecy [45]. Observe that it suffices, for a session pi to be considered
fresh, that pi.id and pi.partner remain uncorrupted for a single common group G.
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Condition (2) is not really mandatory, but permits the consideration of protocols
that are not resilient to key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks [23,113]. We
are now ready to formally define key security of mAHA schemes:
Definition 26 (Key security with forward secrecy) Let mAHA =
{CreateGroup,AddUser,Handshake,Revoke} and let Exptake,0 and Exptake,1 be the ex-
periments specified in Figure 5.2. The advantage of adversary A is defined as
AdvakemAHA,A(κ, n,m) =∣∣∣Pr [Exptake,0mAHA,A(κ, n,m) = 1]− Pr [Exptake,1mAHA,A(κ, n,m) = 1]∣∣∣ .
We say that mAHA offers key security with forward secrecy if AdvakemAHA,A is negli-
gible in κ (for all n,m polynomially dependent on κ), for all efficient adversaries A.
Exptake,bmAHA,A(κ, n,m):
(a) the experiment creates users U1, . . . , Un and corresponding pseu-
donyms id1, . . . , idn
(b) the experiment createsm groupsG1, . . . , Gm and registers user Ui
with pseudonym idi in group Gj , for all (i, j) ∈ [1, n]× [1,m]
(c) A(1κ) interacts with all participants using the queries from Sec-
tion 5.3.1; at some point, A asks Test(pi∗) to a fresh session pi∗.
(d) A continues to interact via queries (including on session pi∗) until
it terminates and outputs bit b′
(e) the output of the experiment is b′
Figure 5.2.: ake experiment
5.4. A mAHA construction based on RSA
We give an efficient mAHA construction that solves the group discovery problem.
Our protocol builds on the RSA-based single-group AHA scheme sketched in Sec-
tion 2.5.1, that allows to check for correspondence of only one group per participant
and Handshake session. However, this scheme brings along the nice property that
the transferred messages are indistinguishable from random to any observer that
is not a group member. We exploit this fact and, by combining the protocol with
IHME from Section 4.5, we achieve group discovery with (almost) linear complexity,
without assuming any further building blocks.
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5.4.1. Protocol specification
Let ` = `(κ) be polynomially dependent on security parameter κ. The innovative
building block of our mAHA protocol is the perfect IHME scheme constructed in Sec-
tion 4.5.1 and defined over an arbitrary finite field F = GF (q). Although, generally,
finite fields exist for any prime power q = pn, for concreteness and ease of exposition
we will use F = GF (T ), where T is the smallest prime number satisfying T > 2κ+`.
We admit that, in some scenarios, finite fields of the form GF (2κ+`) could offer
benefits in efficiency. The security of our scheme, however, is not dependent on the
particular choice of F.
Our mAHA scheme is defined in respect to a set of hash functions: For any (RSA
modulus) n ∈ N, let Hn : {0, 1}∗ → Zn be a hash function. For instance, Hn can
be constructed as Hn(x) := H
′(n‖x) modn, where H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → Z2κ+` denotes an
auxiliary hash function. We further assume hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → [0, T − 1]
and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`.
We specify the different algorithms of our mAHA protocol as follows:
CreateGroup
To set up a new group, GA generates fresh RSA parameters (n, e, d) ←R
SRSA-GEN(1κ) and picks an element g ∈ Z×n such that Z×n = 〈−1〉n× 〈g〉n (cf.
Section 2.5.1). GA sets G.prl← ∅, and outputs G.sk = (n, g, e, d) and G.prl.
AddUser
The credential skG[id] = (n, g, e, σid) corresponding to pseudonym id ∈ {0, 1}∗
in group G consists of parameters (n, g, e) and the RSA signature σid =
Hn(id)
d modn on the full-domain hash of id (cf. Section 2.2.2).
Handshake
The protocol is executed between two users, UA and UB, holding pseudo-
nyms idA, idB and lists GA,GB of pairs (skG[id], G.prl), respectively. The full
specification is given in Figure 5.3, where padding function pad is defined as
in Section 2.5.1. The aim of the latter is to hide moduli nA and nB from
observers.
The lines where the numbering is formatted in bold face coincide with Fig-
ure 2.6; in particular, this includes the calculation of the
θ = pad((−1)bgxσid, n, T ) values (lines 3–6), the intermediate keys
r = (θeHn(id)
−1)2x (line 16), and the confirmation messages v (lines 17 and 25).
Lines 14 and 19 effectively implement user revocation. Innovative in this pro-
tocol is the parallel transmission of multiple θ and v values encoded as IHME
structures S and S ′, respectively (lines 9, 15, 21, and 24). Note the usage
of RSA moduli n as group specific indices (lines 7, 15, 20, and 24). Lists T
and R are not transmitted, but hold the inner state of the protocol.
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Correctness of the protocol follows by inspection (see also equation (2.1) in
Section 2.5.1), given that string X is mounted in the same order by both UA
and UB (lines 22–27). This can be achieved by letting the corresponding for
loop iterate in order of ascending n. Recall from Section 2.5.1 that, for any
group G for which both participants provide valid credentials, the intermediate
keys rA, rB will match.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
User A
Input: idA,GA, init
PA ← ∅, TA ← ∅
for all (skGA [idA], GA.prl) ∈ GA:
parse (nA, gA, eA, σA)← skGA [idA]
(bA, xA)←R Z2 × ZnA/2
θ′A ← (−1)bA(gA)xAσA modnA
θA ← pad(θ′A, nA, T )
PA ← PA ∪ {(nA, θA)}
TA ← TA ∪{(skGA [idA], xA, GA.prl)}
SA ← iEncode(PA)
sidA ← mA ‖mB
P ′A ← ∅, RA ← ∅
for all (skGA [idA], xA, GA.prl) ∈ TA:
parse (nA, gA, eA, σA)← skGA [idA]
if idB 6∈ GA.prl:
θB ← iDecode(SB , nA) modnA
rA ←
(
(θB)
eAHnA(idB)
−1)2xA modnA
vA ← H(nA ‖rA ‖sidA ‖ init)
RA ← RA ∪ {(GA, nA, rA)}
else: vA ←R [ 0, T − 1 ]
P ′A ← P ′A ∪ {(nA, vA)}
S ′A ← iEncode(P ′A)
XA ← "", groupsA ← ∅
for all (GA, nA, rA) ∈ RA:
vB ← iDecode(S ′B , nA)
if vB = H(nA ‖rA ‖sidA ‖ resp):
groupsA ← groupsA ∪ {GA}
XA ← XA ‖nA ‖rA
if groupsA 6= ∅ then
keyA ← H1(XA ‖sidA)
partnerA ← idB
terminate with “accept”
else
(keyA, partnerA)← (⊥,⊥)
terminate with “reject”
mA = (idA,SA)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
mB = (idB ,SB)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
S ′B←−−−−−−−−−−
S ′A−−−−−−−−−−→
User B
Input: idB,GB, resp
PB ← ∅, TB ← ∅
for all (skGB [idB ], GB .prl) ∈ GB:
parse (nB , gB , eB , σB)← skGB [idB ]
(bB , xB)←R Z2 × ZnB/2
θ′B ← (−1)bB (gB)xBσB modnB
θB ← pad(θ′B , nB , T )
PB ← PB ∪ {(nB , θB)}
TB ← TB ∪ {(skGB [idB ], xB , GB .prl)}
SB ← iEncode(PB)
sidB ← mA ‖mB
P ′B ← ∅, RB ← ∅
for all (skGB [idB ], xB , GB .prl) ∈ TB:
parse (nB , gB , eB , σB)← skGB [idB ]
if idA 6∈ GB .prl:
θA ← iDecode(SA, nB) modnB
rB ←
(
(θA)
eBHnB (idA)
−1)2xB modnB
vB ← H(nB ‖rB ‖sidB ‖ resp)
RB ← RB ∪ {(GB , nB , rB)}
else: vB ←R [ 0, T − 1 ]
P ′B ← P ′B ∪ {(nB , vB)}
S ′B = iEncode(P ′B)
XB ← "", groupsB ← ∅
for all (GB , nB , rB) ∈ RB:
vA ← iDecode(S ′A, nB)
if vA = H(nB ‖rB ‖sidB ‖ init):
groupsB ← groupsB ∪ {GB}
XB ← XB ‖nB ‖rB
if groupsB 6= ∅ then
keyB ← H1(XB ‖sidB)
partnerB ← idA
terminate with “accept”
else
(keyB , partnerB)← (⊥,⊥)
terminate with “reject”
Figure 5.3.: RSA-based Handshake protocol with group discovery
Revoke
The pseudonym id to be revoked is added to G.prl. It is assumed that this list
is distributed authentically to all group members.
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5.4.2. Efficiency and optimizations
The computational costs of the Handshake protocol mainly consist of the exponentia-
tions by x, which are executed twice per credential, in lines 5 and 16. More precisely,
the computational effort a user executing a Handshake session has to stem can be
estimated by 2n exponentiations (with modulus and exponent size κ), where n = |G|
denotes the number of credentials the user provides. Observe that the revocation
checks (line 14) can be implemented with logarithmic complexity, i.e., we assume
the overhead is negligible. The exact performance penalty introduced by deployed
IHME scheme will be investigated in full detail in Sections 6.1–6.3. However, we
anticipate that the computational overhead of the protocol scales roughly linearly
with the number n of provided credentials (at least for reasonable sizes of n). The
size of IHME encodings S,S ′ grows linearly with the number of affiliations as well.
Note that the scheme is displayed as a four-message protocol for reasons of better
readability. By combining messages mB and S ′B into a single datagram, the scheme
can be relieved by one message transmission. For further discussions on the scheme’s
efficiency, including suggestions for further improvements, we refer to Sections 5.6
and 6.3.
5.4.3. Security analysis
Our mAHA construction satisfies all security goals formalized in Section 5.3. In
particular, it is affiliation-hiding and offers key security with forward secrecy. The
proofs to corresponding Theorems 7 and 8 are given on pages 73 and 76, respectively.
Theorem 7 Our RSA-based mAHA scheme from Section 5.4.1 is affiliation-hiding
under the RSA assumption on safe moduli, in the random oracle model.
Theorem 8 Our RSA-based mAHA scheme from Section 5.4.1 offers key security
(with forward secrecy) under the RSA assumption on safe moduli, in the random
oracle model.
Proof of Theorem 7. Besides to the experiments Exptah,b from Figure 5.1 (includ-
ing the modification proposed in Remark 4), we will refer to a set of auxiliary games
(experiments) that will help us to prove that our mAHA scheme is affiliation-hiding.
For each of these games G, let W = Pr[G(κ, n,m) = 1] denote the probability that
G’s execution results in the output of 1. We will parametrize these games with a
bit b and denote this with a superscript, e.g., Gb.
Fix adversary A and parameters κ, n = n(κ) and m = m(κ). We assume that,
for any protocol session pi, session variables pi.partner and pi.sid are set immediately
after receiving the first message in the protocol (this is possible in our scheme, as
opposed to Section 5.2 and Definition 24). Consider the following games:
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Game Gb0. This game is identical to Expt
ah,b
mAHA,A(κ, n,m).
Our goal is to show that |W 00 − W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function.
This holds trivially if the adversary violates any of the conditions (1)–(3) in
Figure 5.1, as this would directly imply W 00 = W
1
0 = 0. We hence assume in
the following that adversary complies with the named conditions.
Game Gb1. Game G
b
1 is like Game G
b
0, except that the simulation is aborted if, for
any pseudonym id ∈ ID and any two sessions run by id, a collision of session
ids occurs, i.e., if there exist sessions pi 6= pi′ with (pi.id, pi.sid) = (pi′.id, pi′.sid).
Observe that session ids, as assigned in line 10 of the protocol, contain values
θ that are freshly and independently picked for each session and carry about
log2 T > κ+ ` bits of entropy each. By the birthday paradox, the probability
of collisions of session ids to occur is bounded by q2s/T < q
2
s/2
κ+`, where
qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake queries.
Game Gb2. Recall that challenge session pi
∗ is run by an honest user pi∗.id ∈ ID,
where |ID| = n. Game Gb2 is like Game Gb1, except that the simulator makes
an a priori guess id∗ ∈ ID on the pseudonym that will be pi∗.id. If this guess
later turns out to be incorrect, i.e., if adversary demands challenge session be
run by another pseudonym, then the experiment outputs a random bit (i.e.,
the simulation aborts).
Game Gb3. Let ID
′ denote the list that contains the pseudonyms of all honest users
plus the pseudonyms that appear ‘on the wire’ in sessions simulated for pseu-
donym id∗, i.e., that appear in received first round messages m = (id,S). We
assume that ID′ is initialized as ID′ ← ID, and during the simulation new en-
tries are appended at the end, unless they are already on the list. Clearly we
have |ID′| ≤ n + qs, where qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake
queries.
Game Gb3 is like Game G
b
2, except that the simulator picks a random pointer
t ←R {1, . . . , |ID′|} into this list. Denote by id′ the t-th entry in ID′. Once
the partner pi∗.partner of the challenge session is determined, the simulation
aborts if pi∗.partner 6= id′ (or id′ is still undefined at that point).
As it is impossible to efficiently guess a priori pseudonym pi∗.partner that the
adversary will use in challenge session pi∗ (the adversary may send any arbitrary
string), in this game we instead guess its first occurrence in the simulation.
The experiment will hence ‘learn’ id′ before it is actually deployed.
Game Gb4. Game G
b
4 is like Game G
b
3, except that the simulator makes an a priori
guess on group Gb such that {Gb} = G∗b \ G∗1−b, out of a set of size |G| = m.
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Note that we assume the modification to experiment Exptah,b that is proposed
in Remark 4. If the guess on Gb later turns out to be incorrect, then the
experiment outputs a random bit (i.e., the simulation aborts).
Game Gb5. Let r
∗ be the value r computed in challenge session pi∗ for group Gb
(line 16). Game Gb5 is like Game G
b
4, except that all confirmation messages v
(lines 17 and 25) and keys key (line 29), that are computed in session pi∗ and all
sessions pi′ with pi∗.sid = pi′.sid in dependence on r∗, are consistently replaced
by random values in the respective range.
Observe that all named confirmation tags and keys are computed from r∗ by
hashing this value, using hash functions H and H1. By the random oracle
model, adversary can detect the difference between Games Gb4 and G
b
5 only
by querying (a string that contains) r∗ to these oracles. However, the proba-
bility of this to happen can be bounded by SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN (cf. Definition 3), as
discussed in Section 2.5.1.
In particular, by embedding an SRSA challenge (n, e, z) into parameters n, g, e
of group Gb and into pseudonym id′, a solution to the challenge can be com-
puted from any hash query on r∗. Moreover, the actions of all (honest) users
continue to be simulatable, with the exception that pseudonym id′ cannot be
corrupted in group Gb. This behavior, however, is compliant with the rules
in Exptah,b. For further details on the reduction we refer to Section 2.5.1,
Appendix A, and to the analysis by Gennaro, Krawczyk, and Rabin [82]. We
conclude that, for a constant c,
|Pr[W b5 ]− Pr[W b4 ]| ≤ c · SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN,A′(κ) (for an adversary A′).
Game Gb6. Game G
b
6 is like Game G
b
5, except that value θ for groupG
b, as computed
by session pi∗ in line 6, is replaced by a random element: θ ←R [0, T − 1].
Observe that, in the protocol, θ is exclusively used to compute r∗ in line 16
(and, correspondingly, in sessions pi′ with pi∗.sid = pi′.sid). As we decoupled this
value from the remaining simulation in Game Gb5, the difference between W
b
5
and W b6 is bounded by the statistical difference of the two methods to gener-
ate θ. As discussed in Section 2.5.1 and [95], this difference is negligible.
Game Gb7. Game G
b
7 is like Game G
b
6, except that, in session pi
∗, we replace index n,
used for IHME encoding value θ in group Gb, by a fixed (unused) index, e.g.,
n = 0 (cf. lines 7 and 9).
The change introduced in Game Gb7 corresponds to the security experiment
of IHME’s index-hiding property (cf. Figure 4.1): As θ is chosen uniformly
from [0, T − 1], which coincides with IHME’s message spaceM, we can readily
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construct an IHME adversary A′ from any distinguisher between Games Gb6
and Gb7. In the reduction, the set of moduli of the groups in G∗b is assigned to
index set I0, while the set of moduli of the groups in G∗b \ {Gb} together with
index n = 0 is assigned to I1. As messages M corresponding to the indices in
I0∩ I1 the θ-values for the groups in G∗b \{Gb} are taken without modification.
We conclude that
|Pr[W b7 ]− Pr[W b6 ]| ≤ AdvihideIHME,A′(κ) (for an adversary A′).
Consider, in Game Gb7, the existence of a session pi
′ such that pi∗.sid = pi′.sid and
D∗ ∩ pi′.G 6= ∅.
If such a session does not exist, then verification tags v assigned by session pi∗
for group Gb are random and completely independent from Gb and the rest of the
simulation (recall the changes introduced in Game Gb5). In particular, (a) the tag v
that pi∗ sends in lines 20 and 21 contains no information about group Gb, (b) IHME
structure S ′ that pi∗ sends in line 21 leaks no information about Gb (by an argument
similar to the one in the hop to Game Gb7), and (c) a Reveal(pi
∗) query unveils no
information about Gb, as the test in line 25 corresponding to group Gb will pass
only with negligible probability 1/T < 2−(κ+`). Recall that the protocol’s first
message, m, sent in line 9, does not leak information about group Gb since the hop
to Game Gb7.
If such a session pi′ does exist, then this can only be if the lifetimes of pi∗ and pi′
overlap. In this case, posing Reveal(pi′) or Reveal(pi∗) queries is not allowed (cf.
conditions (1) and (2) in Figure 5.1). Although the verification tag for group Gb
that pi∗ sends in line 21 is not independent from Gb in the simulation (it is potentially
also computed and expected by session pi′), it is so from the point of view of the
adversary, as the latter has no means to learn how this tag is processed within pi′.
In any case, we observe that the adversary cannot efficiently distinguish experi-
ments G07 and G
1
7, i.e., we have W
0
7 ≈ W 17 . Putting everything together, we note
that AdvahmAHA,A(κ, n,m) = |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function, provided
that the required assumptions hold. 
Proof of Theorem 8. Besides to the experiments Exptake,b from Figure 5.2, we will
refer to a set of auxiliary games (experiments) that will help us to prove that our
mAHA scheme offers key security with forward secrecy. For each of these games G,
let W = Pr[G(κ, n,m) = 1] denote the probability that G’s execution results in the
output of 1. We will parametrize these games with a bit b and denote this with a
superscript, e.g., Gb.
Fix adversary A and parameters κ, n = n(κ) and m = m(κ). We assume that,
for any protocol session pi, session variables pi.partner and pi.sid are set immediately
after receiving the first message in the protocol.
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Recall that, in experiment Exptake,b, the adversary poses exactly one Test query,
on a fresh session pi∗. In particular, session pi∗ accepts during the simulation. We
start by proving that this implies that there is also a session pi′ matching pi∗:
Lemma 2 In the simulation of Exptake,bmAHA,A(κ, n,m), there exists (with overwhelm-
ing probability) a session pi′ 6= pi∗ such that pi∗ and pi′ compute the same session id
in line 10 of the protocol, i.e., pi∗.sid = pi′.sid.
Proof. As session pi∗ is fresh (cf. Definition 25), there exists a group G∗ ∈ pi∗.groups
such that queries Corrupt(pi∗.id, G∗) and Corrupt(pi∗.partner, G∗) are not posed until
pi∗ accepts. Instead of the lemma, we will prove the stronger statement that ses-
sion pi′ exists (with overwhelming probability) already in the moment that session pi∗
executes line 26 of the protocol for group G∗ (what has to occur by definition of G∗).
Observe that the following games need not be simulated after pi∗ accepts:
Game G¯b0. This game is identical to Expt
ake,b
mAHA,A(κ, n,m).
Game G¯b1. Game G¯
b
1 is like Game G¯
b
0, except that the simulation is aborted if, for
any pseudonym id ∈ ID and any two sessions run by id, a collision of session
ids occurs, i.e., if there exist sessions pi 6= pi′ with (pi.id, pi.sid) = (pi′.id, pi′.sid).
Observe that session ids, as assigned in line 10 of the protocol, contain values
θ that are freshly and independently picked for each session and carry about
log2 T > κ+ ` bits of entropy each. By the birthday paradox, the probability
of collisions of session ids to occur is bounded by q2s/T < q
2
s/2
κ+`, where
qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake queries.
Game G¯b2. Game G¯
b
2 is like Game G¯
b
1, except that the simulator makes an a priori
guess on the session that will be Test session pi∗. The experiment aborts if, in
the later simulation, this guess turns out to be incorrect.
Game G¯b3. Recall that Test session pi
∗ is run by an honest user pi∗.id ∈ ID, where
|ID| = n. Game G¯b3 is like Game G¯b2, except that the simulator makes an
a priori guess id∗ ∈ ID on the pseudonym that will be pi∗.id. If this guess
later turns out to be incorrect, i.e., if adversary demands Test session be run
by another pseudonym, then the experiment outputs a random bit (i.e., the
simulation aborts).
Game G¯b4. Let ID
′ denote the list that contains the pseudonyms of all honest users
plus the pseudonyms that appear ‘on the wire’ in sessions simulated for pseu-
donym id∗, i.e., that appear in received first round messages m = (id,S). We
assume that ID′ is initialized as ID′ ← ID, and during the simulation new en-
tries are appended at the end, unless they are already on the list. Clearly we
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have |ID′| ≤ n + qs, where qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake
queries.
Game G¯b4 is like Game G¯
b
3, except that the simulator picks a random pointer
t ←R {1, . . . , |ID′|} into this list. Denote by id′ the t-th entry in ID′. Once
the partner pi∗.partner of Test session is determined, the simulation aborts if
pi∗.partner 6= id′ (or id′ is still undefined at that point).
As it is impossible to efficiently guess a priori pseudonym pi∗.partner that the
adversary will use in Test session pi∗ (the adversary may send any arbitrary
string), in this game we instead guess its first occurrence in the simulation.
The experiment will hence ‘learn’ id′ before it is actually deployed.
Game G¯b5. Let r
∗ be the value r computed in Test session pi∗ for group G∗ (line 16).
Game G¯b5 is like Game G¯
b
4, except that all confirmation messages v (lines 17
and 25) and keys key (line 29), that are computed in session pi∗ and all ses-
sions pi′ with pi∗.sid = pi′.sid in dependence on r∗, are consistently replaced by
random values in the respective range.
Observe that all named confirmation tags and keys are computed from r∗ by
hashing this value, using hash functions H and H1. By the random oracle
model, adversary can detect the difference between Games G¯b4 and G¯
b
5 only
by querying (a string that contains) r∗ to these oracles. However, the proba-
bility of this to happen can be bounded by SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN (cf. Definition 3), as
discussed in Section 2.5.1.
|Pr[W¯ b5 ]− Pr[W¯ b4 ]| ≤ c · SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN,A′(κ)
(for an adversary A′ and a constant c).
In particular, by embedding an SRSA challenge (n, e, z) into parameters n, g, e
of group G∗ and into pseudonym id′, a solution to the challenge can be com-
puted from any hash query on r∗. Moreover, the actions of all (honest) users
continue to be simulatable, with the exception that pseudonym id′ cannot be
corrupted in group G∗, what is, in our setting, unproblematic. For further
details on the reduction we refer to Section 2.5.1, Appendix A, and to the
analysis by Gennaro, Krawczyk, and Rabin [82].
Now, in Game G¯b5, if no session pi
′ exists such that pi∗.sid = pi′.sid, then verification
tags v computed by session pi∗ in lines 17 and 25 for group G∗ are random and
completely independent from the rest of the simulation (recall from Game G¯b1 that
session ids sid do not repeat). Hence, an upper bound for the probability that
pi∗ will execute line 26 for group G∗ is given by 1/T ≤ 2−(κ+`). However, we
have G∗ ∈ pi∗.groups by assumption, i.e., line 26 is executed with probability 1, a
contradiction. We conclude that a session pi′ with pi∗.sid = pi′.sid exists. 
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Given the result from Lemma 2, the proof for key security is straight forward.
Consider the following games:
Game Gb0. This game is identical to Expt
ake,b
mAHA,A(κ, n,m).
Our goal is to show that |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function.
Game Gb1. Due to Lemma 2, there exists a session pi
′ 6= pi∗ such that pi∗.sid = pi′.sid.
Game Gb1 is like Game G
b
0, except that the simulator makes a priori guesses
on these sessions. The experiment aborts if, in the later simulation, one of the
guesses on pi∗, pi′ turns out to be incorrect.
Game Gb2. Game G
b
2 is like Game G
b
1, except that keys pi
∗.key, pi′.key of sessions
pi∗, pi′ are assigned via key ← K, where K ∈R {0, 1}` is a fixed but random
string.
This modification can be detected by an adversary only by posing an H1 query
on (a string that contains) Diffie-Hellman value g2exAxB , where gxA , gxB are
the values contained in pi∗.sid’s values θ′ for group G∗, as computed in line 5 of
the protocol (see also equation (2.1) in Section 2.5.1). However, by embedding
a CDH challenge in group 〈g〉n into gxA , gxB , the probability of this to happen
can be bounded by a negligible function:
|Pr[W b2 ]− Pr[W b1 ]| ≤ c · SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN,A′(κ)
(for an adversary A′ and a constant c).
Roughly speaking, this bound holds as the (S)RSA assumption implies hard-
ness of factoring, which, then again, implies hardness of CDH problem in
Z×n [8, 18, 126, 148]. The adaption to the non-classical CDH setting where
g2exAxB (instead of gxAxB ) is provided by the adversary is detailed out in [95,
p. 367].
As session key pi∗.key is randomly chosen in Game Gb2 and the adversary is not
allowed to pose Reveal queries to neither pi∗ nor pi′ (due to condition (a) in Defi-
nition 25), we have Pr[W 02 ] = Pr[W
1
2 ]. Putting everything together, we note that
AdvakemAHA,A(κ, n,m) = |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function, provided that
the required assumptions hold. 
5.5. A mAHA construction based on NIKDS
The mAHA protocol that we present in the following builds on ideas of the NIKDS-
based AHA scheme sketched in Section 2.5.3. As we will see, its bandwidth consump-
tion and its (asymptotic) computational efficiency improve on our mAHA scheme
from Section 5.4.
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5.5.1. Protocol specification
The central building block of our construction is a generic NIKDS scheme (cf. Defini-
tion 7). In particular, the pairing-based construction from Section 2.3.1 is suitable.
Recall that the algorithms of a NIKDS are denoted NSetup, NRegister, and NGetKey.
We specify our mAHA scheme as follows:
CreateGroup
To initialize a group G, GA sets up a new KGC of a NIKDS by running
msk← NSetup(1κ). GA sets G.prl← ∅, and outputs G.sk = msk and G.prl.
AddUser
Admission of a user with pseudonym id ∈ {0, 1}∗ is done by computing id’s
credential as skG[id]← NRegister(msk, id), where msk = G.sk.
Handshake
The specification of our Handshake protocol is given in Figure 5.4. Besides the
NIKDS, the protocol makes use of the following additional building blocks:
• To achieve forward secrecy of the established session key, a standard
Diffie-Hellman key agreement [69] is incorporated into the protocol (cf.
lines 1 and 17). Hence, we require existence of a cyclic group G = 〈g〉 in
which the CDH problem is hard (cf. Definition 1). Let (G, g, q) be such a
group, generated by GGen from Section 2.1.2.
• By H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` we denote a hash function, where ` = `(κ) is
polynomially dependent on security parameter κ. It will be modeled as
random oracle in the security analysis of the protocol.
• By Sort(M), for a set M ⊆ {0, 1}` of strings of length `, we denote
the lexicographic ordering of M. It is well-known that Sort( ) can be
implemented as an O(n log n) algorithm (e.g., using ‘Heapsort’), and that
look-up in an ordered set is an O(log n) operation.
Revoke(G, id)
The pseudonym id to be revoked is added to G.prl. It is assumed that this list
is distributed authentically to all group members.
We briefly explain the design principles of the protocol from the point of view of
user UA. Note that the lines in Figure 5.4 where the numbering is formatted in bold
face coincide with Figure 2.8. For all groups G in which idA is registered (line 4)
and in which idB is not revoked (line 5), the NIKDS key K
′
A shared by idA and idB
is computed (line 6) and used to derive two authentication tags, vA,0 and vA,1, in
lines 7 and 8 (these tags also serve for key confirmation). One of the tags is sent
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
User A
Input: idA,GA, init
rA ←R Zq
sidA ← mA ‖mB
MA ← ∅, SA ← ∅
for all (skGA [idA], GA.prl) ∈ GA:
if idB 6∈ GA.prl:
K ′A ← NGetKey(skGA [idA], idB)
vA,0 ← H1(K ′A ‖sidA ‖0)
vA,1 ← H1(K ′A ‖sidA ‖1)
SA ← SA ∪ {(GA, vA,1)}
else: vA,0 ←R {0, 1}`
MA ←MA ∪ {vA,0}
groupsA ← ∅
for all (GA, vA,1) ∈ SA:
if vA,1 ∈ Sort(MB):
groupsA ← groupsA ∪ {GA}
if groupsA 6= ∅ then
keyA ← H1(grArB )
partnerA ← idB
terminate with “accept”
else
terminate with “reject”
mA = (idA, g
rA)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
mB = (idB , g
rB )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Sort(MB)←−−−−−−−−−
Sort(MA)−−−−−−−−−→
User B
Input: idB,GB, resp
rB ←R Zq
sidB ← mA ‖mB
MB ← ∅, SB ← ∅
for all (skGB [idB ], GB .prl) ∈ GB:
if idA 6∈ GB .prl:
K ′B ← NGetKey(skGB [idB ], idA)
vB,0 ← H1(K ′B ‖sidB ‖0)
vB,1 ← H1(K ′B ‖sidB ‖1)
SB ← SB ∪ {(GB , vB,0)}
else: vB,1 ←R {0, 1}`
MB ←MB ∪ {vB,1}
groupsB ← ∅
for all (GB , vB,0) ∈ SB:
if vB,0 ∈ Sort(MA):
groupsB ← groupsB ∪ {GB}
if groupsB 6= ∅ then
keyB ← H1(grArB )
partnerB ← idA
terminate with “accept”
else
terminate with “reject”
Figure 5.4.: NIKDS-based Handshake protocol with group discovery
to user UB (line 11), while the other one is stored in state variable SA for later use
(line 9). Note that user UB computes the same tags for all groups that both users
are member of. This intersection (named groups) is determined in lines 12–15, by
recording all matches of group-specific authentication tags v. If users UA and UB
have at least one group in common (line 16), then the protocol accepts with a secure
session key (lines 1 and 17). Observe that the purpose of the sorting step (line 11)
is not only to enable an O(log n) look-up of authentication tags in line 14, but also
to hide the order in which these tags have been computed. This is an important
prerequisite to make the scheme affiliation-hiding.
Correctness of the mAHA protocol follows from correctness of deployed NIKDS
and inspection of Figure 5.4. Recall also the exposition of design rationale in Sec-
tion 2.5.3.
5.5.2. Efficiency analysis
Asymptotically, the Handshake protocol in Figure 5.4 is an O(n log n) protocol, where
n = |G| denotes the number of credentials per user. This is due to the fact that both
the sorting step (line 11) and the tag-matching step (lines 13–15) are O(n log n), and
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the revocation checks (line 5) can be implemented with logarithmic complexity as
well (although in respect to the size of the revocation list prl, to be precise). How-
ever, the number of expensive operations (e.g., pairing evaluations in the NIKDS)
grows only linearly in the number of affiliations. More precisely: A user that pro-
vides credentials for n groups has to evaluate n pairings to complete the proto-
col (or even less, when considering the possibility of revoked users), plus the two
Diffie-Hellman exponentiations. Observe, however, that all NIKDS computations are
session-independent and can be cached: If the same two users run the Handshake
protocol multiple times, they can fall back to previously established keys K ′ in order
to considerably save computation time. The protocol’s bandwidth consumption also
grows linearly in |G|. As mostly short confirmation tags have to be transmitted, the
total number of transferred bits is relatively small. Note that the scheme is displayed
as a four-message protocol for reasons of better readability: To obtain a three-pass
protocol, messages mB and Sort(MB) can be combined into a single datagram. We
further analyze efficiency of this scheme in Sections 5.6 and 6.4.
5.5.3. Security analysis
Our mAHA construction satisfies all security goals formalized in Section 5.3. In par-
ticular, it is affiliation-hiding and offers key security with forward secrecy. The proofs
to corresponding Theorems 9 and 10 are given on pages 82 and 85, respectively.
Theorem 9 Our NIKDS-based mAHA scheme from Section 5.5.1 is affiliation-hiding
given that NIKDS is OW-CIA secure, in the random oracle model.
Theorem 10 Our NIKDS-based mAHA scheme from Section 5.5.1 offers key se-
curity (with forward secrecy) under the CDH assumption and given that NIKDS is
OW-CIA secure, in the random oracle model.
Proof of Theorem 9. Besides to the experiments Exptah,b from Figure 5.1 (includ-
ing the modification proposed in Remark 4), we will refer to a set of auxiliary games
(experiments) that will help us to prove that our mAHA scheme is affiliation-hiding.
For each of these games G, let W = Pr[G(κ, n,m) = 1] denote the probability that
G’s execution results in the output of 1. We will parametrize these games with a
bit b and denote this with a superscript, e.g., Gb.
Fix adversary A and parameters κ, n = n(κ) and m = m(κ). We assume that,
for any protocol session pi, session variables pi.partner and pi.sid are set immediately
after receiving the first message in the protocol (this is possible in our scheme, as
opposed to Section 5.2 and Definition 24). Consider the following games:
Game Gb0. This game is identical to Expt
ah,b
mAHA,A(κ, n,m).
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Our goal is to show that |W 00 − W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function.
This holds trivially if the adversary violates any of the conditions (1)–(3) in
Figure 5.1, as this would directly imply W 00 = W
1
0 = 0. We hence assume in
the following that adversary complies with the named conditions.
Game Gb1. Game G
b
1 is like Game G
b
0, except that the simulation is aborted if, for
any pseudonym id ∈ ID and any two sessions run by id, a collision of session
ids occurs, i.e., if there exist sessions pi 6= pi′ with (pi.id, pi.sid) = (pi′.id, pi′.sid).
Observe that session ids, as assigned in line 2 of the protocol, contain value gr
which is freshly and independently picked for each session. Hence, a collision
of session ids implies that the user, by coincidence, picked the same r ←R Zq
twice, in line 1. By the birthday paradox, this happens with probability smaller
than q2s/|Zq| = q2s/q, where qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake
queries. Note that q = q(κ) grows super-polynomially in κ (cf. Section 2.1.2),
so that this probability is negligible.
Game Gb2. Recall that challenge session pi
∗ is run by an honest user pi∗.id ∈ ID,
where |ID| = n. Game Gb2 is like Game Gb1, except that the simulator makes
an a priori guess id∗ ∈ ID on the pseudonym that will be pi∗.id. If this guess
later turns out to be incorrect, i.e., if adversary demands challenge session be
run by another pseudonym, then the experiment outputs a random bit (i.e.,
the simulation aborts).
Game Gb3. Let ID
′ denote the list that contains the pseudonyms of all honest users
plus the pseudonyms that appear ‘on the wire’ in sessions simulated for pseu-
donym id∗, i.e., that appear in received first round messages m = (id, gr). We
assume that ID′ is initialized as ID′ ← ID, and during the simulation new en-
tries are appended at the end, unless they are already on the list. Clearly we
have |ID′| ≤ n + qs, where qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake
queries.
Game Gb3 is like Game G
b
2, except that the simulator picks a random pointer
t ←R {1, . . . , |ID′|} into this list. Denote by id′ the t-th entry in ID′. Once
the partner pi∗.partner of the challenge session is determined, the simulation
aborts if pi∗.partner 6= id′ (or id′ is still undefined at that point).
As it is impossible to efficiently guess a priori pseudonym pi∗.partner that the
adversary will use in challenge session pi∗ (the adversary may send any arbitrary
string), in this game we instead guess its first occurrence in the simulation.
The experiment will hence ‘learn’ id′ before it is actually deployed.
Game Gb4. Game G
b
4 is like Game G
b
3, except that the simulator makes an a priori
guess on group Gb such that {Gb} = G∗b \ G∗1−b, out of a set of size |G| = m.
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Note that we assume the modification to experiment Exptah,b that is proposed
in Remark 4. If the guess on Gb later turns out to be incorrect, then the
experiment outputs a random bit (i.e., the simulation aborts).
Game Gb5. Game G
b
5 is like Game G
b
4, except that, for all sessions pi with {pi.id,
pi.partner} = {id∗, id′}, confirmation messages v0, v1 for group Gb, as computed
in lines 7 and 8 of the protocol, are assigned via vd ← H ′1(sid ‖ d), where H ′1
is a private random oracle. In particular, the vd are assigned independently of
NIKDS key K ′.
As seen in Figure 5.4, the simulation of Game Gb4 uses key
K ′ = NSharedKey(Gb.sk; id∗, id′) exactly for the computation of the v0, v1 spec-
ified above, and nowhere else. The modification introduced in this game can
be detected by adversary A only by posing an H1 query on (a string that
contains) respective NIKDS’s key K ′. By embedding an OW-CIA challenge (cf.
Definition 9) into group Gb and pseudonyms id∗, id′, the probability of this to
happen can be bounded by a negligible function (where qH1 denotes the total
number of posed H1 queries):
|Pr[W b5 ]− Pr[W b4 ]| = qH1Succow-ciaNIKDS,A′(κ) (for an adversary A′).
Observe that, in this step, we exploited condition (3) from experiment Exptah,b:
Pseudonyms id∗ and id′ may not be corrupted in group Gb.
Consider, in Game Gb5, the existence of a session pi
′ such that pi∗.sid = pi′.sid and
D∗ ∩ pi′.G 6= ∅.
If such a session does not exist, then verification tags v∗d = H
′
1(sid‖d) assigned by
session pi∗ for group Gb are random and completely independent from Gb and the
rest of the simulation (recall from Game Gb1 that session ids sid do not repeat, so
H ′1 is never queried on the same inputs again). In particular, (a) the messages that
pi∗ sends contain no information about group Gb, and (b) a Reveal(pi∗) query unveils
no information about Gb, as the test in line 14 corresponding to group Gb will pass
only with negligible probability |Sort(M)|/2` ≤ m/2`.
If such a session pi′ does exist, then this can only be if the lifetimes of pi∗ and pi′
overlap. In this case, posing Reveal(pi′) or Reveal(pi∗) queries is not allowed (cf.
conditions (1) and (2) in Figure 5.1). Although the verification tag for group Gb
that pi∗ sends in line 11 is not independent from Gb in the simulation (it is potentially
also computed and expected by session pi′), it is so from the point of view of the
adversary, as the latter has no means to learn how this tag is processed within pi′.
In any case, we observe that the adversary cannot efficiently distinguish experi-
ments G05 and G
1
5, i.e., we have W
0
5 ≈ W 15 . Putting everything together, we note
that AdvahmAHA,A(κ, n,m) = |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function, provided
that the required assumption on NIKDS holds. 
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Proof of Theorem 10. Besides to the experiments Exptake,b from Figure 5.2, we
will refer to a set of auxiliary games (experiments) that will help us to prove that our
mAHA scheme offers key security with forward secrecy. For each of these games G,
let W = Pr[G(κ, n,m) = 1] denote the probability that G’s execution results in the
output of 1. We will parametrize these games with a bit b and denote this with a
superscript, e.g., Gb.
Fix adversary A and parameters κ, n = n(κ) and m = m(κ). We assume that,
for any protocol session pi, session variables pi.partner and pi.sid are set immediately
after receiving the first message in the protocol.
Recall that, in experiment Exptake,b, the adversary poses exactly one Test query,
on a fresh session pi∗. In particular, session pi∗ accepts during the simulation. We
start by proving that this implies that there is also a session pi′ matching pi∗:
Lemma 3 In the simulation of Exptake,bmAHA,A(κ, n,m), there exists (with overwhelm-
ing probability) a session pi′ 6= pi∗ such that pi∗ and pi′ compute the same session id
in line 2 of the protocol, i.e., pi∗.sid = pi′.sid.
Proof. As session pi∗ is fresh (cf. Definition 25), there exists a group G∗ ∈ pi∗.groups
such that queries Corrupt(pi∗.id, G∗) and Corrupt(pi∗.partner, G∗) are not posed until
pi∗ accepts. Instead of the lemma, we will prove the stronger statement that ses-
sion pi′ exists (with overwhelming probability) already in the moment that session pi∗
executes line 15 of the protocol for group G∗ (what has to occur by definition of G∗).
Observe that the following games need not be simulated after pi∗ accepts:
Game G¯b0. This game is identical to Expt
ake,b
mAHA,A(κ, n,m).
Game G¯b1. Game G¯
b
1 is like Game G¯
b
0, except that the simulation is aborted if, for
any pseudonym id ∈ ID and any two sessions run by id, a collision of session
ids occurs, i.e., if there exist sessions pi 6= pi′ with (pi.id, pi.sid) = (pi′.id, pi′.sid).
Observe that session ids, as assigned in line 2 of the protocol, contain value gr
which is freshly and independently picked for each session. Hence, a collision
of session ids implies that the user, by coincidence, picked the same r ←R Zq
twice, in line 1. By the birthday paradox, this happens with probability smaller
than q2s/|Zq| = q2s/q, where qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake
queries. Note that q = q(κ) grows super-polynomially in κ (cf. Section 2.1.2),
so that this probability is negligible.
Game G¯b2. Game G¯
b
2 is like Game G¯
b
1, except that the simulator makes an a priori
guess on the session that will be Test session pi∗. The experiment aborts if, in
the later simulation, this guess turns out to be incorrect.
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Game G¯b3. Recall that Test session pi
∗ is run by an honest user pi∗.id ∈ ID, where
|ID| = n. Game G¯b3 is like Game G¯b2, except that the simulator makes an
a priori guess id∗ ∈ ID on the pseudonym that will be pi∗.id. If this guess
later turns out to be incorrect, i.e., if adversary demands Test session be run
by another pseudonym, then the experiment outputs a random bit (i.e., the
simulation aborts).
Game G¯b4. Let ID
′ denote the list that contains the pseudonyms of all honest users
plus the pseudonyms that appear ‘on the wire’ in sessions simulated for pseu-
donym id∗, i.e., that appear in received first round messages m = (id, gr). We
assume that ID′ is initialized as ID′ ← ID, and during the simulation new en-
tries are appended at the end, unless they are already on the list. Clearly we
have |ID′| ≤ n + qs, where qs denotes the total number of posed Handshake
queries.
Game G¯b4 is like Game G¯
b
3, except that the simulator picks a random pointer
t←R {1, . . . , |ID′|} into this list. Denote by id′ the t-th entry in ID′. Once the
partner pi∗.partner of the Test session is determined, the simulation aborts if
pi∗.partner 6= id′ (or id′ is still undefined at that point).
As it is impossible to efficiently guess a priori pseudonym pi∗.partner that the
adversary will use in Test session pi∗ (the adversary may send any arbitrary
string), in this game we instead guess its first occurrence in the simulation.
The experiment will hence ‘learn’ id′ before it is actually deployed.
Game G¯b5. Game G¯
b
5 is like Game G¯
b
4, except that, in all sessions pi with {pi.id,
pi.partner} = {id∗, id′}, confirmation messages v0, v1 for group G∗, as computed
in lines 7 and 8 of the protocol, are assigned via vd ← H ′1(sid‖d), where H ′1 is
a private random oracle.
As seen in Figure 5.4, the simulation of Game G¯b4 uses key
K ′ = NSharedKey(G∗.sk; id∗, id′) exactly for the computation of the v0, v1 spec-
ified above, and nowhere else. The modification introduced in this game can
be detected by adversary A only by posing an H1 query on (a string that
contains) respective NIKDS’s key K ′. By embedding an OW-CIA challenge (cf.
Definition 9) into group G∗ and pseudonyms id∗, id′, the probability of this to
happen can be bounded by a negligible function (where qH1 denotes the total
number of posed H1 queries):
|Pr[W¯ b5 ]− Pr[W¯ b4 ]| ≤ qH1Succow-ciaNIKDS,A′(κ) (for an adversary A′).
Now, in Game G¯b5, if no session pi
′ exists such that pi∗.sid = pi′.sid, then verification
tags v∗d = H
′
1(sid‖d) computed by session pi∗ in lines 7 and 8 for group G∗ are random
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and completely independent from the rest of the simulation (recall from Game G¯b1
that session ids sid do not repeat, so H ′1 is never queried on the same inputs again).
Hence, an upper bound for the probability that pi∗ will execute line 15 for group G∗ is
given by |Sort(M)|/2` ≤ m2−`. However, by definition of G∗, we know that line 15
is executed with probability 1, a contradiction. We conclude that a session pi′ with
pi∗.sid = pi′.sid exists. 
Given the result from Lemma 3, the proof for key security is straight forward.
Consider the following games:
Game Gb0. This game is identical to Expt
ake,b
mAHA,A(κ, n,m).
Our goal is to show that |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function.
Game Gb1. Due to Lemma 3, there exists a session pi
′ 6= pi∗ such that pi∗.sid = pi′.sid.
Game Gb1 is like Game G
b
0, except that the simulator makes a priori guesses
on these sessions. The experiment aborts if, in the later simulation, one of the
guesses on pi∗, pi′ turns out to be incorrect.
Game Gb2. Game G
b
2 is like Game G
b
1, except that keys pi
∗.key, pi′.key of sessions
pi∗, pi′ are assigned via key ← K, where K ∈R {0, 1}` is a fixed but random
string.
This modification can be detected by an adversary only by posing an H1 query
on Diffie-Hellman value grArB , where grA , grB are the values contained in pi∗.sid.
However, by embedding a CDH challenge (cf. Definition 1) into grA , grB , the
probability of this to happen can be bounded by a negligible function (where
qH1 denotes the total number of posed H1 queries):
|Pr[W b2 ]− Pr[W b1 ]| ≤ qH1SucccdhGGen,A′(κ) (for an adversary A′).
Note that factor qH1 disappears in the GapDH setting.
As session key pi∗.key is randomly chosen in Game Gb2 and the adversary is not
allowed to pose Reveal queries to neither pi∗ nor pi′ (due to condition (a) in Defi-
nition 25), we have Pr[W 02 ] = Pr[W
1
2 ]. Putting everything together, we note that
AdvakemAHA,A(κ, n,m) = |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function, provided that
the required assumptions hold. 
5.6. Comparison of our mAHA solutions
We compare security and complexity of known mAHA schemes in Table 5.1, namely
our schemes from Sections 5.4 and 5.5, the na¨ıve approach from Section 4.1, and the
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Protocol Security & Privacy Setting Complexity
AKE1 FS2 AH3 # PK4 complexity5 # passes6 Transf. bits7
Sect. 4.1 3 3 3 generic ≥ O(n2) ≥ O(n2) constant O(n2)
Sect. 5.1 3 7 ? DDH,GapDH 5n O(n2) 3 800n
Sect. 5.4 3 3 3 RSA 2n O(n2) 3 2208n+ 80
Sect. 5.5 3 3 3 BCDH,CDH n+ 2 O(n log n) 3 80n+ 240
1key security; 2forward secrecy; 3affiliation-hiding security; 4number of basic public key operations
(e.g., exponentiations, pairing evaluations); 5overall computational complexity; 6number of message
passes per protocol execution; 7total number of bits sent per protocol execution
Table 5.1.: Security and performance comparison of mAHA protocols
scheme from [97] (see Section 5.1). Focusing on those schemes where the number of
expensive operations (e.g., exponentiations and pairing evaluations) grows at most
linearly in the number n = |G| of provided credentials, we notice that only the
schemes from Sections 5.4 and 5.5 achieve key security with forward secrecy. It
remains unclear whether the protocol by Jarecki and Liu [97] is affiliation-hiding in
the strong sense of our model (cf. Section 5.3.2). This is due to the fact that sender
privacy of the AHE scheme underlying their construction is only claimed to hold
against outsider attacks, in contrast to the more powerful insider attacks that are
allowed in our model. Moreover, all privacy-related properties of both their AHE
and mAHA schemes remain unproven in their paper (see footnote in Section 5.1).
In regards to computational performance, the protocols from [97] and Section 5.4
have quadratic complexity. While in [97] the envelope’s receiver has to perform
O(n2) decryptions of a symmetric CCA-secure encryption scheme, in our RSA-based
scheme from Section 5.4 it is the IHME encoding that takes O(n2) field multiplica-
tions. Note that, in Chapter 6, we will investigate the practical impact of IHME’s
performance in full detail. Best efficiency for large n we clearly expect from the
NIKDS-based protocol from Section 5.5.Especially in respect to bandwidth consump-
tion, our protocol from Section 5.5 impressively outperforms its competitors, as in its
execution mainly (short) authentication tags have to be transferred. Observe that
our NIKDS-based scheme consumes only 3.6% (respectively, 10%) of the bandwidth,
when compared to our RSA-based protocol (resp., the protocol from [97]). When
estimating bandwidth complexity of all protocols, we assume RSA moduli of length
1024 bit, DLP groups with 160 bit element representation, authentication tags with
a length of 80 bits, and symmetric CCA-secure ciphertexts of length 160 bits.
5.7. On the feasibility of DLP-based mAHA
We conclude this section by giving intuition about the reason why the DLP-based
AHA scheme from Section 2.5.2 cannot be transformed into a (DLP-based) mAHA
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scheme by applying the IHME primitive from Section 4.5. Regarding the discussion
in Section 4.5.2, at first sight, such a generic conversion could be expected to be
straight forward. However, as we will justify in the following, this transformation
seems not to be possible at all. Recall that, in the first protocol messages of the
DLP-based scheme from Figure 2.7, participants exchange elements ω ∈ G that
allow recovery of ElGamal encryption keys z, by computing z ← ωyH(ω). Observe
that values ω serve as individual identifiers for group members, and are generated
and assigned in a randomized process in AddUser procedure. In particular, these
tokens cannot be freely specified by the users, and users would, with overwhelming
probability, receive two different and independent elements ω when registering to two
different GAs. On the other hand, the IHME primitive hides indices only for random
(looking) messages (cf. Definition 21). It follows that, if a single-group Handshake
protocol comprises the transmission of any affiliation-dependent constant element
(e.g., identifier ω), then a generic IHME-based conversion from AHA to mAHA will
generally not result in a secure scheme. Observe that our mAHA solution from
Section 5.4 exploits the fact that users may freely pick their pseudonyms in the
underlying AHA scheme, i.e., users may use the same pseudonym in all groups, so
that no constant data has to be IHME-transmitted.

6
Multigroup AHA in practice
Only little work on practical aspects of affiliation-hiding authentication schemes,
pursuing optimized implementations and deployment, has been reported in the lit-
erature so far, and the main question a practitioner might ask — whether AHA
schemes are truly practical today — remains widely unanswered. In this section, we
analyze and optimize practical performance of our mAHA schemes from Chapter 5.
Regarding our RSA-based scheme from Section 5.4, we propose numerous al-
gorithmic optimizations that remarkably speed up the most important operations.
Results are demonstrated not only at theoretical level, but we also offer implementa-
tions, performance measurements, and comparisons. In respect to the NIKDS-based
mAHA scheme from Section 5.5, we observe that the by far most time consuming
operation during protocol execution is the evaluation of NIKDS’s bilinear maps (cf.
Section 2.3.1). However, the improvement of efficiency of this operation is clearly out
of the scope of this thesis. Hence, we abstain from optimizing the scheme itself and
restrict ourselves to give expected performance values for the protocol execution.
6.1. Optimizing IHME
The central building block that we used in the construction of RSA-based mAHA is
a generic IHME scheme (cf. Section 4.5). A possible instantiation of this primitive,
based on polynomial interpolation in finite fields, was proposed in Section 4.5.1. Note
that corresponding IHME encoding algorithm takes O(n2) field operations. Hence,
the same bound applies to the full Handshake protocol. However, as field operations
are rather cheap (IHME mainly uses multiplications), one may ask which role this
asymptotic bound plays in practice for the overall performance of the protocol, where
one might expect that running time is dominated by RSA exponentiations. In the
following, we give several optimized algorithms for the implementation of IHME
and compare them in respect to computational efficiency and memory consumption.
These implementational aspects were left unconsidered in Sections 4.5 and 5.4.
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The algorithms presented in the following sections make computations in a given
finite field F. Efficient implementation of field arithmetic and element representa-
tion is a wide field of research and out of the scope of this thesis; see Hankerson
et al. [86, Chapter 2] for a comprehensive overview. Generally speaking, fields of
small characteristic (e.g., F = GF (2k) for some k) offer speed advantages on SIMD
machines and dedicated hardware, while modern PCs with 32/64 bit ALUs benefit
from fields of large characteristic (e.g., F = GF (p) for a large prime p).
In the analysis of the following algorithms, we measure computational performance
by counting the number of expensive field operations, i.e., multiplications (c← ab),
inversions (c ← a−1), and divisions (c ← a/b). As a/b = ab−1, divisions can
always be implemented at the cost of one inversion and one multiplication. However,
often both operations can be conflated into a single operation of the cost of one
inversion [86, Section 2.3.6]. In the following, we denote the time needed to perform
a multiplication, an inversion, or a division, by M , I, and D, respectively. In
practice, it is reasonable to assume I ≈ D ≈ 60M (cf. [86, Section 5.1.5]).
6.1.1. Polynomial interpolation1
The following well-known theorem [142] ensures existence and uniqueness of inter-
polation polynomials.
Theorem 11 (Polynomial interpolation) In a field F, let (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈
F×F be n pairs of elements satisfying i 6= j ⇒ xi 6= xj. Then there exists a polyno-
mial p ∈ F[x] of degree deg(p) < n that interpolates all points (xi, yi), i.e., yi = p(xi)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Moreover, this polynomial exists uniquely.
For fixed n ∈ N, the set Πn consisting of all polynomials p ∈ F[x] of degree
deg(p) ≤ n naturally constitutes a vector space over F. Algorithms for polynomial
interpolation [142] usually represent computed polynomials in Πn by the coefficients
of the corresponding linear combination of some basis elements of Πn. While the
monomial basis {1, x, x2, . . . , xn} seems to be the most versatile one, popular inter-
polation algorithms do not refer to it, but instead compute coefficients in respect
to specially crafted bases, that often depend on the specific problem instance. We
stress that such algorithms might not serve for secure IHME implementations. For
example, the bases of two well-known interpolation algorithms, namely Lagrange
and Newton Interpolation, are directly dependent on deployed x-abscissas. This
behavior contradicts the desired index-hiding property of IHME, as x-values (i.e.,
indices) would have to be included in IHME structures S.
1We clarify that by ‘polynomial interpolation’ we comprehend the determination of a set of co-
efficients that fully describe the sought for polynomial. In the literature, however, often the
evaluation of this polynomial at given points is subsumed under the same term, possibly with-
out explicit computation of the coefficients.
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6.1.2. Lagrange interpolation
In the terms of Theorem 11, a polynomial that interpolates (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) is
given by
p(x) =
n∑
k=1
yk n∏
j=1
j 6=k
x− xj
xk − xj
 .
Correctness of this approach can be seen as follows: For all k ∈ [1, n], function
Lk(x) =
n∏
j=1,j 6=k
x− xj
xk − xj
is a polynomial of degree n−1 which evaluates to 1 at position xk, and evaluates to 0
at positions xl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ n, l 6= k. It follows that p(x) =
∑n
k=1 ykLk(x) ∈ Πn−1
interpolates (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn).
Relating this to the said above, Lagrange’s method for polynomial interpolation
does not look for coefficients of a linear combination of fixed basis elements of Πn−1,
but rather outputs vectors L1, . . . , Ln in Π
n−1 such that p is their ‘trivial’ linear
combination with coefficients yi.
In practice, Lagrange’s method is rarely used for polynomial interpolation for
being awkward and inefficient. Its importance is more on the theoretical side, e.g.,
for proving ‘existence’ in Theorem 11.
6.1.3. Newton interpolation
A far more efficient (and popular) way to perform polynomial interpolation in the
context of scientific computing is due to Newton. We refer to [142, Section 4.2] for a
detailed exposition, but stress that this method outputs coefficients ak in respect to
Newton bases {N1, . . . , Nn} of Πn, which are instance-specific as well. In particular,
if the points (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) are to be interpolated, the corresponding basis
consists of the polynomials
Nk(x) =
k−1∏
j=1
(x− xj) .
Corresponding coefficients ak = [y1, . . . , yk] can be efficiently computed via divided
differences [142], to obtain the interpolating polynomial as p(x) =
∑n
k=1 akNk(x).
6.1.4. Interpolation without precomputation
An algorithm for polynomial interpolation that outputs coefficients in respect to
monomial basis {1, x, x2, . . . , xn} of Πn is due to Bjo¨rck and Pereyra [20, 84], and
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portrayed below as Algorithm 1. It has (quadratic) running time
n(n− 1)
2
(D +M)
and, as most of the algorithms proposed in this section, needs no extra storage, as
all calculations can be implemented ‘in place’.
Algorithm 1 Polynomial interpolation (Bjo¨rck and Pereyra)
Input: Pairs (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ F× F with i 6= j ⇒ xi 6= xj
Output: Coefficients c0, . . . , cn−1 ∈ F such that yi =
∑n−1
k=0 ck(xi)
k ∀i
(c0, . . . , cn−1)← (y1, . . . , yn)
for k = 0 to n− 2 do
for j = n− 1 downto k + 1 do
cj ← (cj − cj−1)/(xj+1 − xj−k)
end for
end for
for k = n− 2 downto 0 do
for j = k to n− 2 do
cj ← cj − xk+1cj+1
end for
end for
Algorithm 1 already solves the problem of polynomial interpolation in reasonable
time. However, we develop a technique to further improve computational efficiency
by reducing the number of field divisions from O(n2) to 1, while at the same time
increasing the number of multiplications only moderately. The trick is to represent
intermediate variables c not as field elements, but as fractions2
c/d =ˆ (c, d) ∈ F× F× ,
where we identify fraction (c, 1) with field element c. Note that the field operations
translate to operations on fractions as expected, e.g., (c, d)+(c′, d′) = (cd′+c′d, dd′)
and (c, d)(c′, d′) = (cc′, dd′). The benefit achieved by the redundancy introduced
by the ‘computing with fractions’ technique is that most divisions can be replaced
by multiplications, as the example (c, d)/(c′, d′) = (cd′, dc′) illustrates. It is quite
natural to consider two fractions (c, d), (c′, d′) ∈ F × F× equivalent (or equal) if
cd′ = c′d. Fractions are normalized to equivalent field elements by the reduction
mapping (c, d) 7→ cd−1. If n of these reductions are to be computed in batch,
the required n divisions can be conflated into a single inversion, at the cost of some
additional multiplications (see [123, Appendix B], or [56, Algorithm 10.3.4], or [128]).
2Note that this idea is somewhat similar to the use of projective coordinates in efficient implemen-
tations of elliptic curve cryptography [86, Section 3.2.1].
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This technique, applied to Algorithm 1, results in our Algorithm 2, which has
computational performance (
5n(n− 1)
2
+ 1
)
M + 1I .
Its speed advantage over Algorithm 1 is obvious for D  M . We note that Algo-
rithm 2 needs extra storage for n− 1 auxiliary variables d1, . . . , dn−1.
Algorithm 2 Interpolation with deferred inversion
Input: Pairs (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ F× F with i 6= j ⇒ xi 6= xj
Output: Coefficients c0, . . . , cn−1 ∈ F such that yi =
∑n−1
k=0 ck(xi)
k ∀i
(c0, . . . , cn−1)← (y1, . . . , yn)
for j = n− 1 downto 1 do
cj ← cj − cj−1
dj ← xj+1 − xj
end for
for k = 1 to n− 2 do
for j = n− 1 downto k + 1 do
cj ← cjdj−1 − cj−1dj
dj ← djdj−1(xj+1 − xj−k)
end for
end for
cj ← cjd−1j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 (see note on batched reduction)
for k = n− 2 downto 0 do
for j = k to n− 2 do
cj ← cj − xk+1cj+1
end for
end for
6.1.5. Interpolation with precomputation
In some occasions, polynomial interpolations have to be computed many times in
succession, with fixed inputs x1, . . . , xn but variable inputs y1, . . . , yn. These cases
are susceptive for improvements in efficiency by splitting calculations into a pre-
computation phase (on input the xi), and a computation phase (on input the yi
and the precomputed state). The costs of polynomial interpolation are then deter-
mined by the costs of the second step, which might be more efficient than a regular
interpolation by Algorithms 1 or 2.
Observe that, for the coefficients ck of the polynomial p(x) =
∑n−1
k=0 ckx
k ∈ F[x]
that passes through the set of points {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, , yn)}, the following linear
system of equations holds:
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
1 x1 x
2
1 · · · xn−11
...
...
1 xn x
2
n · · · xn−1n


c0
...
cn−1
 =

y1
...
yn
 (6.1)
The (n × n)-matrix V = V (x1, . . . , xn) on the left is called Vandermonde ma-
trix [142]. It is known from Numerical Analysis that V is invertible iff i 6= j ⇒ xi 6=
xj . After determining V
−1 in a precomputation step, one can solve equation (6.1)
for c0, . . . , cn−1 by computing (c0, . . . , cn−1)T ← V −1(y1, . . . , yn)T , essentially per-
forming a matrix by vector multiplication with n2M costs (cf. Algorithm 3). Explicit
formulae for V −1 are developed in [64, 159], see also [123, Appendix A] for a clean
presentation.
Algorithm 3 Interpolation after precomputation
Input: Inverted Vandermonde matrix V −1 = (m1,1, . . . ,mn,n) ∈ Fn×n as output
by [123, Algorithm 7], elements y1, . . . , yn ∈ F
Output: Coefficients c0, . . . , cn−1 ∈ F such that yi =
∑n−1
k=0 ck(xi)
k ∀i
for i = 1 to n do
ci−1 ← 0
for j = 1 to n do
ci−1 ← ci−1 +mi,jyj
end for
end for
6.1.6. Performance comparison of interpolation algorithms
We compare practical efficiency of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 6.1. It becomes
obvious that Algorithm 1 by Bjo¨rck and Pereyra is actually not competitive with our
optimized variant (Algorithm 2), and that precomputations can, moreover, roughly
halve running time of polynomial interpolation. Time consumption, on the right
axis, is estimated by assuming M = 0.44µs, as measured in our test implementation
(see also notes in Figure 6.4).
6.1.7. Polynomial evaluation
Recall that IHME decoding is defined through polynomial evaluation. For a set
c0, . . . , cn−1 ∈ F of coefficients, the na¨ıve way of evaluating polynomial p(x) =∑n−1
k=0 ckx
k ∈ F[x] at a given point x ∈ F would have O(n2) performance. De-
ployment of Horner’s scheme (Algorithm 4), however, reduces the running time to
(n− 1)M .
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Figure 6.1.: Efficiency comparison of interpolation algorithms 1, 2,
and 3. The axis on the left reflects the number of computed field
multiplications (we assume D = I = 60M), the axis on the right
indicates time consumption for a finite field F of about 280 elements.
Algorithm 4 Polynomial evaluation
Input: Coefficients c0, . . . , cn−1 ∈ F and x ∈ F
Output: Element y ∈ F with y = ∑n−1k=0 ckxk
y ← cn−1
for k = n− 2 downto 0 do
y ← ck + xy
end for
6.2. Interleaved IHME
In Sections 6.1.4, 6.1.5, and 6.1.7 we have seen implementations of IHME’s iEncode
and iDecode routines. Their computational complexity is O(n2) and O(n), respec-
tively, with regards to a fixed finite field F. In practice (e.g., in the Handshake
protocol in Figure 5.3), these fields may become rather large, e.g., |F| ≈ 21108, and
IHME will perform accordingly slow (although still in O(n2)). In this section, we
present an interleaving technique which allows to (generically) speedup IHME com-
putations. Note that the algorithms remain in O(n2) and O(n), respectively; it is
rather the constant that is considerably reduced.
Consider, for instance, an IHME setting with F = GF (21024) and M = I = F ∼=
{0, 1}1024. Instead of encoding messages m1,m2, . . . ∈ M over this field, one could
split all messages mi into, say, 8 chunks mi,1, . . . ,mi,8, each of length 1024/8 = 128.
Now, using IHME over field F′ = GF (2128), all mi,1 can be IHME-encoded into a
structure S1, all mi,2 can be independently encoded into a structure S2, and so on.
The overall encoding is then S = (S1, . . . ,S8). A gain in efficiency is caused by the
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trade of super-linear costs of finite field arithmetics for linear costs of splitting the
field elements.
We formalize the ideas of the preceding paragraph in a more general setting: We
show how to generically compose IHME schemes from IHME schemes with smaller
message sets.
Definition 27 (Interleaved IHME) Let IHME′ = {iEncode′, iDecode′} be an index-
hiding message encoding scheme over index set I ′ and message set M′. For any
ν ∈ N, the ν-interleaved index-hiding message encoding scheme IHME = {iEncode,
iDecode} with index space I = I ′ and message space M = (M′)ν is constructed
from IHME′ as follows:
iEncode(P)
On input of P = {(i1, (m1,1, . . . ,m1,ν)), . . . , (in, (mn,1, . . . ,mn,ν))} ⊆ I×M =
I ′× (M′)ν , the resulting encoding is the list S = (S1, . . . ,Sν) of IHME′ encod-
ings
Sk = iEncode′({(ij ,mj,k)}1≤j≤n) for 1 ≤ k ≤ ν .
iDecode(S, i)
On input of S = (S1, . . . ,Sν) and index i ∈ I, this algorithm outputs m =
(m1, . . . ,mν), where
mk = iDecode
′(Sk, i) for 1 ≤ k ≤ ν .
Index-hiding security of interleaved IHME (cf. Definition 21) is established via a
standard hybrid argument (with ν − 1 intermediate steps), where in the i-th hybrid
experiment index set I1 is used for structures S1, . . . ,Si, and index set I0 is used for
structures Si+1, . . . ,Sν (cf. experiment Exptihide in Figure 4.1). The tightness factor
obtained in the corresponding reduction is ν.
Theorem 12 (Security of interleaved IHME) For any given index-hiding IHME′
scheme and any ν ∈ N, the ν-interleaved scheme IHME constructed in Definition 27
is index-hiding as well. If IHME′ is perfectly-index hiding, then so is IHME.
6.2.1. Efficiency analysis
The gain in efficiency over standard IHME, achieved by deployment of ν-interleaved
IHME, is illustrated in Figure 6.2. We use 1104 bit fields in the test case as fields
of this size naturally emerge in the setting of affiliation-hiding protocols (cf. Sec-
tion 5.4). We observe that ν-interleaved IHME outperforms standard IHME by about
30%, for both underlying Algorithms 2 and 3.
6.3. An optimized RSA-based mAHA protocol 99
Figure 6.2.: Efficiency comparison of standard IHME (Section 4.5.1)
and ν-interleaved IHME (Section 6.2). More precisely, we compare
standard IHME over a 1104 bit prime field with (the more or less
equivalent) 14-interleaved IHME over a 80 bit prime field (note that
80·14 = 1120), both without and with precomputations (Algorithms 2
and 3, respectively). The offset on the y-axis for interpolations with-
out precomputation is due to the (relatively high) cost of the inversion
in Algorithm 2. See Figure 6.4 for further implementation details.
6.2.2. Interleaved IHME over the integers
Let Π be a prime and ν ∈ N. By iEncode(P,Π, ν) we denote the IHME encoding
with index space I = [0,Π−1] and message spaceM = [0,Πν−1], i.e., P ⊆ I×M.
This scheme is obtained by combining the interpolation-based construction from
Section 4.5.1 with Definition 27, and by exploiting existence of finite field F =
GF (Π) and the natural and efficient bijections [0,Π− 1]→ F and [0,Πν − 1]→ Fν
(e.g., for the latter, the representation to base Π, i.e., a 7→ (a0, . . . , aν−1) such that
a =
∑ν−1
k=0 akΠ
k). Analogously, by iDecode(S,Π, ν, i) we denote the corresponding
IHME decoding at index i ∈ [0,Π− 1].
6.3. An optimized RSA-based mAHA protocol
In this section, we propose a set of optimizations to different algorithms of RSA-
based mAHA protocol from Section 5.4 that lead towards a truly practical implemen-
tation. Within others, we replace the IHME scheme used in the original Handshake
specification by the optimized version from Section 6.2.2, but our improvements also
cover a multitude of unrelated aspects and optimize computational performance,
bandwidth consumption, and key sizes. The verbosity of the presentation of all al-
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gorithms and protocols should be sufficient for an immediate implementation of the
protocol.
6.3.1. Optimized CreateGroup algorithm
The CreateGroup algorithm is run once per group authority and, hence, computa-
tional efficiency is not too important for its implementation. Instead, we decide to
improve on storage size of group parameters. Recall that part of users’ credentials
in Section 5.4.1 are triples (n, g, e), where n is a safe RSA modulus, e is an RSA
exponent suitable for modulus n, and g is such that Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n. Our im-
proved algorithm, denoted as Algorithm 5, outputs RSA moduli n that are crafted
in such a way that g = 2 and e = 3 are valid group generators and RSA exponents,
respectively. As consequence, it suffices to store just modulus n in the credentials. In
addition, in Section 6.3.3, we will see that choosing g = 2 offers an attractive oppor-
tunity to implement the exponentiations in the Handshake protocol very efficiently.
We start by giving some convenient lemmas:
Lemma 4 Let p = 2p′ + 1 be a safe prime. Then p = 11 (mod 12).
Proof. As p′ is a prime number we have p′ ∈ {1, 5} (mod 6). Case p′ = 1 (mod 6)
leads to p = 2p′ + 1 = 3 (mod 12), a contradiction. Hence p′ = 5 (mod 6) and
p = 11 (mod 12). 
Lemma 5 Let n = pq for safe primes p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1 with p = 3 (mod 8)
and q = 7 (mod 8). Then for g = 2 we have Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n.
Proof. Under the named conditions we have
(
2
p
)
= −1 and (2q ) = 1 (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1.1). Hence g = 2, considered as element g ∈ Z×p , generates 〈g〉p = Z×p , while
g ∈ Z×q generates 〈g〉q = QR(q). By applying CRT, we see that 〈g〉n ∼= 〈g〉p × 〈g〉q
and that the order of g ∈ Z×n is lcm(ordp g, ordq g) = lcm(2p′, q′) = 2p′q′ = λ(n). In
addition, as q = 3 (mod 4), we have
(−1
q
)
= −1, i.e., −1 6∈ QR(q) = 〈g〉q, and hence
−1 6∈ 〈g〉n. This proves Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n. 
Algorithm 5 outputs tuples (n, d, p, q) such that n = pq is a safe RSA modulus,
Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈2〉n, and a public/privat RSA key pair is given by (3, d), i.e., 3d =
1 modλ(n). Factor p = 2p′ + 1 of n = pq is chosen such that p = 11 (mod 12)
and p = 3 (mod 8), and hence p = 11 (mod 24), while for q = 2q′ + 1 we require
q = 11 (mod 12) and q = 7 (mod 8), i.e., q = 23 (mod 24) (cf. Lemmas 4 and 5).
The search for safe primes for which these congruences hold is performed by the
two while loops. By RandNum([a, b]) we denote the uniformly random choice of an
integer x with a ≤ x ≤ b. By IsPrime(x) we denote the application of a (probabilistic)
primality test, e.g., the Miller-Rabin test, to integer x. Note that λ(n) = 2p′q′, and
hence e = 3 is always invertible modλ(n).
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Algorithm 5 Implementing CreateGroup
Input: Security parameter κ (typically 1024 ≤ κ ≤ 2048)
Output: Secret key sk = (n, d, p, q)
`← bκ′/2c
p← 24 · bRandNum([2`−1, 2` − 1])/24c+ 11
while ¬IsPrime(p) ∨ ¬IsPrime((p− 1)/2) do
p← p+ 24
end while
q ← 24 · bRandNum([2`−1, 2` − 1])/24c+ 23
while ¬IsPrime(q) ∨ ¬IsPrime((q − 1)/2) do
q ← q + 24
end while
λ = (p− 1)(q − 1)/2
(n, d, p, q)← (pq, 3−1 modλ, p, q)
6.3.2. Optimized AddUser algorithm
In the AddUser protocol from Section 5.4.1, users obtain credentials sk[id] of the form
(n, g, e, σid), where σid = Hn(id)
d modn, i.e., σid is the full-domain hash RSA signa-
ture on the respective pseudonym id (cf. Section 2.2.2). (A concrete instantiation
of hash functions Hn : {0, 1}∗ → Zn is proposed in [123, Section 5]). We observe
that, in the actual Handshake protocol, term Hn(id) only occurs in contexts where
values are divided by Hn(id). For the sake of efficiency, and without influencing the
scheme’s security, we move these necessary inversions into the registration process,
by altering the generation of user credentials to
sk[id] = (n, σid) where σid = Hn(id)
−d modn .
A standard trick [102] to speed up private RSA operations is to apply CRT before
computing exponentiations by d. More concretely, if the factorization of RSA mod-
ulus n = pq is known, then y = xd modn can be computed by CRT-decomposing x
into xp = xmod p and xq = xmod q, by computing yp = xp
d = x
dmodϕ(p)
p (mod p)
and yq = xq
d = x
dmodϕ(q)
q (mod q), and by mapping (yp, yq) back to Zn, by applying
CRT a second time. Besides the fact that exponentiations mod p and mod q can
be computed substantially faster than exponentiations modn, many intermediate
values of this alternative signing method can be precomputed. An implementation
of the AddUser algorithm that includes these optimizations is given in Algorithm 6.
6.3.3. Optimized Handshake protocol
Our optimized version of the mAHA protocol from Figure 5.3 is presented in Fig-
ure 6.3. By H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` we denote a hash function. Let Π be a prime
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Algorithm 6 Implementing AddUser
Input: Secret key sk = (n, d, p, q), pseudonym id ∈ {0, 1}∗
Output: Credential sk[id] = (n, σid)
Precompute: dp ← −3−1 (mod p− 1), dq ← −3−1 (mod q − 1), u← p−1 (mod q)
h← Hn(id)
(hp, hq)← (hmod p, hmod q)
(σp, σq)← (hpdp mod p, hqdq mod q)
a← u · (σq − σp) (mod q)
σid ← σp + pa
sk[id]← (n, σid)
slightly greater than 2` and let ν ∈ N be minimal such that Πν > 2κ+`. A typical
configuration in practice would be (κ, `, ν) = (1024, 80, 14).
The principal enhancement of the new design over the scheme from Section 5.4.1
is the deployment of the more efficient interleaved IHME scheme introduced in Sec-
tion 6.2.2 (see lines 10, 15, 23, and 26). In the original protocol, all messages that
are exchanged in the two communication rounds are, when IHME-encoded, consid-
ered as elements of a certain finite field F. In particular, in the first round, padded
RSA values of length κ + ` are exchanged. Hence, F has to be chosen accordingly
large (|F| ≥ 21104 at least) and field arithmetic performs rather slow. In contrast, in
Figure 6.3, first-round messages θ ∈ [0,Πν − 1] are encoded over a (much smaller)
field of Π ≈ 2` elements, using the ν-interleaved technique. Note that careful choice
of Π, e.g., of low Hamming weight, allows impressively fast implementations of field
arithmetics [86, Section 2.2.6]. Considering the second round messages, in the pro-
tocol from Section 5.4.1, the per-group key confirmation messages are also of length
κ + `, but actually ` bits would suffice for a secure scheme. In our new protocol,
confirmation messages are shortened to this more reasonable level and encoded using
IHME, again over the field of Π ≈ 2` elements. Both these optimizations lead to a
considerable boost of computational efficiency and bandwidth consumption, when
compared to a na¨ıve implementation of the protocol.
A consequence of the switch to a smaller field is that also deployed IHME indices
have to be chosen from a smaller set (see Section 6.2.2). While, in Section 5.4.1, RSA
moduli n serve directly as group index, in our protocol the set of possible indices is
reduced to the elements of [0,Π− 1], which is much too small for allowing a direct
embedding of moduli n. We solve this problem by hashing public group parameters
into F (line 4). These hash values, hn = H1(n), can further on be considered as
convenient ‘handles’ for groups, and are therefore designated as the elements of the
‘shared group’ set groups that is part of the output of the protocol (see line 27).
A further improvement over the protocol from Figure 5.3 is the more straight
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
User A
Input: idA,GA, init
PA ← ∅, TA ← ∅
for all (skGA [idA], GA.prl) ∈ GA:
parse (nA, σA)← skGA [idA]
hnA ← H1(nA)
(bA, xA)←R [0, 1]× [0, 22` − 1]
θ′A ← (−1)bA2xAσA modnA
θA ← pad(θ′A, nA,Πν)
PA ← PA ∪ {(hnA , θA)}
TA ← TA ∪ {(nA, hnA , xA, GA.prl)}
SA ← iEncode(PA,Π, ν)
sidA ← H1(mA ‖mB)
P ′A ← ∅, RA ← ∅
for all (nA, hnA , xA, GA.prl) ∈ TA:
if idB 6∈ GA.prl:
θB ← iDecode(SB ,Π, ν, hnA)
rA ←
(
(θB)
3HnA(idB)
)2xA
modnA
vA,0 ← H1(sidA ‖rA ‖0)
vA,1 ← H1(sidA ‖rA ‖1)
vA,2 ← H1(sidA ‖rA ‖2)
RA ← RA ∪ {(hnA , vA,0, vA,2)}
else: vA,1 ←R {0, 1}`
P ′A ← P ′A ∪ {(hnA , vA,1)}
S ′A ← iEncode(P ′A,Π, 1)
KA ← 0`, groupsA ← ∅
for all (hnA , vA,0, vA,2) ∈ RA:
if iDecode(S ′B ,Π, 1, hnA) = vA,2:
groupsA ← groupsA ∪ {hnA}
KA ← KA ⊕ vA,0
if groupsA 6= ∅ then
(keyA, partnerA)← (KA, idB)
terminate with “accept”
else
(keyA, partnerA)← (⊥,⊥)
terminate with “reject”
mA = (idA,SA)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
mB = (idB ,SB)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
S ′B←−−−−−−−−−−
S ′A−−−−−−−−−−→
User B
Input: idB,GB, resp
PB ← ∅, TB ← ∅
for all (skGB [idB ], GB .prl) ∈ GB:
parse (nB , σB)← skGB [idB ]
hnB ← H1(nB)
(bB , xB)←R [0, 1]× [0, 22` − 1]
θ′B ← (−1)bB2xBσB modnB
θB ← pad(θ′B , nB ,Πν)
PB ← PB ∪ {(hnB , θB)}
TB ← TB ∪ {(nB , hnB , xB , GB .prl)}
SB ← iEncode(PB ,Π, ν)
sidB ← H1(mA ‖mB)
P ′B ← ∅, RB ← ∅
for all (nB , hnB , xB , GB .prl) ∈ TB:
if idA 6∈ GB .prl:
θA ← iDecode(SA,Π, ν, hnB )
rB ←
(
(θA)
3HnB (idA)
)2xB
modnB
vB,0 ← H1(sidB ‖rB ‖0)
vB,1 ← H1(sidB ‖rB ‖1)
vB,2 ← H1(sidB ‖rB ‖2)
RB ← RB ∪ {(hnB , vB,0, vB,1)}
else: vB,2 ←R {0, 1}`
P ′B ← P ′B ∪ {(hnB , vB,2)}
S ′B ← iEncode(P ′B ,Π, 1)
KB ← 0`, groupsB ← ∅
for all (hnB , vB,0, vB,1) ∈ RB:
if iDecode(S ′A,Π, 1, hnB ) = vB,1:
groupsB ← groupsB ∪ {hnB}
KB ← KB ⊕ vB,0
if groupsB 6= ∅ then
(keyB , partnerB)← (KB , idA)
terminate with “accept”
else
(keyB , partnerB)← (⊥,⊥)
terminate with “reject”
Figure 6.3.: Optimized RSA-based Handshake protocol with group discovery
forward way of session key derivation. In Section 5.4.1, the key is computed as the
hash value of a string that is composed of several per-group secrets. To achieve
correctness of the protocol, both protocol participants have to mount this string in
the same order. To do this, a canonical ordering of groups has to be assumed. In
our new protocol, however, the key is computed as XOR-sum of per-group secrets
(line 28), which, without loss of security, now can be computed in any order.
In contrast to Section 5.4, in our optimized protocol, ephemeral exponents x (see
lines 5, 6 and 16) are not chosen from Zn/2 (where n is an RSA modulus of length κ),
but from much smaller range [0, 22`− 1]. This, again, leads to a notable gain in effi-
ciency in the modular exponentiations. Under the common assumption [81,83] that
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in Z×n is hard even when exponents are short,
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distributions of ephemeral keys with short and long exponents, respectively, are
computationally indistinguishable from each other (see Lemma 3.6 in [83]). Hence,
shortening ephemeral keys in the described way does not result in a considerably
weaker security of the protocol.
Observe that the exponentiation in line 6 has an a-priori known basis, namely g =
2. In general, diverse fast algorithms for fixed-basis exponentiations are known [127,
Section 14.6]. However, we stress that in our case exponentiations’ performance
can be even further improved by exploiting the structure of ‘square and multiply’
algorithms [127], where an accumulator is repeatedly multiplied by the base element.
When g = 2, this multiplication becomes a doubling of the accumulator, which can
be implemented by a simple left-shift. The overall performance then depends solely
on the cost of the squaring operation. We remark that term (−1)b for b ∈ {0, 1} in
line 6 should, of course, never be computed by calling an exponentiation subroutine,
but by doing a distinction of cases. We conclude this paragraph by noting that
messages θ (or even whole IHME structures SA/SB) can be precomputed before the
protocol session starts in order to further reduce run-time computations.
Note that, even though the protocol in Figure 6.3 is displayed as four-message
protocol, by concatenating messages mB and S ′B into a single message, the protocol
is trivially turned into a three-message protocol.
6.3.4. Performance analysis and discussion
We discuss performance results obtained from a concrete implementation of our op-
timized Handshake protocol from Figure 6.3. In particular, we present performance
measurements and investigate the scalability of our Handshake protocol for the se-
curity level (κ, `) = (1024, 80), i.e., 1024 bit RSA combined with 80 bit ‘symmetric
security’, and varying numbers of credentials n = |G|. Note that, in the implemen-
tation, we use ν-interleaved IHME with ν = 14.
In Figure 6.4, by plotting separately the amount of time spent in exponentiations
and IHME routines (Te and Ti, respectively), we expose the relevance of IHME’s
optimization. For instance, while in a Handshake with precomputation (Algorithm 3)
the balance between Te and Ti is 50:50 for about n = 200 affiliations, this bound is
reached for Handshake executions without precomputations (Algorithm 2) already
for about n = 120 groups. Note that, in typical application scenarios of mAHA
protocols, e.g., in social networks, the average number of affiliations (social groups)
is about 80 [154].
The charts cannot belie that the IHME primitive with its quadratic complexity
introduces a noticeable weight into protocol’s performance, especially for large n.
Noticing, however, that a full Handshake without precomputation takes only 2 sec-
onds to complete, even for 250 affiliations, we argue that this quadratic overhead is
still acceptable for practical deployment.
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Figure 6.4.: Timing values for our optimized protocol from Fig-
ure 6.3. All measurements were made on a single core of an ‘In-
tel XEON 2.66 GHz’ machine, using the gcrypt library [108] for bigint
arithmetic.
6.4. Efficiency of NIKDS-based mAHA protocol
We highlighted in Section 5.6 that one of the strengths of our NIKDS-based mAHA
scheme is its small bandwidth requirements. However, generally speaking, the eval-
uation of a pairing is a more time-consuming operation than an RSA exponentia-
tion (at a comparable security level). Hence, in terms of computational costs, the
NIKDS-based scheme might be more expensive than its competitor, the optimized
RSA-based protocol from Figure 6.3.
We did not actually implement the protocol, but we still try to give a perfor-
mance estimation based on measurements of bilinear map evaluations found in the
literature. Although many speed records on different architectures have been re-
cently reported, care has to be taken with the interpretation of the results, as not
all pairing parameters necessarily match our needs. In particular, the NIKDS con-
struction from Section 2.3.1 asssumes a symmetric pairing G × G → GT , in contrast
to an asymmetric pairing G1 × G2 → GT , for different groups G1,G2. Generally, the
NIKDS’s specification can also be adapted to the asymmetric setting, but still there
would remain the need to hash to both input groups, G1 and G2, which might be
problematic [79]. As most recent implementations [2, 3, 129] focus only on asym-
metric pairings (as these, within others, offer large embedding degrees), we will use
timings reported by Scott in 2007 [146] for our estimations. The (Tate) pairing
implemented in [146] is defined over a 512 bit prime field and has embedding degree
k = 2. One pairing evaluation is claimed to be computable in less than 3 ms, on a
3 GHz Pentium IV.
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In respect to our estimations, assuming that the computational overhead of a full
protocol execution is almost exclusively determined by the time spent in the n =
|G| pairing evaluations, the total running time of one Handshake can be estimated
with 3|G| ms.
6.5. Practical comparison of our mAHA solutions
We conclude this chapter by comparing practical performance of our RSA-based and
NIKDS-based mAHA schemes. While, in Figure 6.5, the RSA-related plots are iden-
tical with those from Figure 6.4, we estimate the performance of the NIKDS-based
protocol via the linear prediction from Section 6.4. We see that the scheme from
Figure 5.4 mostly outperforms our optimized Handshake scheme from Figure 6.3.
Deployment of the latter, however, may be advantageous for a small number n of
credentials, e.g., for n ≤ 30 affiliations — presuming a setting in which it is feasible
to store precomputed values. On the other hand, if storage place for precomputed
data is not available, then, efficiency-wise, there is no point in using the RSA-based
scheme. We hence propose, as a general recommendation, deployment of the NIKDS-
based scheme in all cases, for offering more flexibility and efficiency for a wide range
of affiliations. Note that, although execution times of RSA-based and NIKDS-based
schemes were measured on different machines, we expect that more consistent mea-
surements would have led to the same conclusion.
Figure 6.5.: Comparison of measured performance of optimized
RSA-based protocol (cf. Figure 6.3) and expected performance of
NIKDS-based protocol (cf. Figure 5.4).
7
Applications of AHA: private contact discovery
One of today’s most popular internet applications is given by online social networks
(OSN). These provide services to share interests, activities, and pictures, and have
proved valuable to help participants to build and reflect social relations to other par-
ticipants. In late 2011, popular social network websites, such as Facebook, Linkedin,
or MySpace, involve billions of active users [118,154]. Moreover, a clear tendency of
users accessing OSN services ubiquitously has to be noted: 350 of today’s 800 million
Facebook users access the site from their mobile devices [154].
One of the first steps towards establishing social network relationships is to verify
the existence of common contacts or friends. An interesting problem occurs when
two unfamiliar users want to do this privately: Consider two users with their mobile
devices that are connected via a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) and want to
assess their social proximity by discovering mutual contacts. A na¨ıve solution would
require participants to reveal their friends to each other. Clearly, this would not
preserve users’ privacy, since their complete lists would be exposed. Another trivial
solution would employ a central server to find and output the common friends.
However, such a server is not always considered trustworthy, as it would learn not
only participants’ friends, but also which users become friends, how, when, and
where. Moreover, central servers are not necessarily reachable in MANET settings,
e.g., if users meet in a bar or on the subway.
We introduce the concept of private contact discovery, a novel general construct
geared to preserve user privacy, not only in social network interactions, but also in
any other application that uses personal contact lists. The corresponding crypto-
graphic primitive, termed contact discovery scheme (CDS), lets two users, on input
their respective contact lists, learn their mutual contacts (if any), and nothing else.
Following a rigorous cryptographic treatment of the problem, we define the privacy-
protecting contact-hiding property and construct corresponding provably secure pro-
tocols. Note that our schemes neither rely on any (trusted) third party nor are they
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bound to a specific network infrastructure. They are hence suitable for users that
may want to operate outside the social network website to establish new relation-
ships. Moreover, the efficiency of our protocols allows deployment even on mobile
devices, as corresponding measurements attest.
In order to protect privacy in the described setting, within others, it is necessary
to prevent malicious users from arbitrarily manipulating their lists of friends, e.g., by
populating them with their best guesses of other users’ lists to maximize the amount
of information learned. Our model and constructions prevent users from claiming
unwarranted friendships by introducing contact certification. For instance, in order
to include Carol in her contact list, Alice needs to obtain an individual certificate
from Carol attesting this friendship. Then, when Alice interacts with Bob, not
only the entries in her contact list are hidden from Bob, but also the possession of
corresponding certificates with respect to non-common friends.
7.1. Approaches towards private contact discovery
We briefly discuss some private contact discovery schemes that were proposed in
the literature so far. We also analyze whether the CDS challenge can be solved
using existing cryptographic building blocks. However, we will see that all these
approaches do not reach a satisfactory level of security. In particular, none of the
schemes fulfills our strong privacy requirements formalized in Section 7.4.
Von Arb et al. [157] present a mobile social networking platform that enables
Friend-of-Friend (FoF) detection in physical proximity. Their solution compares
friend lists through PSI techniques [92,100]. For the reasons discussed in Section 4.2,
we argue that such protocols, constructed to privately compute the intersection of
input sets, do not yield satisfying CDS solutions: PSI schemes do not prevent parties
from arbitrarily manipulating their input lists. Observe that also the authenticated
variant, APSI, does not solve the CDS problem acurately: the primitive assumes a
single authority, in contrast to contact discovery, where all users act as their own
CA and issue certificates independently of each other.
Freedman and Nicolosi [77] propose two solutions for the FoF problem, in the
context of trust establishment in email whitelisting. One solution is based on hash
functions and symmetric encryptions, the other on bilinear maps. Both solutions
leverage friendship attestation, but basically implement an (optimized) variant of
the na¨ıve matching approach from Section 4.1. Moreover, their solution based on
symmetric encryption allows users to maliciously transfer attestations to other users
(what would contradict our security model), while their pairing-based technique is
inefficient for involving a quadratic number of bilinear map operations. Furthermore,
the paper lacks a rigorous security analysis.
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Huang, Chapman, and Evans [48,91] recently described their ready-to-use contact
discovery application for the Android platform. Using garbled circuits [165] to solve
CDS as a generic instance of secure multi-party compution, they report timing values
of 150 seconds to match 128 contacts. Their construction suffers from the security
issues discussed above and in Section 4.2, i.e., adversaries are not hindered from
arbitrarily populating their contact lists. Moreover, security is claimed only in a
model with semi-honest adversaries.
Further (non-cryptographic) treatments of Friend-of-Friend detection with no or
unclear privacy properties are given in [54,109,110].
The cryptographic tools discussed in Section 1.4, e.g., group signatures or anony-
mous credentials, do also not induce appropriate solutions to CDS, as hiding the
respective certifying party (in our case: the user that issues contact certificates)
is generally neither an explicit security goal of such schemes, nor is it implicitly
achieved.
Some works analyze, to a higher extent, social relationships, without focusing
on privacy. For instance, [138] uses random walks to discover communities in large
social-network graphs, [166, Chapter 12] formalizes the problem of dynamically iden-
tifying core communities (i.e., sets of entities with frequent and consistent interac-
tions), [167] builds a prediction model to identify certain social structures, e.g.,
friendship ties and family circles, while [68] attempts to identify communications
that substantiate social relationship types.
7.2. Contact discovery from mAHA?
Intuitively, mAHA schemes could provide a generic solution to the privacy challenge
imposed by the CDS problem. Consider a setting where each CDS user controls
its own group authority (GA) of a mAHA scheme, independently of all other users.
Contact certificates issued by the user would be credentials obtained from mAHA’s
AddUser operation. The discovery process itself would be implemented through
mAHA’s Handshake protocol: Whenever two users want to discover which contacts
they have in common, they execute Handshake on input their credentials (i.e., contact
certificates): the set of matching affiliations would correspond to the list of common
contacts, i.e., the list of users that both participants got certificates from. Moreover,
the security notion of affiliation-hiding (cf. Definition 23) would hopefully translate
to a meaningful notion of ‘contact-hiding’.
We argue, however, that this ‘CDS from mAHA’ construction is not secure in gen-
eral. The main reason for this is that, in our mAHA model from Section 5.3, group
authorities are unconditionally trusted and are assumed to always follow the proto-
col specification. While this assumption might be realistic in classic mAHA scenarios
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(where GAs are notaries or otherwise trusted agencies), it is not reasonable, in the
context of contact discovery, to trust all users, e.g., of a social network. For con-
creteness, we show that the CDS protocol obtained by applying the transformation
described above to the mAHA scheme by Jarecki and Liu [97] is not secure.
Recall from Section 5.1 that, in the protocol from [97], users U register to groups G
by sending their secret key xU to the respective GA, which returns rU,G = g
xUxG
and ΠU,G = PoK [(α) : rU,G = g
α] as credentials, where xG is GA’s private key. Now,
in the context of CDS, this means that users reveal their secret keys to all their
contacts. However, in discovery sessions with these contacts, users would provide
their respective rU,G = (g
xG)xU values to parties knowing xU (cf. Section 5.1), i.e.,
the public keys gxG , and hence the identities, of all their contacts would be directly
revealed.
This example illustrates that it is not clear how to generically convert mAHA
schemes into satisfyingly secure CDS. Apparently, privacy of CDS needs to be mod-
elled specifically, and corresponding schemes deserve individual evaluation and secu-
rity proofs. Nevertheless, we admit that the CDSs we propose in Sections 7.5 and 7.6
build on ideas that also drive our mAHA constructions from Chapter 5.
7.3. Syntax of CDS
Formally, a CDS consists of algorithms to initialize users, to issue contact certifi-
cates to other users, and to run the actual contact discovery protocol. Note that our
definition does not comprehend the possibility of user revocation, that, as we argue,
is mostly meaningless in the context of social relationship management. However,
should revocation of contacts be considered indispensable, then our syntax and pro-
tocols for CDS can be easily retrofitted (in a way similar to revocation handling in
our mAHA schemes in Sections 5.4 and 5.5).
Definition 28 (Contact discovery scheme) A contact discovery scheme is de-
fined as a set CDS = {InitUser,AddContact,Discover} of three algorithms and proto-
cols:
InitUser(1κ)
This algorithm is executed once by each user U . On input of security parame-
ter 1κ, it initializes U ’s private key U.sk.
AddContact(U, V )
This algorithm is executed by user U , on input the identity of a user V . User U
certifies a given social relation to V by issueing V a corresponding contact
certificate ccU→V .
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Note that we model contact certification as an unidirectional process: A mutual
certification requires two executions of AddContact algorithm.
Discover(U ↔ U ′)
This protocol is executed between two users, U and U ′, to discover common
contacts. User U ’s private input is (CLU , partnerU , rU ), where contact list CLU
is a set of pairs of the form (V, ccV→U ), for some users V , partnerU is the
name/id of the supposed protocol partner, and rU ∈ {init, resp} specifies the
role of the session as initializer or responder. All values ccV→U are assumed
to be contact certificates previously obtained as output of AddContact(V,U).
Private input of user U ′ is (CLU ′ , partnerU ′ , rU ′), defined analogously.
The protocol shall detect the set of users V for which both participants pro-
vide corresponding contact certificates, ccV→U and ccV→U ′, respectively. This
shared contact list is denoted by SCL.
Users keep track of the state of created Discover protocol sessions pi through
session variables that are initialized by setting pi.state← running and pi.SCL←
∅, and by initializing pi.CL and pi.partner from the session parameters. In
addition, pi.id is set to the own identity. After the protocol completes, pi.state is
updated to accepted and pi.SCL holds a (possibly empty) set of user identifiers.
Observe that, in contrast to mAHA schemes (cf. Section 5.2), CDSs are pure au-
thentication protocols: Besides the set SCL of contacts shared between the two
participants, protocol executions do not output additional session keys.
Definition 29 (Correctness of CDS) Suppose that users U and U ′ interact in
a Discover protocol on input (CLU , U
′, init) and (CLU ′ , U, resp), respectively. Let pi
and pi′ denote the corresponding sessions. Let CL∩ denote the set of users (con-
tacts) V that appear in both CLU and CLU ′. The CDS is correct if both sessions
accept and pi.SCL = pi′.SCL = CL∩.
7.4. Security model for CDS
We introduce a security model for private contact discovery schemes by describing
the capabilities of the adversary and by defining appropriate experiments for the
security goal of contact-hiding. Note that, as we deal with a pure authentication
protocol, there is no need to model key security.
Moreover, many applications that would deploy CDSs, such as social networks and
other group applications, already provide an independent user-based authentication
infrastructure, e.g., they deploy a PKI or use password-based techniques. Such
an authentication infrastructure can be used for various types of communication,
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including the execution of CDS protocols within a secure channel [28, 111]. With
this assumption in mind, we can now focus on the core functionality of the CDS,
namely the private discovery of shared contacts, for which potential attacks may be
mounted by other users of the application, i.e., from the inside.
7.4.1. Adversarial queries
We model adversary A as polynomially-bounded probabilistic algorithm that has
the following queries at its disposal to interact with protocol participants. By Uh
we denote the set of honest users in the system.
RequestCC(U, V )
Contact certificate ccU→V issued by user U ∈ Uh for user V is given to the
adversary. Note that this query corresponds to AddContact algorithm and
models the possibility of selective contact corruptions.
Discover(U,CL, partner, r)
User U ∈ Uh initiates a new session pi of the Discover protocol, using all
available certificates received from users listed in CL ⊆ Uh, and using partner
and r as further session parameters, where partner may not be an honest user,
i.e., partner 6∈ Uh. This query returns a first protocol message M (if available).
Note that restriction partner 6∈ Uh models assumed deployment of secure chan-
nels between users that execute the Discover protocol.
Send(pi,M)
Message M is delivered to session pi. After processing M , the output (if any)
is given to A. This query is ignored if pi is not waiting for input.
Reveal(pi)
This query returns (pi.state, pi.SCL).
Note that, as opposed to the model of mAHA in Section 5.3.1, we do not provide a
query for user corruption. If defined, it would reveal user’s secret key U.sk and the
set of stored certificates ccV→U . However, we argue that Corrupt queries are mainly
needed to model forward secrecy in key establishment protocols. In particular, as
the corruption of users in CDS would reveal all their contacts anyway, there is close
to nothing left to protect against, in the CDS setting.
7.4.2. Contact-hiding security
Informally, the property of contact-hiding (CH) protects users from disclosing non-
matching contacts to other participants. We model CH security by means of an
experiment, following the indistinguishability approach. The goal of the adversary
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is to decide which of two contact lists, CL∗0 or CL
∗
1, is used in a challenge Discover
session pi∗. The adversary can invoke any number of independent Discover sessions,
and perform Reveal and RequestCC queries at will. Observe the similarity between
the CH experiment and affiliation-hiding security in Definition 23.
Definition 30 (Contact-hiding security) Let CDS = {InitUser,AddContact,
Discover} and let Exptch,0 and Exptch,1 be the experiments specified in Figure 7.1.
The advantage of adversary A is defined as
AdvchCDS,A(κ, n) =
∣∣∣Pr [Exptch,0CDS,A(κ, n) = 1]− Pr [Exptch,1CDS,A(κ, n) = 1]∣∣∣ .
We say that CDS is contact-hiding if AdvchCDS,A is negligible in κ (for all n polyno-
mially dependent on κ), for all efficient adversaries A.
In Figure 7.1, conditions (1) and (2) exclude some trivial attacks on contact-hiding.
In particular, condition (1) thwarts the attack where A starts a
Discover(U ′,CL′, partner′, r′) session pi′ with CL′ ∩ D∗ 6= ∅ and (pi′.id, pi′.partner) =
(pi∗.partner, pi∗.id), relays all messages between pi∗ and pi′, and finally asks Reveal(pi∗)
or Reveal(pi′). By protocol correctness, pi∗.SCL = pi′.SCL would contain elements
from D∗, and it would be trivial to correctly decide about b. Condition (2) pre-
vents A from asking for contact certificates issued by users V ∈ D∗ for a user
U ′ ∈ U , to simulate a protocol session on behalf of U ′with challenge session pi∗, and
to decide about bit b from resulting SCL.
Observe that the ‘winning conditions’ in Exptch,b are simpler than those of Exptah,b
from Definition 23. The reason for this is that (a) the model does not have to deal
with user corruptions, and (b) due to a change in the syntax (cf. Definition 28),
protocol partner pi∗.partner of the challenge session is known before the session is
actually starts. An additional novelty is that the new security definition allows
deterministic protocols, like the one we present in Section 7.6, to be proven secure.
Remark 5 (Variant of contact-hiding security) Observe that, in experiment
Exptch,b, we do not pose requirements on sets CL∗0,CL
∗
1, except that we demand
|CL∗0| = |CL∗1|. It is easily seen by a hybrid argument that a modified definition of
contact-hiding security with the additional constraint |CL∗0 \ CL∗1| = 1 = |CL∗1 \ CL∗0|
would be equivalent to the one from Definition 30. In this case we would always have
|D∗| = 2.
7.5. A CDS construction based on RSA
We present an RSA-based construction of CDS that is secure in the model presented
in Section 7.4. It is quite similar to our mAHA scheme from Section 5.4.1. We
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Exptch,bCDS,A(κ, n):
(a) the experiment creates a set of n users, denoted by U =
{U1, . . . , Un}. The adversary A specifies a set Uc ⊆ U of ini-
tially corrupted users. Let Uh = U \ Uc. InitUser(1κ) is run for
all U ∈ Uh, and, for all combinations (U, V ) ∈ Uh × Uh, contact
certificates ccU→V are created by respective user U and given
to V , each time by running the AddContact(U, V ) algorithm. For
all U ∈ Uc, the adversary sets up all parameters himself. He then
specifies a list L ⊆ Uh × Uc, and for all (U, V ) ∈ L, algorithm
AddContact(U, V ) is run, and the respective certificate ccU→V is
given to A.
(b) A(1κ) interacts with all (honest) users using the queries
from Section 7.4.1; at some point, A outputs a tuple
(U∗,CL∗0,CL
∗
1, partner
∗, r∗), where U∗ ∈ Uh, CL∗0,CL∗1 ⊆ Uh with
|CL∗0| = |CL∗1|, partner∗ is any user id (in U), and r∗ ∈ {init, resp}.
Let D∗ = ∆(CL∗0,CL∗1) denote the symmetric difference of the
sets CL∗0 and CL
∗
1 (cf. Section 5.3.2).
(c) the experiment invokes a Discover(U∗,CL∗b , partner∗, r∗) session
pi∗ (and provides all needed certificates)
(d) A continues to interact via queries (including on session pi∗), until
it terminates and outputs bit b′
(e) the output of the experiment is b′ if all of the following hold;
otherwise the output is 0:
(1) if there is a Discover session pi′ with D∗ ∩ pi′.CL 6= ∅
and (pi′.id, pi′.partner) = (pi∗.partner, pi∗.id), then neither
Reveal(pi∗) nor Reveal(pi′) was asked;
(2) for no user V ∈ D∗, a RequestCC(V, pi∗.id) or
RequestCC(V, pi∗.partner) query has been posed, or a pair
(V, pi∗.partner) is contained in L, i.e., the adversary did not
request a contact certificate for id∗ or partner∗ issued by any
user in set D∗.
Figure 7.1.: ch experiment
assume that all interactions between users during AddContact and Discover sessions
are protected by secure channels, as motivated in Section 7.4. However, we claim
that our scheme would also be secure if Discover sessions would be run over a channel
that guarantees authenticity but not privacy.
7.5. A CDS construction based on RSA 115
7.5.1. Protocol specification
Let ` = `(κ) be polynomially dependent on security parameter κ. As in our mAHA
protocol from Section 5.4.1, we use the perfect IHME scheme from Section 4.5.1 as
a building block, where IHME is defined over field F = GF (T ), for the smallest
prime number T satisfying T > 2κ+`. Moreover, let H : {0, 1}∗ → [0, T − 1] and
Hn : {0, 1}∗ → Zn be hash functions, for any (RSA modulus) n ∈ N.
The three algorithms of our CDS protocol are defined as follows:
InitUser
The setup routine run by each user generates safe RSA parameters (n, e, d)←R
SRSA-GEN(1κ) (cf. Definition 3) and picks an element g ∈ Z×n such that Z×n =
〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n (cf. Section 2.5.1). User U keeps key U.sk← (n, g, e, d) secret.
AddContact
This routine is executed by user U , on input U.sk = (n, g, e, d) and identi-
fier idV ∈ {0, 1}∗ of a user V . User V receives contact certificate ccU→V =
(n, g, e, σV ), where σV is the RSA signature σV = Hn(idV )
d modn on the
full-domain hash of idV (cf. Section 2.2.2).
Discover
The contact discovery protocol is executed between two users, U and U ′, on
inputs (CLU , partnerU , rU ) and (CLU ′ , partnerU ′ , rU ′), respectively. The proto-
col is specified in detail in Figure 7.2, where padding function pad is defined
as in Section 2.5.1.
As the protocol is rather similar to the RSA-based AHA protocols from Sec-
tions 2.5.1 and 5.4.1, we refer to these sections for an exposition of the working
mechanisms of our CDS design. The main difference to the AHA schemes is
that, in the CDS protocol, the key computation step has been removed: the
scheme’s output is just the list SCL of shared contacts. Correctness of the
protocol follows as shown in Section 5.4.
7.5.2. Efficiency analysis
The similarity of our CDS and the mAHA scheme from Section 5.4 allows us to
apply all efficiency considerations given in Section 5.4.2 also to the new protocol.
In particular, we can apply all tweaks and improvements studied in Section 6.3,
and would obtain the same timing measurements for protocol execution (see Sec-
tion 6.3.4). However, as we argued in the introduction to this section that privacy-
preserving contact discovery is important particularly on mobile devices, we made
additional timing measurements on CPUs with reduced computational power. Fig-
ure 7.3 presents running times of our Discover protocol on different CPUs: a single
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User U
Input: CLU , partnerU , init
P ← ∅, T ← ∅
for all (V, ccV→U ) ∈ CLU :
parse (n, g, e, σV )← ccV→U
(b, x)←R Z2 × Zn/2
θ′ ← (−1)bgxσV modn
θ ← pad(θ′, n, T )
P ← P ∪ {(n, θ)}
T ← T ∪ {(V, n, e, x)}
SU ← iEncode(P)
sid← SU ‖SU ′
P ′ ← ∅, R ← ∅
for all (V, n, e, x) ∈ T :
θ ← iDecode(SU ′ , n) modn
r ← (θeHn(partnerU )−1)2x modn
v0 ← H(sid‖r‖0)
v1 ← H(sid‖r‖1)
R ← R∪ {(V, n, v1)}
P ′ ← P ′ ∪ {(n, v0)}
S ′U ← iEncode(P ′)
SCLU ← ∅
for all (V, n, v1) ∈ R:
if v1 = iDecode(S ′U ′ , n):
SCLU ← SCLU ∪ {V }
SU−−−−−−−→SU ′←−−−−−−−
S ′U ′←−−−−−−−−−−−
S ′U−−−−−−−−−−→
User U′
Input: CLU ′ , partnerU ′ , resp
P ← ∅, T ← ∅
for all (V, ccV→U ′) ∈ CLU ′ :
parse (n, g, e, σV )← ccV→U ′
(b, x)←R Z2 × Zn/2
θ′ ← (−1)bgxσV modn
θ ← pad(θ′, n, T )
P ← P ∪ {(n, θ)}
T ← T ∪ {(V, n, e, x)}
SU ′ ← iEncode(P)
sid← SU ‖SU ′
P ′ ← ∅, R ← ∅
for all (V, n, e, x) ∈ T :
θ ← iDecode(SU , n) modn
r ← (θeHn(partnerU ′)−1)2x modn
v0 ← H(sid‖r‖0)
v1 ← H(sid‖r‖1)
R ← R∪ {(V, n, v0)}
P ′ ← P ′ ∪ {(n, v1)}
S ′U ′ ← iEncode(P ′)
SCLU ′ ← ∅
for all (V, n, v0) ∈ R:
if v0 = iDecode(S ′U , n):
SCLU ′ ← SCLU ′ ∪ {V }
Figure 7.2.: RSA-based Discover protocol for private contact discovery
core of an Intel XEON 2.6 GHz CPU, an AMD NEO 1.6 GHz processor (often found
in Netbook computers), and an ARMv7 600 MHz CPU (installed on many today’s
smartphones). All measurements were performed using the GMP library [76], thus,
execution on smartphones presumably can even be speeded up by choosing a dif-
ferent cryptographic library, optimized for mobile environments. Note that, in our
prototypes, we applied all optimizations from Section 6.3.
We observe that our protocol for private contact discovery scales fairly well. For
security level (κ, `) = (1024, 80), i.e., 1024-bit RSA moduli and 80-bit symmetric
security, on laptops and server machines, a full protocol execution requires less than
a second, even for 100 and more contacts per user. On cores with smaller footprint,
e.g., on recent smartphones like Nokia’s N900 (equipped with the ARMv7 600 MHz
processor), protocol execution with 100 contacts requires about 5 seconds, which
is an acceptable overhead. Note that smartphones’ CPU speeds are envisioned to
increase rapidly in the near future (e.g., the iPhone 4G is already equipped with a
1 GHz processor). Finally, we computed that each user sends and receives around
300 Bytes per user of his contact list, where we assume |CLU | = |CLU ′ | for simplicity.
That is, in the protocol execution with 100 contacts, a total of 30 KB is transmitted.
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(a) AMD Neo and Intel Xeon (b) ARMv7
Figure 7.3.: Running times of our Discover protocol on different CPUs, in dependence
of the number of contacts. For each CPU, we also consider session-independent (off-
line) precomputations (cf. Section 6.1.5). All measurements are performed for 80 bit
(symmetric) security and 1024 bit RSA moduli.
We conclude that our solution for private contact discovery is efficient and practi-
cal enough for actual deployment, also on smartphones widely available today. Yet,
our technique does not give up solid privacy guarantees, as we show next.
7.5.3. Security analysis
Our CDS construction satisfies the security goal of contact-hiding, as formalized in
Section 7.4.
Theorem 13 Our RSA-based CDS scheme from Section 7.5.1 is contact-hiding un-
der the RSA assumption on safe moduli, in the random oracle model.
Proof. Besides to the experiments Exptch,b from Figure 7.1 (including the modifica-
tion proposed in Remark 5), we will refer to a set of auxiliary games (experiments)
that will help us to prove that our CDS scheme is contact-hiding. For each of these
games G, let W = Pr[G(κ, n) = 1] denote the probability that G’s execution results
in the output of 1. We will parametrize these games with a bit b and denote this
with a superscript, e.g., Gb.
Fix adversary A and parameters κ, n = n(κ). We assume that, for any protocol
session pi, session variable pi.sid holds the value computed in line 10 in Figure 7.2,
after receiving first protocol message S. Consider the following games:
Game Gb0. This game is identical to Expt
ch,b
CDS,A(κ, n).
Our goal is to show that |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function. This
holds trivially if the adversary violates conditions (1) or (2) in Figure 7.1, as
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this would directly imply W 00 = W
1
0 = 0. We hence assume in the following
that adversary complies with the named conditions.
Game Gb1. Game G
b
1 is like Game G
b
0, except that the simulation is aborted if, for
any user U ∈ U and any two sessions run by U , a collision of session ids occurs,
i.e., if there exist sessions pi 6= pi′ with (pi.id, pi.sid) = (pi′.id, pi′.sid).
Observe that session ids, as assigned in line 10 of the protocol, contain values
θ that are freshly and independently picked for each session and carry about
log2 T > κ+ ` bits of entropy each. By the birthday paradox, the probability
of collisions of session ids to occur is bounded by q2s/T < q
2
s/2
κ+`, where
qs denotes the total number of posed Discover queries.
Game Gb2. Recall that for the challenge session pi
∗ we have that pi∗.id and pi∗.partner
identify users in U = {U1, . . . , Un}. Game Gb2 is like Game Gb1, except that
the simulator makes a priori guesses on the pseudonyms id∗, id′ ∈ U that will
be pi∗.id and pi∗.partner, respectively. If one of these guesses later turns out
to be incorrect, i.e., if adversary demands challenge session be run for other
users, then the experiment outputs a random bit (i.e., the simulation aborts).
Game Gb3. Game G
b
3 is like Game G
b
2, except that the simulator makes an a priori
guess on user U b such that {U b} = CL∗b \ CL∗1−b, out of a set of size |Uh| ≤ n.
Note that we assume the modification to experiment Exptch,b that is proposed
in Remark 5. If the guess on U b later turns out to be incorrect, then the
experiment outputs a random bit (i.e., the simulation aborts).
Game Gb4. Let r
∗ be the value r computed in challenge session pi∗ for contact U b
(line 14). Game Gb4 is like Game G
b
3, except that all confirmation messages v
(lines 15 and 16), that are computed in session pi∗ and all sessions pi′ with
pi∗.sid = pi′.sid in dependence on r∗, are consistently replaced by random values
in the range [0, T − 1].
Observe that named confirmation tags are computed from r∗ by hashing this
value, using hash function H. By the random oracle model, adversary can
detect the difference between Games Gb3 and G
b
4 only by querying (a string
that contains) r∗ to this oracle. However, the probability of this to happen can
be bounded by SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN (cf. Definition 3), as discussed in Section 2.5.1.
In particular, by embedding an SRSA challenge (n, e, z) into parameters n, g, e
of user U b and into pseudonym id′, a solution to the challenge can be computed
from any hash query on r∗. Moreover, the actions of all (honest) users continue
to be simulatable, with the exception that for user id′ a RequestCC(U b, id′)
query cannot be processed. This behavior, however, is compliant with rule (2)
in Exptch,b. For further details on the reduction we refer to Section 2.5.1,
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Appendix A, and to the analysis by Gennaro, Krawczyk, and Rabin [82]. We
conclude that, for a constant c,
|Pr[W b4 ]− Pr[W b3 ]| ≤ c · SuccsrsaSRSA-GEN,A′(κ) (for an adversary A′).
Game Gb5. Game G
b
5 is like Game G
b
4, except that value θ for contact U
b, as com-
puted by session pi∗ in line 6, is replaced by a random element: θ ←R [0, T −1].
Observe that, in the protocol, θ is exclusively used to compute r∗ in line 14
(and, correspondingly, in sessions pi′ with pi∗.sid = pi′.sid). As we decoupled this
value from the remaining simulation in Game Gb4, the difference between W
b
4
and W b5 is bounded by the statistical difference of the two methods to gener-
ate θ. As discussed in Section 2.5.1 and [95], this difference is negligible.
Game Gb6. Game G
b
6 is like Game G
b
5, except that, in session pi
∗, we replace index n,
used for IHME encoding value θ for contact U b, by a fixed (unused) index, e.g.,
n = 0 (cf. lines 7 and 9).
The change introduced in Game Gb6 corresponds to the security experiment
of IHME’s index-hiding property (cf. Figure 4.1): As θ is chosen uniformly
from [0, T − 1], which coincides with IHME’s message spaceM, we can readily
construct an IHME adversary A′ from any distinguisher between Games Gb5
and Gb6. In the reduction, the set of moduli of the contacts in CL
∗
b is assigned
to index set I0, while the set of moduli of the contacts in CL
∗
b \ {U b} together
with index n = 0 is assigned to I1. As messages M corresponding to the
indices in I0 ∩ I1 the θ-values for the contacts in CL∗b \ {U b} are taken without
modification. We conclude that
|Pr[W b6 ]− Pr[W b5 ]| ≤ AdvihideIHME,A′(κ) (for an adversary A′).
Consider, in Game Gb6, the existence of a session pi
′ such that (pi′.id, pi′.partner) =
(pi∗.partner, pi∗.id) and D∗ ∩ pi′.CL 6= ∅.
If such a session does not exist, then verification tags v assigned by session pi∗
for contact U b are random and completely independent from U b and the rest of
the simulation (recall the changes introduced in Game Gb4). In particular, (a) the
tag v that pi∗ sends in lines 18 and 19 contains no information about contact U b,
(b) IHME structure S ′ that pi∗ sends in line 19 leaks no information about Gb (by
an argument similar to the one in the hop to Game Gb6), and (c) a Reveal(pi
∗) query
unveils no information about U b, as the test in line 22 corresponding to contact U b
will pass only with negligible probability 1/T < 2−(κ+`). Recall that the protocol’s
first message, S, sent in line 9, does not leak information about group Gb since the
hop to Game Gb6.
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If such a session pi′ does exist, then posing Reveal(pi′) or Reveal(pi∗) queries is not
allowed (cf. condition (1) in Figure 7.1). Although the verification tag for contact U b
that pi∗ sends in line 19 is not independent from U b in the simulation (it is potentially
also computed and expected by session pi′), it is so from the point of view of the
adversary, as the latter has no means to learn how this tag is processed within pi′.
In any case, we observe that the adversary cannot efficiently distinguish experi-
ments G06 and G
1
6, i.e., we have W
0
6 ≈ W 16 . Putting everything together, we note
that AdvchCDS,A(κ, n) = |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function, provided that
the required assumptions hold. 
7.6. A CDS construction based on NIKDS
We present a CDS that builds on ideas of the NIKDS-based mAHA scheme described
in Section 5.5. Observe that, in contrast to the CDS in Section 7.5, the actual
Discover protocol is deterministic.
7.6.1. Protocol specification
In our construction, we use a generic NIKDS scheme (cf. Definition 7) as central
building block, e.g., the pairing-based construction from Section 2.3.1. The CDS is
specified as follows:
InitUser
User U is initialized by running msk← NSetup(1κ) and setting U.sk← msk.
AddContact
The contact certificate issued by user U for identity idV ∈ {0, 1}∗ of user V is
computed as ccU→V ← NRegister(msk, idV ), where msk = U.sk.
Discover
The specification of our Discover protocol is given in Figure 7.4. Besides the
NIKDS, the algorithms make use of a hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`,
where ` = `(κ) is polynomially dependent on security parameter κ. As in
Section 5.5.1, by Sort(M) we denote the lexicographic ordering of M. In
regards to protocol’s correctness, note that, for all contacts V common to U
and U ′, i.e., all users V such that (V, ccV→U ) ∈ CLU and (V, ccV→U ′) ∈ CLU ′ ,
intermediate keys K ′ computed by U and U ′ in line 3 of the protocol are
equal. Observe that the missing Diffie-Hellman key agreement (lines 1 and 3
in Figure 5.4) is not needed in protocols without key establishment.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
User U
Input: CLU , partnerU , init
MU ← ∅, S ← ∅
for all (V, ccV→U ) ∈ CLU :
K ′ ← NGetKey(ccV→U , partnerU )
v0 ← H1(K ′ ‖0)
v1 ← H1(K ′ ‖1)
S ← S ∪ {(V, v1)}
MU ←MU ∪ {v0}
SCLU ← ∅
for all (V, v1) ∈ S:
if v1 ∈ Sort(MU ′):
SCLU ← SCLU ∪ {V }
Sort(MU ′)←−−−−−−−−−
Sort(MU )−−−−−−−−−→
User U′
Input: CLU ′ , partnerU ′ , resp
MU ′ ← ∅, S ← ∅
for all (V, ccV→U ′) ∈ CLU ′ :
K ′ ← NGetKey(ccV→U ′ , partnerU ′)
v0 ← H1(K ′ ‖0)
v1 ← H1(K ′ ‖1)
S ← S ∪ {(V, v0)}
MU ′ ←MU ′ ∪ {v1}
SCLU ′ ← ∅
for all (V, v0) ∈ S:
if v0 ∈ Sort(MU ):
SCLU ′ ← SCLU ′ ∪ {V }
Figure 7.4.: NIKDS-based Discover protocol for private contact discovery
7.6.2. Efficiency analysis
Generally, the efficiency estimations from Sections 5.5.2 and 6.4 apply also to our
CDS protocol. In particular, Discover has O(n log n) computational overhead, where
n = |G| denotes the number of contacts per user. While the number of pairing
evaluations (in the NIKDS) is only linear in the number of contacts, it is the Sort(M)
part that is responsible for the superlinear complexity. Observe that, in contrast to
the mAHA protocol from Figure 5.4, our Discover protocol is a two-message protocol
that is, moreover, deterministic (i.e., messages are dependent on the users and their
certificates, but not on the session id).
7.6.3. Security analysis
Our CDS construction satisfies the security goal of contact-hiding, as formalized in
Section 7.4.
Theorem 14 Our NIKDS-based CDS from Section 7.6.1 is contact-hiding, given
that NIKDS is IND-CIA secure, in the random oracle model.
Proof. Besides to the experiments Exptch,b from Figure 7.1 (including the modifica-
tion proposed in Remark 5), we will refer to a set of auxiliary games (experiments)
that will help us to prove that our CDS scheme is contact-hiding. For each of these
games G, let W = Pr[G(κ, n) = 1] denote the probability that G’s execution results
in the output of 1. We will parametrize these games with a bit b and denote this
with a superscript, e.g., Gb.
Fix adversary A and parameters κ, n = n(κ). Consider the following games:
Game Gb0. This game is identical to Expt
ch,b
CDS,A(κ, n).
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Our goal is to show that |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function. This
holds trivially if the adversary violates conditions (1) or (2) in Figure 7.1, as
this would directly imply W 00 = W
1
0 = 0. We hence assume in the following
that adversary complies with the named conditions.
Game Gb1. Recall that for the challenge session pi
∗ we have that pi∗.id and pi∗.partner
identify users in U = {U1, . . . , Un}. Game Gb1 is like Game Gb0, except that
the simulator makes a priori guesses on the pseudonyms id∗, id′ ∈ U that will
be pi∗.id and pi∗.partner, respectively. If one of these guesses later turns out
to be incorrect, i.e., if adversary demands challenge session be run for other
pseudonyms, then the experiment outputs a random bit (i.e., the simulation
aborts).
Game Gb2. Game G
b
2 is like Game G
b
1, except that the simulator makes an a priori
guess on user U b such that {U b} = CL∗b \ CL∗1−b, out of a set of size |U| = n.
Note that we assume the modification to experiment Exptch,b that is proposed
in Remark 5. If the guess on U b later turns out to be incorrect, then the
experiment outputs a random bit (i.e., the simulation aborts).
Game Gb3. Game G
b
3 is like Game G
b
2, except that, for all sessions pi with {pi.id,
pi.partner} = {id∗, id′}, confirmation messages v0, v1 for contact U b, as com-
puted in lines 4 and 5 of the protocol, are assigned via vd ← v¯d, where
v¯d ∈R {0, 1}`, d ∈ {0, 1}, are fixed but random tokens. In particular, the
vd are assigned independently of NIKDS key K
′.
As seen in Figure 7.4, the simulation of Game Gb2 uses key
K ′ = NSharedKey(U b.sk; id∗, id′) exactly for the computation of the v0, v1 spec-
ified above, and nowhere else. The modification introduced in this game can
be detected by adversary A only by posing an H1 query on (a string that
contains) respective NIKDS’s key K ′. By embedding an OW-CIA challenge (cf.
Definition 9) into credentials issued by U b for pseudonyms id∗, id′, the proba-
bility of this to happen can be bounded by a negligible function (where qH1
denotes the total number of posed H1 queries):
|Pr[W b3 ]− Pr[W b2 ]| = qH1Succow-ciaNIKDS,A′(κ) (for an adversary A′).
Observe that, in this step, we exploited condition (2) from experiment Exptch,b:
For common contact U b, neither RequestCC(U b, id∗) nor RequestCC(U b, id′)
may be asked by the adversary.
Consider, in Game Gb3, the existence of a session pi
′ such that (pi′.id, pi′.partner) =
(pi∗.partner, pi∗.id) and D∗ ∩ pi′.CL 6= ∅.
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If such a session does not exist, then verification tags v∗d = v¯d assigned by ses-
sion pi∗ for contact U b are random and completely independent from U b and the
rest of the simulation. In particular, (a) message Sort(M) that pi∗ sends contains
no information about contact U b, and (b) a Reveal(pi∗) query unveils no information
about U b, as the test in line 10 corresponding to contact U b will pass only with
negligible probability |Sort(M)|/2` ≤ m/2`.
If such a session pi′ does exist, then posing Reveal(pi′) or Reveal(pi∗) queries is not
allowed (cf. condition (1) in Figure 7.1). Although the verification tag for contact U b
that pi∗ sends in line 7 is not independent from U b in the simulation (it is potentially
also computed and expected by session pi′), it is so from the point of view of the
adversary, as the latter has no means to learn how this tag is processed within pi′.
In any case, we observe that the adversary cannot efficiently distinguish experi-
ments G03 and G
1
3, i.e., we have W
0
3 ≈ W 13 . Putting everything together, we note
that AdvchCDS,A(κ, n) = |W 00 −W 10 | is bounded by a negligible function, provided that
the required assumption on NIKDS holds. 

8
Conclusion
The results of this thesis contribute to the understanding and deployment of privacy-
preserving authentication in manifold ways. We summarize the major achievements
in a short overview:
AHA with untrusted group authorities (Chapter 3)
In the setting of affiliation-hiding authentication (AHA), we analyze the means
to repel the threat of dishonest or corrupt group authorities (GAs). We high-
light that, while prior attempts to deal with GA corruption [104,151] resulted
in cumbrous settings where GAs are split in two or more (sub)authorities,
our strengthened security model not only allows staying in the more practical
one-GA setting, thus facilitating more robust and reliable constructions, but
also defends against a wider range of attacks; for instance, it also averts GA
attacks on session key security. We construct an RSA-based AHA protocol
that is secure in the new model. In particular, our linkable scheme is the first
untraceable one, i.e., even GAs cannot reveal identities of its users.
AHA in the multi-affiliation setting (Chapters 4 and 5)
We explore the multi-affiliation AHA (mAHA) setting where users are affiliated
to multiple independent groups at the same time, and aim at learning from
protocol sessions the set of groups they have in common. After motivating
this scenario and proposing different ways to achieve the desired functionality,
we select the most promising method (that bases on a new ‘IHME’ primitive)
and construct two mAHA solutions (one RSA-based, one pairing-based). The
efficiency of our protocols is O(n) public key operations, where n is the number
of affiliations per user. We expect this bound to be optimal.
Our multi-affiliation variant of AHA makes deployment of such privacy-aware
authentication methods much more attractive and likely in practice, as this
setting naturally arises in collaborative applications such as online social net-
works. At the same time our protocols offer the first satisfactory solution to
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an open problem posed by Jarecki et al. in 2008 [95, p. 356], who ask for an
efficient construction of mAHA.
Implementability of AHA (Chapter 6)
With the aim of obtaining meaningful performance evaluations of our mAHA
solutions, we demonstrate multifaceted ways to further optimize our protocols
in general, and our IHME primitive in particular (in respect to runtime and
consumption of memory and bandwidth). We implement the protocols, and
our measurements clearly document that mAHA protocols are now practically
deployable on a wide range of architectures; for instance, assuming that par-
ticipants are member of up to 50 groups, a full privacy-aware group discovery
takes only 150 ms on an average PC.
For all non-trivial routines of the optimized protocols, we provide elaborate
algorithmic descriptions that allow direct implementation. We also make pro-
posals on parameter choices for multiple security settings.
Private discovery of common social contacts (Chapter 7)
We provide a treatment of the topic of private contact discovery. This setting
assumes that participants individually manage lists of their respective friends
(‘contacts’). If two users jointly execute a contact-discovering protocol, on
input their contact lists, the protocol identifies the set of contacts they have in
common. This matching is performed in a privacy-preserving way, i.e., without
disclosing non-matching contacts to the respective peer. After showing that
all previously published approaches to this challenge suffer from severe privacy
shortcomings, we construct two provably-secure solutions. The efficiency of our
protocols is O(n) public key operations, where n is the number of contacts per
user.
During protocol design, we overcome several challenges. Amongst others, in
order to prevent adversaries from arbitrarily expanding their contact lists to
maximize the amount of information learned about the peer, we introduce the
concept of contact certification. We also show, through experimental evalu-
ation, that our solutions are practical enough to be deployed in real-world
applications, including those running on mobile devices.
We stress that our contributions and treatments follow the rules of modern cryp-
tography, i.e., we precisely specify execution and attack models, and offer elaborate
security reductions to well-accepted hardness assumptions like RSA or the Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Problem to support the security of our protocols.
All presented models and protocols have been published in the proceedings of
peer-reviewed international conferences (cf. Appendix B), with the exception of the
protocol from Section 7.6, which was specifically designed for this thesis.
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8.1. Directions for future research
The research field of affiliation-hiding authentication (AHA) is quite young. Al-
though this thesis closes some open problems in this setting, a variety of topics is
left for future research.
Multi-party mAHA
As we report in Section 1.3, some AHA constructions proposed in the literature
generalize the standard two-party setting of authentication to a multi-party
setting [93,94,155,162]. Such a scenario is certainly interesting in practice, for
instance in the context of online social networks.
However, the listed protocols lack support for users that are affiliated to multi-
ple groups at the same time (mAHA). Corresponding sessions would privately
detect the set of groups that all participants have in common. We propose to
investigate whether the techniques we develop in Chapters 4 and 5 can be com-
bined with the approaches from [93, 94, 155, 162] to obtain a first multi-party
multi-affiliation AHA protocol.
mAHA in standard model
All schemes described in this thesis have security reductions that assume ran-
dom oracles. Hence, an alternative standard model construction for mAHA
(and likewise for a contact discovery scheme CDS) would be appealing. We
observe that simply ‘adjusting’ our protocols towards standard model is not
straight-forward. In particular, it is unclear how our main building blocks —
Okamoto’s RSA-based key agreement and the NIKDS construction by Sakai,
Ohgishi, and Kasahara — could be replaced by equivalent standard model
tools.
Fairness in AHA/mAHA
Another interesting research direction is to consider fairness [4, 27] in AHA.
Observe that, in all protocols discussed in Section 1.2, one of the authenticat-
ing parties will learn about matching groups before the other does. Moreover,
this party can modify its last messages to trick its peer to assume that au-
thentication failed.
The property of fairness ensures a balanced gain of knowledge of protocol
participants even against insider adversaries. In other settings, fairness is often
achieved via trusted third parties (that mostly stay oﬄine) [4], or through
protocols with a large number of rounds [27].
Privacy-aware revocation
In linkable AHA protocols [9, 47, 94, 95, 97], revocation of users is usually han-
dled via revocation lists that are maintained and published by the GAs. A
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consequence is that users loose their privacy upon revocation: once their pseu-
donym appears on the revocation list of their respective group, all their past
AHA sessions can immediately be linked to this group.
Ways to handle this issue could be the introduction of a global revocation list
(i.e., revocation would be ‘outsourced’ from the GAs to a single third party),
or the limitation of all credentials’ validity to a short time frame. In this case,
users would have to regularly contact their GAs to obtain new credentials, and
revocation would be achieved by simply not renewing credentials of revoked
users.
However, we wonder whether more practical ways to handle revocation in
linkable AHA protocols do exists, that also preserve privacy of revoked users.
Private path discovery
In Chapter 7 we treat the topic of private discovery of common social contacts
and give constructions that allow two users to detect the list of their common
friends in a privacy-preserving way. Now, given two users, Alice and David, can
they efficiently discover in a privacy-aware two-party protocol whether there
exists a ‘chain of friendship’ between them? For example, can they efficiently
discover whether there are also Bob and Charlie such that Alice is friend of
Bob, Bob is friend of Charlie, and Charlie is friend of David?
Future research could answer the question whether the private discovery of
such i-th grade contacts is possible without relying on trusted third parties.
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A
On the security of RSA-based AHA
We show how the security reduction given by Gennaro, Krawczyk, and Rabin
in [81, 82] for Okamoto’s key establishment protocol (cf. Section 2.5.1) translates
to the setting where element g ∈ Zn is not a generator of QR(n) but such that
Z×n = 〈−1〉n × 〈g〉n. In the following, we refer to the individual paragraphs of [82,
Section 3.2]. We list only the changes that need to be applied to the proof.
Identities and keys. [ . . . ] For Bob, SIM sets H(idB) = B = R, where R is the input
to SIM (note that R is random in Z×N ).
Choosing a QRN generator. SIM [ . . . ] chooses random r¯ ←R Z×N , sets r = r¯e, and
g = (rB)e. Note that [ . . . ] g and B are random in Z×N and independent. Note
moreover, that Z×N = 〈−1〉N × 〈g〉N with probability 1/2.
Session Interactions (non-test sessions). [ . . . ] Whenever Bob is activated in a ses-
sion, SIM will set the value β = (−1)kgb/r¯, where k ←R {0, 1}, as the outgoing
message from Bob [ . . . ]
Response to party corruption and session key queries (non-test sessions). In the
third paragraph: Note that β = (−1)kgb/r¯ for a known value k ∈ {0, 1}.
Replace β by (−1)kβ, and keep all remaining computations.
Simulating the test session. [ . . . ] SIM sets this message to the value
α = (−1)k′(rB)fSA, where k′ ←R {0, 1} and r,B are as described at the
beginning of the simulation. [ . . . ] In the second paragraph: Note that α =
(−1)k′(rB)fSA for a known value k′ ∈ {0, 1}. Replace α by (−1)k′α, and keep
all remaining computations.
Computing the forgery Rd. [ . . . ] since SIM chose B = R then (R2f )d = β2f/K¯.
Using Lemma 1 and the fact that 2f is relatively prime to e we derive Rd from
(R2f )d.
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